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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the ethical issues and controversies that surround the use of 
plea bargaining in international criminal tribunals. Existing approaches to this subject 
have a tendency to be overly abstract, resulting in often ideologically deterministic 
justifications or critiques of plea bargaining in an international context. These 
approaches also fail to take into account any human dimension that may be involved 
in these negotiations. This thesis goes some way towards remedying this by making 
use of extensive in-depth interviews with international trial professionals. The thesis 
incorporates these interviews into an analysis of plea bargaining through three 
theoretical models: classic utilitarianism, classical liberal rule of law and legal 
imperialism.   
Each of these three models highlights significant issues in relation to the use of 
plea bargaining in an international context. Whilst they offer both justifications and 
critiques, revealing a number of gaps and blind spots, elements of each offers 
something that can assist an understanding of the use of plea bargaining in such a 
controversial arena as international war crime tribunals. The thesis argues that, when 
considered together, a holistic approach begins to develop which offers a more 
nuanced approach to plea bargaining than is currently available. This analysis is 
assisted and illustrated by interviews with named participants in war crime tribunals. 
These assist in developing a more unique perspective on plea bargaining by 
contextualising its theoretical findings by placing them into the tangible and realistic 
contexts of legal practitioners. 
The thesis opens with an introduction which sets out its aims and objectives.  
After which there is a separate chapter that discusses the methodologies used in this 
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thesis. This is then followed by two chapters that outline the role of the international 
tribunals and introduce the concept and to explain the trajectory of plea bargaining 
and its use in the global arena. The thesis then moves on to its more substantial 
chapters which evaluate the this particular legal phenomenon; the third explores the 
justifications for plea bargaining through the theory of utilitarianism, examining its 
relevance in light of the interview responses, whilst the fourth is concerned with the 
objections to plea bargaining that are contained within the concept of the classical rule 
of law. Here, once more, the interviews undertaken with legal practitioners are used to 
challenge the theoretical assumptions put forward by such liberal thinking. Building 
even further on these responses, the fifth chapter argues for a consideration of plea 
bargaining as a form of legal imperialism. The thesis concludes with a critical 
reflection that draws on its analysis of the three models to offer some 
recommendations concerning the future use of plea bargaining within the context of 
international war crime tribunals.   
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Introduction 
 
In 1993, 48 years after the Nuremberg and 47 after the Tokyo tribunals were set the 
task of bringing to justice those responsible for war crimes during the Second World 
War, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) set up an ad hoc international 
tribunal, The International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), to 
prosecute those responsible for atrocities committed during the conflicts that flared up 
around the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The following year saw the 
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) which was 
given the task of bringing to justice those who had been responsible for the atrocities 
committed during the recent civil wars in that country. 
The establishment of these tribunals are significant as in the years between 
them there have been many human rights violations, many of which were due to war, 
where those responsible for mass violence were not subjected to international criminal 
justice. Therefore, the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR can be seen as both a 
turning point for international criminal justice and a re-commitment on behalf of the 
international community to bring people to book for crimes against humanity.  
Following on from these two tribunals there have been a number of other tribunals 
that have been established in order to try human rights abuses. Examples of 
international courts include The Special Courts for Sierra Leone (SCSL) established 
in 2002, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) established 
in 2003, and The International Criminal Court (ICC) founded in 2002. More recently, 
there is The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) established in 2009. The STL 
tribunal was set up in order to bring to justice those responsible for the assassination 
of the Lebanese President Rafic Hariri. Although this is not a war crime it is an 
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international criminal court with similar rules and procedures as the war crime courts 
mentioned.  
International criminal tribunals have become an important aspect of 
transnational justice. They operate to apportion blame and then punish those who have 
been responsible for some of the most serious crimes committed. According to the 
International Centre for Transitional Justice international criminal tribunals are 
important because, ‘investigations and trials of powerful leaders (whether political or 
military) help strengthen the rule of law and send a strong signal that such crimes will 
not be tolerated in a rights-respecting society.’ Also they state, ‘trials remain a key 
demand of victims. When conducted in ways that reflect victims’ needs and 
expectations, they can play a vital role in restoring their dignity and delivering justice’ 
(Criminal Justice, ictj.org). In conjunction with this line of thinking, when Antonio 
Cassese, the first President of the ICTY, presented the first annual report of the 
Tribunal to the UN in 1994 he argued that it was founded upon the Hegelian principle: 
‘fiat justitia ne pereat mundus’ (let justice be done though the world should perish) 
(1994: 12). International justice has come a long way from this statement and at times 
may feel far removed from the rationales put forward by the ICTJ above. This is 
particularly true when the tribunals dispose of cases via the means of plea bargains or 
negotiations. The international perspectives of international tribunals clearly show a 
desire to apply justice evenly across conflicts wherever they take place in the world. 
However, in this thesis I am concerned with the practical impact of the broad 
acceptance of the principles of plea bargaining within such contexts. To this end, I 
have undertaken a series of interviews with legal practitioners in order to further a 
discussion of the use of plea bargaining in the context of these international war crime 
tribunals.  
11 
 
For many years plea bargaining has been a regular fixture in the common law 
criminal justice systems of the United States of America and, more recently, the 
United Kingdom. This is due partly to its ability to render convictions in an efficient 
and economical way and because the use of plea bargaining has spread across the 
globe. One of the results of such proliferation has been a growing legal influence of 
the USA, one that has reflected a desire to construct, instigate and influence legal 
models based on its own model. One might argue that this initial taking up of plea 
bargaining has, at times, been a response to the local occurrence of problems that arise 
in the USA, such as the overcrowding of the court system which in turn led to the 
introduction of various judicial mechanisms, including plea bargaining, to better cope 
with such problems (Spence 2006: 217-251). However, significantly the use of plea 
bargaining has also spread to the level of international law with the first judgement to 
be handed down at the ICTY; a negotiated guilty plea in the case of Erdemovic. 
Following this it is now fairly common practice for defendants who are accused of 
grave international crimes to enter into negotiations with the prosecutors adopting a 
USA style model of plea bargaining. It is the proliferation of this style of negotiation 
that this thesis investigates, taking an interdisciplinary approach to its analysis of the 
law and the process of plea bargaining in the context of the application of 
international criminal law.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
Whilst this thesis works on the premise that the practice of plea bargaining in 
international war crime tribunals is largely seen as unavoidable it sets out to 
investigate the ideas that underpin its application. However, before doing so it has a 
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brief section on methodology, setting out how the research was conducted and why 
particular critical methods were used. This thesis comprises of a number of 
substantive chapters. Chapters one and two are aimed at setting out the foundations  
for this work with a historical background to subject area and discussion of plea 
bargaining in general, helping inform this thesis. Chapter one also lays down 
background information regarding international criminal tribunals, and a brief history 
of plea bargaining cases in international law. Chapter two focuses on plea bargaining. 
It gives an explanation of what plea bargaining is and the different forms in which it 
may take, using primarily UK domestic law to illustrate the differences. The chapter 
then moves on to a discussion of the history of guilty pleas and plea bargaining in 
international law. This chapter also analyses a number of cases in order to highlight 
the progression of guilty plea throughout the different tribunals. 
Following on from the exploration of the idea of plea bargaining, the 
substantive part of the thesis is set out in three main chapters. Chapters three and four 
offer an analysis of the two competing analytical models, utilitarianism and the liberal 
theory of the rule of law, which are most often evoked in discussions of this area and 
offered as explanations of and justifications for intuitional practices in this area. It will 
also explore objections raised that are based on the liberal ideology that the 
international criminal law holds as standard, especially with regard to fair trial 
principles. Chapter five offers a consideration of plea bargaining that draws on the 
notion of imperialism and in doing so highlights the limitations of the other two 
analytical models particularly when viewed from this particular prospective.   
I would argue that the three different approaches are necessary for a 
comprehensive analysis of this subject area as no one single theory is able to give a 
full perspective on the practice of plea bargaining in international criminal courts. 
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Using these three theoretical approaches also opens up debates and issues surrounding 
plea bargaining by placing it into a practical context that can then be analysed through 
the information gathered via my interviews. This will give a more rounded and 
nuanced picture of international criminal law and the practices of plea bargaining 
within it. By way of support for these arguments the thesis draws extensively on 
primary materials such as interviews with professionals working, or who have 
worked, in the field of international criminal justice. These interviews took place over 
2009-2011 and offer important insights not only to the actual working nature of plea 
bargaining in the international context but also their professional perspectives on it. 
This allows for a critical analysis of the ideological implications of empirical findings 
in relation to the theoretical work in this study. The overall aim of the thesis is to 
explore how far the concept of plea bargaining, rather than offering an abstract 
concept of justice, is in fact highly influenced by specific political and economic 
formulations and considerations. 
To further develop these arguments, chapter three explores the justifications 
for plea bargaining using the principle of classic utilitarianism. It offers a brief 
overview of the main claims of this approach using the concepts and arguments put 
forward by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. This then enables a detailed 
analysis of the justifications for plea bargaining through the interpretive framework of 
utilitarianism. Having discussed utilitarian justifications of plea bargaining in general, 
it then examines specifically at the case of Plavsic (IT-00-39 & 40/1) as a case study. 
Chapter three discusses the justifications given in this particular case in order to 
consider if they might still apply to cases yet to be heard before International war 
crime tribunals. 
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Chapter four investigates some of the criticisms of the use of plea bargaining 
through the lens of a classic form, the liberal theory of the rule of law. Firstly, there is 
an examination of the ideology of the liberal rule of law, focusing on those aspects 
that relate to plea bargaining. This is done through a close analysis of the principles of 
classical liberalism and uses the work of Dicey and Hayek. After which there is a 
discussion of how the application of the liberal claims in relation to plea bargaining 
and how its use, in particular in war crime tribunals, offends the liberal principles of 
the rule of law.  Some of the justifications and the objections have been discussed by 
other academics (Combs 2006; Henham 2005; Henham and Findlay 2005; Drumbl 
2007; Turner 2009; Schoun 2010). However, they have to some degree been glossed 
over in that there has been to date no sustained critical analysis of plea bargaining 
under these two expressly discussed theoretical frameworks. In other words, whilst 
broadly liberal and utilitarian points have made, the underlying cluster of beliefs and 
assumptions has rarely been developed in an express manner. Both these approaches 
are important as they provide an analytical context to the role of plea bargaining in the 
international criminal legal system, which in turns allows for deeper, more meaningful 
investigation into the case law, written law and the perceptions of it. 
Chapter five interrogates the idea of legal imperialism in the context of plea 
bargaining in international law. Again, it is generally accepted that the use of plea 
bargaining has the potential to be imperialistic if and when imposed on sections of the 
global population who do not understand, wish or desire it as it forms no part of their 
indigenous legal tradition. There has been even less discussed about plea bargaining 
and legal and cultural imperialism. Responses from interviews I conducted and certain 
authors such as Combs (2010) and Linton and Rieger (2002) highlight the difficulties 
that some post conflict societies have when entering into negotiations. Unfortunately 
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Combs’s work does not put this in a theoretical framework that advances the debate 
about imperialism in anyway. This section therefore aims to add to the understanding 
of the use of plea bargaining in international tribunals by using a socio-legal approach 
towards the notion of the legal transplantation of plea bargaining from the domestic 
legal system of common law regimes to the international system. This section will 
also examine what place plea bargaining has in the international sphere, especially 
where there people/populations that are potentially ‘left out’ of the international 
criminal system due to the lack of cultural and legal understanding of the laws and 
informal practices that surround plea bargaining. In conclusion, the thesis will offer a 
critical analysis of the ideological implications of my empirical findings drawing on a 
number of interdisciplinary approaches, including jurisprudence, political theory and 
criminology. From this, the thesis will present a framework of plea bargaining that 
takes all the limitations and positive attributes discussed to offer a more realistic and 
formulated model of plea bargaining in the international criminal arena.  
Whilst many studies have analysed the role of plea-bargaining in the legal 
process few have considered how these applications are actually ‘worked through’ by 
legal practitioners working within the contexts of the international war crime 
tribunals. For this reason, one of the main supporting strands of my overall thesis has 
been drawn from extensive communication with a number of legal professionals who 
have acquired actual experience of negotiating plea bargains at international war 
crime tribunals. Therefore, my analysis of plea bargaining in international criminal 
tribunals not only offers in-depth critical analysis of the process drawn from the legal 
records but also benefits from the information, views and perspectives obtained 
through interviews conducted face to face, via telephone and through email 
correspondence with trial professionals. These have included: Professor David Crane 
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who is the Former Chief Prosecutor of the SCSL. In the text this shall be referred to as 
(Interview with Crane 2009). Sir Desmond De Silva QC who is the Former Deputy 
Prosecutor for the SCSL and Chief Prosecutor for the SCSL. In the text this shall be 
referred to as (Interview with De Silva 2010). Wayne Jordash who has worked as 
defence counsel at the ICTR, ICTY, SCSL and as a legal consultant at the ECCC. 
Throughout this shall be referred to as (Interview with Jordash 2010).
1
 Karim Khan 
QC who has worked in the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY and ICTR and as 
defence counsel at the ICTY, SCSL, ICC, and lead counsel for a civil party at the 
ECCC. This shall be referred to as (Interview with Khan 2010).
2
 Wayde Pittman who 
is a Senior Legal Officer at the ICTY. This shall be referred to as (Interview with 
Pittman 2010). Jonas Nilsson who is a Legal Officer at the ICTY. In the text this shall 
be referred to as (Interview with Nilsson 2010). Dr Eugene O’Sullivan who is defence 
counsel at the ICTY and the STL, referred to as (Interview with O’Sullivan 2010).3 
HHJ Peter Murphy who has worked as defence counsel at the ICTY. In the text this 
shall be referred to as (Interview with Murphy 2010).
4
 Chief Charles Taku who is 
defence counsel at the SCSL and ICTR. In the text this has be referred to as 
(Interview with Taku 2010).
5
 Sir Geoffrey Nice QC who was a Deputy Prosecutor at 
the ICTY. In the text this shall be referred to as (Interview with Nice 2010).
6
 and 
Slobodan Zecevic who is defence counsel at the ICTY and is the Former President of 
the Association of Defence Counsel at the ICTY. Finally, this shall be referred to as 
(Interview with Zecevic 2011).
7
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Methodology 
 This chapter explains the methodologies I employed and how and why I used them to 
carry out this research. I start by discussing the role these methodologies play in 
distinguishing between the explanation of the development of plea bargaining in war 
crimes trials and the evaluation of the phenomenon and outline the extent that the 
research methods do this. I then move on to discuss the interviews I conducted, before 
going on to explain how the interviews developed the thesis. 
In order to realise and achieve the research goals of this thesis I have 
employed a number of different approaches borrowed from other academic fields, 
making it both interdisciplinary as well as transdisciplinary. These include empirical 
analysis, case law analysis, legal theory, and an analysis of the written law in regard 
to the use of plea bargaining in international criminal law. Therefore, the research 
goals of this thesis are achieved by broadly employing what can be termed a socio-
legal approach rather than a purely doctrinal approach.
8
 The overarching aim of this 
thesis is to place the use and role of plea bargaining in the context of international 
criminal law, asking what its use can actually achieve and what the real and ethical 
limitations of its application may be? This in turn facilitates a greater understanding of 
this legal phenomenon.  
When reflecting back on the methodologies used to do this, it would seem that 
the thesis is predominantly concerned with evaluating the plea bargaining 
phenomenon.
9
 However, it should be noted that in order to do this satisfactorily there 
needs to be some degree of explanation of plea bargaining itself. By explanation I 
mean what actually constitutes plea bargaining and the development of its role and 
use in the international tribunals. Therefore this research devotes space to do this as 
well as its core evaluation of plea bargaining. This is carried out in order to lay a firm 
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foundation that allows for the sustained analysis and evaluation of plea bargaining 
that is contained within.  
The methodologies I employ both aid the explanation and evaluation of plea 
bargaining. The aspects of the thesis that aid the explanation of what plea bargaining 
is and how it operates, offers just that, rather than an explanation of the causality of 
plea bargaining. This aspect is delivered throughout the thesis, but the main element 
that aims to do this is the examination of the case law, the analysis of the rules and 
laws governing plea bargaining, and to some extent the interview responses.
10
 The 
elements of the research which evaluate the use of plea bargaining are namely the 
analysis through the theoretical frameworks. Each of the three frameworks put plea 
bargaining into a specific context within international criminal law scholarship and by 
looking at the three of them separately, but in a connected manner, it is hoped that this 
thesis will go some way towards providing an overarching perspective. This also 
provides conceptual insights that will contribute to the understanding of plea 
bargaining. The frameworks themselves can be viewed as interpretive methodologies 
which have been dictated by the theoretical approaches chosen (Henham and Findlay 
2007: 113).
11
   
Although I have distinguished between explanation and evaluation in order to 
help describe and understand what the different methodologies used have to offer the 
thesis, the reality is that there is no distinct methodology in this research that deals 
solely with the evaluation or explanation of plea bargaining as they overlap with each 
other. Rather, I acknowledge that it is important to recognise this as it is necessary to 
be able to fully analyse the issues and debates that arise from the use of plea 
bargaining and, following on from that, in order to achieve the aims of the thesis.
12
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When thinking about plea bargaining in international criminal law I began by 
considering how and why plea bargaining may take place in this particular legal 
system. In order to do this I gathered information about the use of plea bargaining in a 
number of domestic jurisdictions and approached them as a backdrop to the issue of 
plea bargaining in international law. This was initially carried out by conducting a 
conventional literature review focussing on plea bargaining in these domestic contexts 
before moving on to widen my research by reading work that engaged with plea 
bargaining in international criminal law. I then moved on to examining the case law 
that related to the subject area. All the while I kept in mind the actual rules and laws 
governing plea negotiations.  
In order to establish the justifications for the use plea bargaining in 
international criminal law one must start looking at how it has been established in 
case law and the literature. Having done this one should also bear in mind what the 
objections to this practice are in order to get a sense of what drives the discussions 
and debates within the field. This also helped with the explanation of the issues that 
surround plea bargaining, as without the theoretical frameworks there would be no 
base to ground the particular issues in. This in turn, leads one to evaluate the 
justifications and objections in order to move the thesis from being one that is purely 
explanatory to one which assesses and engages with these issues. From this research I 
found that many of the justifications for the use of plea bargaining broadly fell into 
the framework of classical utilitarianism as put forward by Bentham (2004) and Mill 
(2004). The objections to, and criticisms of plea bargaining, for the most part, fell into 
the classical liberal theory of the rule of law as highlighted by Dicey (1982) and 
Hayek (1944; 1960). It is appropriate to use these theories to evaluate the 
justifications and objections of plea bargaining as both are diametrically opposed to 
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each other, in that utilitarianism is concerned with the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number of people and the rule of law is interested in individual rights. 
 I used the classical models of these two theories over more contemporary 
versions for a number of reasons. The most obvious reason is that the articulation of 
the main issues that arise from plea bargaining most often draws broadly on the 
classical versions of these theories. Alongside this, without explicitly discussing either 
of the two theories, the trial professionals I spoke to, in my opinion, clearly articulate 
their responses to the issues raised by relating plea bargaining within these 
frameworks. In light of this, taken together, these theories offer an apt way to examine 
plea bargaining. Whilst there has been a considerable amount of work undertaken on 
plea bargaining in general, there has not been a sustained study of it in an 
international context that places this practice into any kind of theoretical framework. 
For this reason, it is worth reviving these theories which, at first sight may be 
considered as ‘old hat’ or ‘out of date’.  I argue that they are highly appropriate when 
it comes to both explaining and evaluating the use of plea bargaining in an 
international setting as they provide a good foundation for the rest of my analysis in 
which I build an argument around, through and beyond them. Before moving on to 
discuss the interviews it should therefore be stressed that the theoretical analysis of 
plea bargaining remained important as the issues arising from these formed the basis 
of the questions I would pose to the trial professionals. Without this original 
theoretical exploration there would be no and foundation the interviews would lack 
focus and direction.  
 
The Interviews 
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Having undertaken my initial literature review I felt that there were two clear 
directions in which my research could go. The first would be to analyse further the 
use of plea bargaining through the two main theories I adopted and critiquing each 
theory through the lens of the other. Another was, following a theoretical 
consideration of plea bargaining, to investigate the lived experiences of the trial 
professional in relation to plea bargaining in the context of these courts. I decided on 
the second option as I felt this would give substantial insights into the role of plea 
bargaining in the context of war crime tribunals and allow for a more engaged 
analysis of the theoretical models that support or oppose the use of plea bargaining. 
This in turn, would result in an analysis that would contribute significantly to the 
evaluation and understanding of plea bargaining. Interviewing practitioners who have 
been involved in plea bargaining also offered the potential to uncover certain case 
specific insights into the process and procedures by which negotiations are carried out 
that are not in the public domain, and which can only be achieved through some sort 
of engagement with the trial professionals who hold this information. Again, this gave 
me the opportunity to add something new to the explanation of plea bargaining in the 
context of the international tribunals. The practice of plea bargaining is subject to a 
considerable amount of interpretation and human agency neither of which are codified 
in the existing literature on the subject. Interviewing trial professionals about their 
lived experiences brings out some of these factors. 
Conducting the interviews also offered important insights that simply 
theoretical approaches may not offer as for the most part studies of plea bargaining in 
the international arena do not take into account the human agency that is involved in 
the process. Much of information gained from the interviews raised issues that were 
not present in the literature and case law surrounding plea bargaining. As they are not 
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only used to merely corroborate theories, the interviews add something distinct and 
new to international law scholarship as there is a lack of qualitative empirical research 
utilised within legal research.
13
 As Silveman says, ‘[T]he general purpose of such 
interviews is to explore in details specific topics relevant to the interviewee's 
knowledge and also relevant to the research questions and objectives forming the 
focus of the research project.’ (2004: np) 
Whilst Dobinson and John assert that, ‘many law academics are simply 
untrained and lacking in experience when it comes to empirical research and the 
general rules applicable to such research’ (2007: 17) this does not automatically mean 
that such an undertaking such research is not a useful venture. Indeed, as I have 
argued above, such research offers insights that can only be gained by actually talking 
to practitioners. In order to conduct this research I considered the work of writers 
associated with Cultural Studies in Britain, in particular those who theorised the 
importance of lived experience to an understanding of social institutions such as 
Raymond Williams (1981) and EP Thompson (1975). These assisted an investigation 
into the experiences of the trial professionals in the field in relation to the negotiation 
of plea bargaining.  
I now turn to the interviews themselves, considering who I interviewed and 
what approachs I adopted in order to give some background and context to the 
material that influenced and shaped much of this thesis.
14
 Initially, I decided to 
approach individuals who were directly involved in the plea bargaining process and 
those who would have been present at the inception of the tribunals and therefore had 
direct experience of the decisions that were made to allow plea bargaining into the 
tribunals’ jurisprudence. This allowed me to investigate and analyse the different 
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perceptions and views of the trial professionals in a much more nuanced and original 
way.  
The first person who I contacted was Professor David Crane. I did this as he 
was the first Chief Prosecutor of the SCSL and would therefore be able to offer very 
informed views on the use of plea bargaining at this particular trial and why he felt 
plea bargaining would be a desirable mechanism in this context. For the same reasons 
I also approached Sir Desmond de Silva QC, who was the Deputy Prosecutor and then 
the Chief Prosecutor of the SCSL and therefore able to offer similarly well informed 
insights. Both of these prosecutors were practitioners who were implementing the law 
at the very inception of this tribunal so it would be very prudent to talk to them about 
their experiences. Both agreed to speak to me and this subsequently raised a number 
of issues that caused me to further consider the process of gathering information in 
this manner. However, following my initial success at securing interviews I found that 
there were a number of trial professionals who would be closed off to me due to a 
variety of ethical reasons,
15
 time constraints, and language barriers. In response to 
this, I therefore became more strategic in ‘targeting’ who I approached and 
interviewed, with the aim of obtaining a number of different viewpoints from those 
who have been involved in some way in the plea bargaining process. With this aim in 
mind, I interviewed Mr Karim Khan QC who had worked in a number of trials in the 
capacity of defence counsel. He had also acted as counsel for the civil party
16
 in the 
Duch Trial and worked for the OTP in the ad hoc tribunals. To further achieve my 
research goals, I also undertook extensive interviews with Mr Wayde Pittman, a 
senior legal officer at the ICTY, and Mr Jonas Nilsson, a legal officer at the ICTY. 
Both of these interviewees had worked on cases that involved plea bargaining and 
offered a different viewpoint from that of either defence counsel or the OTP. As 
24 
 
mentioned with my selection of trial participants, I secured a range of people from 
different cultural and work based backgrounds
17
 in order to gain a more balanced 
view of the use and role of plea bargaining in international law. 
  Whilst the interviews I conducted add substantially to my research, it is 
important to recognise they may also be viewed as somewhat limiting in what they 
can offer. This is because if a different selection of trial professionals had been 
selected and interviewed there may well have been a different set of responses due to 
differing viewpoints and perspectives, which in turn may have given rise to different 
conclusions. One way to remedy this would be to select a larger group of 
interviewees, but this would have be inappropriate as not only was this thesis bound 
by time and financial restraints but many of the trial professionals approached were 
unavailable for interview. However, I would argue that due to my careful selection of 
a range of interviewees from different legal and cultural backgrounds the information 
gleaned from the interviews and the subsequent analysis that was conducted from 
them has been sufficient to enable me to gain in depth and new insight into the issues 
involved in plea bargaining in the context of international criminal law.
18
 This was 
also achieved through the careful consideration of the questions that I asked the 
subjects of the interviews. 
In order to ensure I garnered as much material as possible from the interview 
subjects I initially considered the use of questionnaires and structured formal 
interviews as I felt these would best enable the collection of useful and appropriate 
interview data and this method has more potential to yield a more uniformed outcome 
across a range of interviewees. Questionnaires can also be used across a wide range of 
trial professionals as they offer more potential for an unbiased response as the 
interviewer has a less active role in the information gathering process and the 
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interviewee is less likely to take their specific experiences and personal background 
into consideration when responding. Pre-structured interviews and questionnaires 
therefore give more scope for a quantitative analysis.
19
 However, my initial 
experiences conducting the empirical research suggested that this would not be an 
appropriate approach. The main reason for not conducting structured interviews and 
using questionnaires was that I received some negative responses from some of the 
trial professionals I initially sent questions to. A number of them felt that there were 
simply too many questions and that I should be concentrating on only one or two 
areas that pertain to plea bargaining.  For example, the role of plea bargaining in the 
reconciliation process or the presumption of innocence and its relationship to plea 
bargaining. It also became apparent from my initial ‘face-to-face’ interviews that the 
trial professionals on the whole wanted to discuss their experiences and the issues 
arising from plea bargaining in their own way. This meant that the interviews had to 
be much more flexible and that I had to engage much more actively with what they 
were saying rather than sticking to a strict, predetermined structure. Mason (2004) 
describes this as a flexible and fluid base which is structured around an aide memoire 
or interview guide. The aim is usually to ensure flexibility in how and in what 
sequence questions are asked, and in whether and how particular areas might be 
followed up and developed with different interviewees. This is so that the interview 
can be shaped by the interviewee's own understandings as well as the researcher's 
interests, and if any unexpected information is given to be able to incorporate that in 
to the interview questions or to change track and concentrate on these. I also had to be 
aware of the length and depth of the responses that were given as some would give 
long and detailed responses whereas others would give simple, straightforward 
answers. It was therefore necessary to treat the interviews in a formal but semi-
structured way and be aware of the length of time the trial professionals were able to 
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spend on the interviews and how much detail they were willing to go into regarding 
their experiences.
20
 This was also necessary as the interviews took place in a variety 
of different contexts, some formal others more relaxed and some via the telephone. 
The interviews varied in length depending on the amount of time people were able to 
offer, ranging from 30 minutes to 2.5 hours. When it came to email interviews, I once 
again had to take into account the issue of ‘overloading’ people with a long list of 
questions. In light of this, I thought it best to begin with open questions such as and 
what their experiences were with plea bargaining, what was their own personal 
opinion of plea bargaining in international criminal tribunals?
21
 After receiving the 
responses I asked more specific questions and developed an on-going dialogue with 
them. In all the interviews I made sure that I had asked what their views and 
experiences were with plea bargaining in general as an opening question. This 
allowed me to gauge how the interview would progress and adapt my approach 
accordingly.  
I also made sure that the interviewees expressed their opinions regarding plea 
bargaining and the theories of utilitarianism and the rule of law as I was aware this 
would be important given the structure the thesis (Lindlof and Taylor 2002).
22
 For 
example, I asked whether they believed that plea bargaining can help with the 
reconciliation process within a post conflict society, or whether there is a significant 
contribution to the historical record by its use. I also asked questions such as whether 
the trial professionals thought that the use of plea bargaining breached the equal 
treatment clause in the rule of law. As the interviews were not structured I worked 
these questions in where appropriate. Often I did not have to ask these questions 
explicitly as the issues that plea bargaining raises where bought up by the trial 
professionals themselves when they spoke about their own views and experiences. It 
27 
 
also became apparent that many of the trial professionals spoke about the issues 
arising from these theories without actually having to explicitly discuss them in terms 
of utilitarianism or the rule of law. When preparing for the interviews I looked at the 
cases and the tribunals the interviewees worked on and in what capacity they were 
employed, for example were they defence counsel or prosecuting counsel. This 
enabled me to engage with the specific aspects of plea bargaining that arose through 
looking at the case law.  By utilising this approach I was able to ascertain detailed 
information from the views and experiences of the trial professionals that could be 
related to the thesis’ theoretical analysis. When undertaking an evaluation and critical 
analysis of the interview responses I only used material when it was consistent and 
well-illustrated either by case law, legal rules, theory or literature. I also made sure 
that there was no material that contradicted the interview responses used and so they 
are as corroborated as they could be. This ensured that they were not merely the 
personal opinion of the trial professionals but arguments that would be used in the 
context of the thesis’ overall approach, adding to an understanding of plea bargaining 
in the context of international tribunals. When looking to identify themes that might 
be pertinent to plea bargaining, I only considered them if they were raised by at least 
two or more of the interviewees, this ensured that the subsequent evaluation of the 
issues are appropriate and not just asserting a mere opinion as a theme.
23
  However, it 
should also be noted that often the interview responses offered material that the 
literature and case law by themselves did not, therefore the inclusion of the interview 
material and the subsequent analysis offers something new and distinct to the 
scholarship of this subject. 
The interviews and their subsequent analysis developed the thesis in a number 
of ways: they were used in order to get the perspective of the trial professionals 
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working at the international tribunals; they helped inform some of the arguments put 
forward by the theory; they highlighted areas of plea bargaining that are inconsistent 
with the theories as well; and most importantly they brought to light issues 
surrounding the area of legal imperialism. The latter helped develop the thesis in a 
wholly unexpected way than was originally intended but which contributed greatly to 
its original thinking.  
The idea of legal imperialism, as a theory by which to examine plea 
bargaining, was something that offered the thesis a number of things. Centrally it 
provided a framework for understanding some of the responses from the interviewees 
that did not fit fully either into the utilitarian justification or the rule of law objections 
of plea bargaining. Indeed, as already mentioned, the issues raised in some of the 
interviews where so unexpected that to do them real justice they required an analysis 
that went further than the mere explanation of them and how they may arise. This 
decision was not taken lightly and it came after much consideration regarding whether 
to continue on my original path,
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 possibly tackling the issues of imperialism outside 
the thesis, or to confront what trial practitioners were telling me and finding a 
theoretical approach that would enable me to fully explore them within the scope of 
my research. The issues that caused me to consider this issue were raised at the outset 
of the interview phase of my research. Professor David Crane spoke about an 
attempted plea bargain at the SCSL where the defendant had consulted with a witch 
doctor. Although the interviews that followed did not deliver such unusual 
information there was a growing amount of material that pointed towards the idea that 
understanding what is actually expected of the actors in a plea bargain is not at all 
clear to people who come from non-adversarial cultures and that they are therefore 
essentially at a potential disadvantage. One that does not come just from a lack of 
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understanding of the basic legal principal of plea bargaining but also the different 
manner in which plea bargaining can take place and the ideologies which underpin the 
adversarial legal culture that allows for it to take place. As other trial participants, in 
particular those from adversarial legal backgrounds, are able to navigate the unwritten 
and discretionary codes that are required when entering into a plea bargain much 
easier, I discovered that on occasion defence counsel had to employ lawyers from 
adversarial backgrounds in order to successfully negotiate a plea deal. However, in 
the context of plea bargaining, the idea of legal imperialism is not limited to defence 
counsel, it also extends to defendants, the prosecutorial teams, legal officers and 
judges when it comes to plea bargaining.  
Although the chapter on legal imperialism relies heavily on the responses of 
the interviewees, it does not take these responses for granted. As mentioned above, all 
interview responses are corroborated and do not stand alone as just mere statements. 
Therefore, under the umbrella heading of legal imperialism, this chapter not only 
examines the use of plea bargaining under the traditional notions of imperialism but it 
also examines the trajectory plea bargaining has taken from its inception at the ICTY 
to its current place in international law by looking at how this has happened through 
an examination of legal transplant and plea bargaining. This chapter then looks at 
what the upshot of plea bargaining is under the notion of legal imperialism by 
examining it through approaches drawn from subaltern studies.  
It is through combining more traditional theoretical approaches such as 
utilitarianism and the rule of law with more recently developed ones such as legal 
imperialism that this thesis offers an interdisciplinary approach that ensures that it 
offers something original to the study of plea bargaining in the international tribunals. 
The addition of the perspectives of those working in the contexts of these tribunals 
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means that this study is able to consider its theoretical findings alongside the lived 
experiences of trial professionals who are making ‘real’ decisions through their work 
creating case law. Having discussed the mythologies used to conduct this research I 
shall now move on to discuss the foundations that this area of research is built upon 
on. 
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1. An Introduction to Plea Bargaining in the International Tribunals 
 
This Chapter will lay down the foundations upon which this thesis is based on. It aims 
to introduce the subject of plea bargaining in the international arena, from which the 
ideas in this thesis are built upon. The chapter goes on to give a case analysis detailing 
the history of plea bargaining in international law. The ICTY was established on 25th 
May 1993 under Resolution 827 of the UN Security Council and is located in the city 
of The Hague, capital of the Netherlands. The court’s focus has been the civil war in 
the former Yugoslavia, during which at least 200,000 people were killed. It possesses 
jurisdiction to try crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes that occurred in 
the region since 1991. Dusko Tadic (Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997) was the first 
defendant brought to trial in 1997 at the ICTY, and he was sentenced to 20 years 
imprisonment after being found guilty of crimes against humanity. 
               The ICTR was the second ad hoc Tribunal and was set up in Arusha, 
Tanzania in November 1994 under Security Council Resolution 955. The function of 
this Tribunal is to try crimes of genocide and other serious violations against 
international humanitarian law that had been committed in Rwanda between 1st 
January 1994 and 31st December 1994. The first conviction handed down by this 
Tribunal was in 1998 and concerned the case of Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T) 
where the first ever conviction for genocide was passed. 
                Significantly, and from their inception, both these tribunals were plagued 
with many obstacles, which included issues surrounding staffing and finances. 
However, over the years the two ad hoc tribunals have emerged from these difficulties 
and become functioning institutions for international justice. These pressures have 
resulted in the adoption of practices, such as plea bargaining, designed to assist 
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resolving these issues. Following on from these two examples, a number of other war 
crime tribunals have been created in order to attempt to bring to justice those 
responsible for what have been deemed international war crimes, and to end the 
impunity that was often seen to follow mass violence. These tribunals cover a wide 
geographic field, and include the special panels in the Dili District Court of Timor-
Leste (2000), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (2003), the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002), and the permanent International Criminal 
Court (2002).  There have also been a number of domestic trials for international 
crimes such as the Gacaca courts in Rwanda. In addition, the former Yugoslavian 
countries also have domestic war crime tribunals, as do Ethiopia, Chile and Argentina. 
More recently, a tribunal has been set up in Bangladesh to prosecute the crimes 
committed in the 1971 War of Liberation. All are built upon the desire to bring war 
criminals to justice. Before moving on to discuss plea bargaining in international law 
it would be prudent to discuss the role and function of international criminal tribunals 
themselves in order to have some grounding to understand where plea bargaining may 
fit into this. This will also give an indication of how far these are met when plea 
negotiations are entered into. 
In the debate surrounding the international justice system, just as there is in 
domestic  systems, there are a number of legal, moral and sociological reasons put 
forward for the justification and desirability for transitional and/or post conflict justice 
in the form of international criminal law tribunals. Ultimately the role of the 
international tribunals is to protect the international community from criminal 
behaviour this is done in a number of different ways. 
The clearest justifications for criminal trials are that wrongdoers are punished, 
an idea that is based on the idea of retribution. The same justifications that underpin 
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the role of retribution and accountability in domestic criminal jurisdictions underpin it 
in the international sphere. That is to say that its purpose, finding accountability, is to 
bring about the end of the criminal activity individuals have perpetrated on their 
victims and are subsequently punished for it. It is hoped that in international law 
punishing perpetrators will help in ending impunity and this, in turn, will help bring 
about some form of stabilizing effect to the post conflict region. Retribution itself is 
not a future looking theory for punishment as it is concerned with the past and aims to 
punish those who have committed crimes, through which the wrong doing and the 
wrong doers shall be denounced through public reprobation and stigmatisation 
(Henham 2005: 89). Retribution through criminal proceeding is said to replace the 
desire for personal vengeance on the victims’ part, as retribution is ‘an inheritance of 
the primitive theory of revenge’. (Prosecutor V Delalic et al. IT-96-21-T Judgement 
16 November 1998: Para 1231) Through this logic the greater the number of 
perpetrators who are subjected to the criminal process the less chance there is for 
revenge attacks  and the instigation of further violence, hence the potential to have a 
stabilising effect. The use of plea bargaining works towards this function, as to date 
when a defendant has pleaded guilty they still received a custodial sentence. It is most 
likely the case that the sentence the defendant received is less than the one they would 
have received had they been found guilty after a full trial, but never the less there 
would still be some punishment and therefore achieves the tribunals’ role of 
retribution. Also it should be mentioned that linked to retribution is the notion that 
criminal prosecutions remove the leaders who have been responsible for atrocities and 
mass violence. 
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Returning briefly to the concept of retribution, in the Delalic Judgement the 
Trial Chamber stated that the retributive functions of international justice conflict with 
the reconciliatory ambitions of it: 
A consideration of retribution as the only factor in sentencing is likely to 
counter-productive and disruptive of the entire purpose of the Security 
Council, which is the restoration and maintenance of peace in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia. Retributive punishment by itself does not bring justice. 
(Para 1231) 
 
Therefore for the retributive function of international law to work it must work 
alongside the other functions and purposes of international justice. 
Another aspect of international criminal justice that has a high value in the 
debate is that criminal trials will help with the reconciliation process in post conflict 
societies (Combs 2008).  It is thought when evidence and witness testimony is 
analysed in open court post conflict societies will be able to understand what 
happened and why. From this they will be able to start to rebuild the community 
around them (Clark 2008).  
The word reconciliation itself invokes a number of different meanings. These 
range from, the violence has stopped but people still may not live ‘harmoniously’ to 
past inequalities that gave rise to the conflict have been ‘reconciled’. Of course there 
are many more incarnations of what reconciliation may mean. Mendez points out: 
There is great difficulty in defining “reconciliation” for these purposes, 
especially because the word has been recklessly used many times to attempt 
the justification of blatant impunity. Just as peace cannot be the mere absence 
of fighting, reconciliation cannot be decreed. It generally takes place through a 
long-term process aided by public policies and actions that confront the 
conflict between persons, institutions, or communities head-on and take an 
honest look at the conditions under which reconciliation can take place. 
(Mendez 2001:28) 
This suggests that international criminal law is only one part of a complex and lengthy 
process that, regarding reconciliation, may not have any real guarantee of success for 
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a number of generations. Linked with reconciliation is the notion of truth telling and 
historical record. It is commonly held that reconciliation can only be really achieved if 
there is a truth telling function to the criminal proceedings. This is often found in non-
judicial mechanisms such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as seen in 
South Africa and Sierra Leone. 
 The issue of criminal trials forming a historical record is a controversial one 
and has been strongly debated by the trial chamber in Blagojević (IT-02-60) and the 
literature surrounding international law (Stuart and Simmons 2009: 28). The ICTY 
believes one of its functions is to form a historical record. The Judgment in the case of 
Tadic spends considerable time discussing this when it contextualised the war in the 
Balkans and expressed the importance of forming a historical record. (IT-94-1-T 
Opinion and Judgment May 7 1997 Para 130-197) Osiel (1997) observes that truth 
telling and the formation of a historical records should have more emphasise as a 
function of international criminal law than their punitive purpose, as this forms a type 
of collective memory of the peoples of the post conflict region. As mentioned above, 
there has been some debate as to whether it is appropriate for international courts to 
focus too much of their resources on this, but in short criminal trials are unequipped to 
deliver accurate historical truths, they are only able to deliver legal truths. Within 
criminal proceedings it is widely acknowledged that certain forms of evidence are 
used and other equally important and truthful pieces of evidence are not due to the 
rules of procedure and evidence that are in place (Combs 2007: 54). This has the 
potential to make any historical record formed a selective one, and one that is not able 
to reflect the many different competing ‘truths’ that emerge from mass violence and 
racial hatred. 
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 All of these justifications for international criminal justice work alongside 
each other. Within them there are a number of complex ideologies that require much 
deeper analysis than the remit of this thesis allows. It should be noted that truth telling 
and reconciliation are functions that are generally associated with criminal justice 
systems that are more in line with the notion of restorative justice than retributive 
justice. Although international tribunals do not have a concrete ideology that they are 
grounded in (either retributive justice or restorative justice) their aims suggest that 
they try to straddle both these perspectives. Often adding confusion and uncertainty as 
to what the main aims of the tribunals are (Henham 2003, 2009).  
There are also a few other aspects of international criminal trial that may not 
be considered as their main role or function but never the less are important. It is also 
thought that the international criminal tribunals may possess a deterrent effect. The 
Rome Statute of the ICC does not mention it as a factor explicitly. Instead it states in 
its preamble that criminal convictions will ‘contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes’. With this in mind it should be noted that the ICTY was set up whilst the 
conflict in the Former Yugoslavia was still going on, therefore one of this particular 
court’s roles was to deter future would be perpetrators form committing atrocities. 
(ICTY Annual Report, August 29 1994) Relating to this, Judge Macdonald in the 
Tadic said that ‘retribution and deterrence serve as a primary purpose of sentencing’ 
(Case No. IT-94-1-S, Sentencing judgement 14July 1997) The ICTR in the 
Kambanda case also followed this logic and stated: 
[i]t is clear that the penalties imposed on accused persons found guilty by the 
Tribunal must be directed, on the one hand, at retribution of the said accused, 
who must see their crimes punished, and over and above that, on other hand, at 
deterrence, namely dissuading for good those who will attempt in future to 
perpetrate such atrocities by showing them that the international community 
was not ready to tolerate the serious violations of international humanitarian 
law and human rights. (ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence para 28 
September 4 1998)
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Despite the high expectation of international criminal law, it can be viewed that 
international law rarely has a deterrent effect. One only has to see the number of wars 
that are currently being waged to see that there are perpetrators of what might be 
considered international crimes who are unafraid and undeterred by potential 
international criminal sanctions against them. Secondly, it should not be forgotten that 
the massacre at Srebrenica occurred two years after the ICTY had been set up. Martha 
Minow writes, ‘Individuals who commit atrocities on the scale of genocide are 
unlikely to behave as ‘rational actors,’ deterred by the risk of punishment. Even if 
they were, it is not irrational to ignore the improbable prospect of punishment given 
the track record of international law thus far.’ (Minow 1998: 50) 
On a more positive and realistic note, it is worth considering that if 
international criminal law did indeed have a deterrent aspect to it then it would be 
very difficult to detect. That is to say international crimes would not have been 
committed and by potential perpetrators. Therefore despite the above assertions that 
there is little deterrent effect, it could be replaced with the very slightly more 
optimistic, there is little evidence to suggest that there is a deterrent effect to 
international criminal law.  
Considered from the prospective of restoration, international criminal tribunals 
are thought to offer some form of redress to victims. Investigations and trials of 
leaders who have committed crimes and caused mass political or military atrocities 
are important for victims of human rights abuses (Combs 2007: 46-47). Prosecution of 
such criminals can play a key role in restoring dignity to victims, and restoring 
trusting relationships in society, by ‘societies’ acknowledging and recognising the 
harm done to the victim (Clarke 2009). In the past, victims have not played a role in 
international criminal proceedings beyond being witnesses in a trial or being offered 
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compensation for any loss they suffered in the form of restitution. More recently, 
international tribunals have tried to integrate victims into the criminal proceeding 
through the introduction of civil party participation, often referred to as victim groups 
or civil party groups. These groups are represented by counsel who is present in court 
during the criminal proceedings. This innovation is feature in tribunals such as the 
ECCC, STL and the ICC. 
 Therefore it is thought that after a trial the acknowledgement of the wrong 
committed alongside the guilt of the perpetrator and the recognition of the victims 
suffering goes towards restoring at least some of the balance within the post conflict 
community (Rauschenbach and Scalia 2008: 415; Werner and Rudy 2010). In general 
terms it is thought that international justice mechanisms that aspire to the above 
imperatives will help bring about and maintain peace within the regions the tribunals 
work. 
Given the roles and purposes of these tribunals and all the attempts to bring 
perpetrators of war crimes to justice, it is somewhat surprising that such war crime 
tribunals have implemented legal mechanisms that truncate trials or even avoid trials 
altogether, such as the use of plea bargaining, in order to meet their mandates. Whilst 
my next chapter goes into more detail regarding the concept of plea bargaining, it is 
worth stating here that it is, in its most basic form an agreement in which the 
Prosecutor and defendant arrange to settle a case against the latter. This is normally in 
the form of the defendant pleading guilty or no contest to all or some of their charges 
in exchange for concessions by the prosecutor. These concessions may take the form 
of a reduction of charges, the dismissal of charges, known as a charge bargain or the 
limiting of the punishment imposed upon the defendant, known as a sentence bargain. 
The Prosecutor will then disclose the facts of the case that involve the defendant in a 
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more flattering light, known as a fact bargain.
26
 Generally, plea agreements allow 
those parties involved to agree on the outcomes, settle pending charges and expedite 
proceedings. Despite this, when considering the tribunals’ roles and purposes set out 
above, plea bargaining may, in some way, help achieve them. Significantly for this 
study, plea bargains appear mainly in countries that apply an adversarial legal system. 
For this reason, the use of plea bargaining in war crime tribunals has engendered some 
controversy and it is this that is one of the starting points for this thesis.  
There have been a number of significant studies of the use of plea bargaining 
in International War Crime Tribunals, such as those undertaken by human rights 
pressure groups, defence lawyers, war crime prosecutors and groups representing 
victims of specific war crimes (for example, Damaska 2005; Henham 2005, 2006; 
Dixon and Demirdjian 2005; Ellis 2005; Combs 2006). However, there has yet to be a 
sustained critical analysis that incorporates the actual experiences of the professionals 
who work in this field. More particularly, there is very little analytical work that 
considers the impact of institutional, professional and work-place ideologies on the 
formation of their perspectives on their role and subsequent decision making 
processes in relation to it. In order to rectify this, this thesis undertakes such a study, 
that is, one that addresses both the professional and ideological impact of real life 
experiences upon conceptions of justice in the actual application of plea-bargaining in 
instances of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
 
1.1 Rational for Selecting Case Studies 
 
In order to better understand the ways in which the tribunals have operated regarding 
their varied use of plea-bargaining, I have elected to use a number of case studies. In 
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different ways, each of these illustrates how plea bargaining has evolved in 
contemporary war crime tribunals. These are, at the ICTY: Prosecutor v Erdemovic 
(Case No.IT-96-22-T); Prosecutor v Jelisic Case No. IT-95-10-PT; Prosecutor v 
Todorovic (Case No. IT-95-9/1); Prosecutor V Biljana Plavsic (Case No. IT-00-40-I). 
And, at the ICTR: Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda (Case No ICTR 97-23-S). 
The first case to be dealt with by way of a guilty plea was that of Prosecutor v 
Erdemovic (Case No.IT-96-22-T) at the ICTY. What is particularly interesting about 
this case is the fact the Tribunal had never heard of the defendant. Erdemovic made a 
number of attempts to contact the tribunal via interviews he gave to journalists, and 
when he was arrested he was charged with one count of a violation of the laws or 
customs of war and one count of a crime against humanity (para. 80). He initially 
entered a guilty plea to the crimes against humanity charge. He also gave a great deal 
of vital information to the prosecution regarding other defendants, namely in the case 
of Prosector v Krstic (Case No. IT-98-33), and information on his involvement in the 
Srebrenica massacres (Prosecutor v Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis Para. 34-40). 
After initially being sentenced to a term of ten years imprisonment, the Appeals 
Chamber held that the Tribunal could not accept the defendant’s guilty plea on the 
grounds that it was not informed. After which Erdemovic then entered a guilty plea to 
the second charge resulting in a sentence of seven years imprisonment being 
negotiated by the prosecution and his defence (para. 18d).  Although the defence and 
prosecution negotiated a reduced prison term following the defendant both pleading 
guilty and showing remorse for his actions during the conflict, the defendant did not 
enter a guilty plea due to enticements made by the prosecution (para. 29) and 
therefore is not technically a plea bargain.  
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The next case to be dealt with by way of guilty plea in the ICTY was the case 
of Prosecutor v Jelisic Case No. IT-95-10-PT. This case quite clearly was not a plea 
bargain as the defendant was told by the prosecutors that they would not take into 
consideration his guilty plea and would recommend life imprisonment. However the 
defendant still chose to plead guilty believing that his guilty plea would still in fact 
grant him some concessions (Combs, 2007: 62). Although the prosecution dropped 
eight of thirty nine originally proposed charges, they did so due to the lack of 
evidence (Combs, 2007: 62). The trial chamber did considered his guilty plea at 
sentencing, but only as a principle, giving it little weight stating that Jelisic showed no 
remorse for the crimes he committed and sentenced him to forty years imprisonment 
(Prosecutor v Jelisic Case No. IT-95-10-T judgement para.127). 
Prosecutor v Todorovic (Case No. IT-95-9/1)
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 was only the third case heard 
by the ICTY that obtained a conviction by a guilty plea. However, it was also the first 
case to be dealt with by way of plea bargain. The plea deal in this case came about 
due to the fact Todorovic’s arrest was conducted in an improper manner - in fact the 
defendant was kidnapped. The defendant challenged the legality of his arrest, which 
would have caused much embarrassment to the Tribunal and those involved (Combs, 
2007: 62). In order to save them from embarrassment, the prosecution offered 
Todorovic a plea deal - in exchange for a guilty plea and the withdrawal of his 
challenge to the legality of his arrest they dropped a number of the charges brought 
against him. 
One of the most controversial plea bargains to occur in the recent Tribunals is 
that of Prosecutor V Biljana Plavsic (Case No. IT-00-40-I).
28
 This case was 
concerned with crimes committed during the breakup of Yugoslavia. Here, Mrs. 
Plavsic was originally indicted with crimes such as genocide, complicity in genocide 
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and four crimes against humanity. At first she pleaded not guilty. However, later 
when a plea bargain was agreed, she pleaded guilty to three charges of persecution, 
which is a crime against humanity, and the other charges were removed. Plavsic 
originally did not co-operate with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and had initially 
refused to give evidence against other military and political officials that were high in 
the chain of command. However, on July 6 2006 Plavsic was returned to The Hague 
to testify against her wartime political ally, Momcilo Krajisnik. She did so 
begrudgingly, stating that she was forced to do so, and was there against her will.  
Plavsic was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment. 
At Plavsic’s trial, Dr. Alex Boraine gave evidence in favour of her guilty plea, 
stating that her explanations of her actions and the remorse that she showed went a 
long way towards the reconciliation process in the Former Yugoslavia, and that this 
eventually could lead to peace. Dr Boraine said that this was because an admission 
from a higher ranking official, such as her, meant that the victims of the crimes 
committed no longer had to prove they have suffered and that their suffering had been 
recognised. Plavsic also encouraged other perpetrators to come forward and confess 
their guilt. There has been criticism of Dr Boraine’s testimony. Minna Schrag, a 
former Trial Attorney in the ICTY, argued that during Dr Boraine’s testimony the 
judge repeatedly asked whether there was any concrete or statistical evidence to 
support his views that acknowledgement of guilt and responsibility is the first step 
towards reconciliation. There was no such evidence (Minna Schrag, Public Hearing of 
the Prosecutor, 17-18 June 2001).  
Guilty pleas at the ICTY seemed to be at their most popular during 2003, after 
which the number of defendants pleading guilty has dwindled. A possible reason for 
this is the departure of the American Chief of Prosecutors Michael Johnson, who left 
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in 2004 and was also a supporter of plea bargaining facilitating a number of the 2003 
plea deals (Combs, 2006: 99). To date the tribunal has convicted eighteen defendants 
by the use of plea bargaining and two via guilty pleas. In comparison, the ICTR has 
obtained eight convictions through plea bargaining.  
It would seem that cases heard at the ICTR are less likely to enter in to plea 
agreement than the ICTY. The major difference between the two is that the ICTR’s 
caseload deals predominantly with genocide, possibly making the use of plea 
agreements more difficult. Another reason for the infrequent use of plea bargaining 
that has been put forward is that many of the ICTR’s defendants are dissuaded from 
pleading guilty due to ideological factors (Drumbl, 2007: 168). Perhaps more relevant 
may be that the ICTR do not follow the ICTYs in readily giving generous sentence 
concessions to their defendants which can be seen in the case of Prosecutor v Jean 
Kambanda (Case No ICTR 97-23-S).   
Regarding the use of plea bargaining at the ICTR, the Kambanda case is 
controversial as the defendant was one of the highest ranking defendants to be heard 
before this trial chamber, comparable to Plavisic’s rank. Yet he received no sentence 
concessions for his plea and overall cooperation. Kambanda was the Prime Minister 
of the interim government in Rwanda, which had been established after the death of 
president Habyarimana. Kambanda was charged with six counts of genocide and 
crimes against humanity. From the outset, he stated that he was going to enter a guilty 
plea and co-operate with OTP. To this end, he provided the OTP with almost ninety 
hours of invaluable testimony which could be used in future trials. As a result of such, 
Kambanda’s family became at risk of reprisals and in response the prosecutors helped 
with the relocation of the Kambanda family.
29
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Before his, trial Kambanda confessed his guilt regarding all the charges 
against him. The Tribunal verified that the plea of guilty was made voluntarily and 
that it was informed and unequivocal. It was stipulated that there had been no prior 
arrangements or promises made with respect to the sentence he would receive. 
However, Kambanda was sentenced to life imprisonment, and whilst the Trial 
Chamber wanted to recognise the amount of assistance he had given, they 
nevertheless considered themselves unable to do this. This was due to the ‘heinous 
and intolerable’ nature of the crimes that he had pleaded guilty to. The prosecution 
also argued that a life sentence would be appropriate because the ‘maximum penalty 
envisaged by the Tribunal’s sentencing regimes is the only appropriate sentence for 
the grave offences to which the accused has plead guilty.’ (para 62) 
The Kambanda’s case was heard two years before that of Todorovic and 
Sikirica (IT-95-8). It was therefore unclear that a statement of remorse would 
constitute as a mitigating factor, and that a guilty plea was not an expression of 
remorse. Since he received his life sentence Kambanda has appealed this and has 
stopped co-operating with the OTP, and he even revoked his guilty plea demanding 
that he should be able to go to trial (Prosecutor v Kambanda ICTR-97-23-A 
Judgement 19 October 2000: Para 3). He claimed that pleading guilty was a 
mitigating factor, and should have received a sentence discount. The appeal was 
denied as it had been judged that the defendant’s original guilty plea was voluntary, 
informed and unequivocal (para 126). It was also concluded that the plea was 
supported by sufficient factual basis. The Tribunal also asserted that the gravity 
afforded to any mitigating factors is up to the Tribunal, and that it is up to their 
discretion how much or little weight they should receive. Here the Trial Chamber did 
consider his guilty plea to be a mitigating factor, but the aggravating circumstances 
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that surrounded his crimes, ‘negated the mitigating circumstances’ (para 62). Here, 
Kambanda was guilty of the most serious crimes and the Tribunal was not wrong 
when they sentenced him to life imprisonment. This was the only plausible sentence 
that they could give for the amount of culpability the defendant had in the genocide 
committed in Rwanda (para 62). Coupled with this was the knowledge that less 
culpable defendants were being sentenced to death for lesser crimes in Rwandan 
domestic courts at that time (Para 41).  
The next defendant to plead guilty in the ICTR was Omar Serushago 
(Prosecutor v Serushago Case No ICTR-98-39-I). However, he was not on the list of 
suspects wanted for war crimes by the Rwandan authorities when he surrendered 
himself. But the OTP originally charged Serushago with five counts of genocide; 
murder; torture; extermination and rape. This defendant pled guilty to the first four 
charges but not the fifth, rape, and the prosecution dropped that one.
30
 Serushago 
confessed to being in charge of the Interahamwe (the Hutu lead militia) in the Gisenyi 
prefecture, and to commanding bands of militiamen. Along with confessing to other 
crimes, he admitted that he had been in meetings with other military and civil 
authorities in which, amongst other things, the smooth running of the massacre were 
discussed (Combs 2002: 134). The OTP, as in Kambanda, ensured the protection of 
Serushago’s family. The prosecution noted the ‘valuable information’ that the 
defendant had given. In fact, he had been co-operating with the prosecution before he 
surrendered, which had resulted in the arrest of other high level perpetrators. 
However, unlike Kambanda, Serushago showed remorse at his pre-sentence hearing 
where he begged for forgiveness from the Tutsi and his country. Serushago has 
continued to co-operate with the prosecution after being sentenced (Comb 2002: 135). 
Due to this he was given fifteen years imprisonment, despite the prosecution 
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recommending no less than twenty five years. The Trial Chamber when considering 
his sentence gave weight to the continuing co-operation the defendant gave the 
prosecution, his expression of remorse and his voluntary surrender. Serushago still 
appealed his fifteen year sentence. He stated that there was not enough consideration 
of his mitigating factors and that the sentence given was not in keeping with Rwandan 
sentencing practices. The Appeals Chamber has rejected this and his fifteen year 
sentence still stands (Combs, 2002: 136). 
The case of Prosecutor v Bisengimana (Case No. ICTR-2000-60-1) is 
important to examine as it the guilty plea by the defendant in this case was brought 
about by an aggressive use of charge bargaining. The initial indictment against this 
defendant contained thirteen charges of genocide, crimes against humanity  and war 
crimes, alleging that the defendant was not only personally active in committing these 
crimes but also encouraged others to do the same (para. 1-4). The second indictment 
contained only five charges but they none the less still reflected the amount of the 
defendant's involvement in committing the crimes alleged (para. 26-28). After the 
revision of the indictment, the parties involved in this case entered into fuller plea 
negotiations. In exchange for a guilty plea for two relatively minor charges out of the 
possible five, the prosecution agreed to drop and seek acquittals for the other more 
serious charges, including genocide and rape. Along with this, the prosecution agreed 
to recommend a sentence of between twelve and fourteen years, as well as backing 
Bisengimana’s request that he serve his sentence in a European prison (Bisengimana 
Plea Agreement) which can be considered a form of sentence bargaining. When 
reviewing the original indictment and the charges to which the defendant pleaded 
guilty, it is clear to see that the prosecution have also engaged in ‘fact bargaining’ as 
the facts in the first indictment merely resemble the facts that he admitted to. The 
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withdrawal of the genocide charge received much criticism in Rwanda. Indeed, the 
Rwandan government insisted that genocide charges only be dropped only when, ‘it 
would be difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the role that the particular 
accused person played in the preparation of the genocide.’ (ICTR and Rwanda Argue 
over Plea Bargains, Hirondelle News Agency, April 2006) 
The use of plea bargaining is not just limited to these two tribunals. It has been 
suggested by the NGO Human Rights Watch that Ethiopia’s war crime tribunals may 
resort to the use of plea bargaining in order to compensate for the difficulties they 
were having bringing their two thousand defendants to justice. The tribunal’s 
prosecutors decided not to take this advice and are currently trying defendants 
approximately seventeen years after they were arrested in 1991 (Amnesty 
International 1995; Human Rights Watch 1994). Although this particular tribunal does 
not use plea bargaining to get through their heavy case loads, other tribunals do. One 
such tribunal that has embraced the guilty plea process is the Dili District Court of 
Timor-Leste. Approximately half the convictions obtained in this tribunal have 
resulted from guilty pleas (Drumbl 2007: 169). This is not to say that the obtaining 
these convictions were without problems. Indeed, initially the institutions involved in 
the tribunals did not understand the guilty plea process. In turn, this resulted in a 
review of the guilty plea procedure at this tribunal. The case of Joao Fernandes, 
discussed below illustrates this.  
The case of Prosecutor v Joao Fernandes (Dili District Court Special Panels 
for serious Crimes, Case No. 01/00.C.G.) was not only the first case heard before this 
particular tribunal, but it also shows the most basic of difficulties that can arise when 
entering a guilty plea when the charges involve international crimes.
31
 This is 
especially so when defendants and their advisers are unfamiliar with the legal system 
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they are being subjected to. Here the defendant pleaded guilty to murdering the 
village chief, but did so under the instruction of the Indonesian Military (para. 13-14). 
After being sentenced initially to twelve years imprisonment, Fernandes appealed on 
the grounds that his defence counsel were unfamiliar with the guilty plea process. He 
also asserted that the fact that he had acted under the orders of the military negated 
elements needed to obtain a conviction of this crime, namely his actions were not 
deliberate or premeditated, and this was confirmed at his appeal (Joao Fernandes v 
prosecutor Court of Appeal of East Timor, Criminal Appeal No. 2001/02). This then 
resulted in the a review of the tribunal's guilty plea procedure in order to make sure 
that when entering a guilty plea all parties involved, including judges, understand the 
process and are able to ensure the defendants plea is voluntary, informed ad 
unequivocal (Judgement of Egonda-Ntende. J, June 2001, para. 20). Seemingly guilty 
pleas are quite common in the East Timor Special Panels, where defendants readily 
admit their guilt to crimes where there may be a defence, such as duress, and/or 
without fully understanding the implications of the guilty plea (prosecutor v Joao 
Fernandes) East Timor seems to have a more reconciliatory nature to justice than 
Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavian countries (Combs 2006: 118). There is, one 
might argue, more of a karmic or socio-cosmic quality to East Timor society, where 
the admittance of any wrongdoing will go a long way to restoring the karma of the 
region.  
Combs asserts that at the end of 2002 defendants in this particular tribunal 
were afforded better defence counsel. As a result there were not as many 
‘confessions’ as defendants were being encouraged to plead not guilty. In a bid to 
receive guilty pleas the tribunal started to enter into plea negotiations (Combs 2007: 
119-120). One such case is The Lototoe Case (Case No. 49/2001) where the 
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defendants Jhoni Franca
32
 and Sabino Leite
33
 entered in to negotiations. Both these 
cases were subject to charge bargaining and sentence bargaining. Both defendants 
entered into a written plea agreement (Comb 2007: 211). However, in the case of 
Franca the defendant asserted that he had not committed some of the crimes that he 
had pleaded guilty to. This was eventually put down to a misunderstanding in the 
translation of a conversation between the defendant and his counsel. He was 
subsequently sentenced to five years, two years less than what the prosecution had 
argued for. Both Franca and Leite gave statements of remorse and told the tribunal 
how they had acted under the duress of their superiors, this acted in way of mitigation 
for them both (East Timor Judicial System Monitoring Programme 2004: 26). 
 The use of plea bargaining in all international tribunals has caused controversy 
and concern. As of yet there has been no uniform procedure in which negotiations 
should be entered into, and what form they should take, let alone any uniformed 
sentencing policy (Henham 2005). The secretive nature of plea bargaining also raises 
the possibility that prosecutors may not enforce their end of the bargain (Prosecutor v 
Dragan Nikolic Case No. IT-94-2-A). Although the acceptance of guilty pleas in 
modern day war crime tribunals has now been accommodated for in the tribunals’ 
statutes, it poses the same two opposing arguments in all of these tribunals. One the 
one hand the utilitarian benefits of plea bargaining which are too great to ignore, but 
on the other hand, the rule of law and equal treatment arguments, as well as the 
gravity of the crimes committed are factors that should not be forgotten. 
In the case of the ICC, we have yet to see if the prosecutors will engage in plea 
bargaining. It will be of great interest to see how this permanent international court 
will unite its trial avoidance policies and practices, for whatever reason, with the 
justice needs of the different countries it aims bring justice to, whilst still maintaining 
50 
 
international credibility. In order to understand the ethical issues that plea bargaining 
may raise in these contexts I will now turn to the various ways in which the process 
may be used in a number of legal contexts. 
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2. International Adoptions of Plea Bargaining 
  
In this section I will explore the history of plea bargaining. This is needed because in 
order to more fully understand the shifting application of the principles of plea 
bargaining one has to be able to reconstruct and grasp its incremental development 
and operation historically within different legal systems. This, in turn, allows an 
analysis of its application within the particular historical and cultural context of 
international law.   
According to Vogel, it was in the lower court of Boston USA that plea 
bargaining began to emerge during the 1830s and 1840s where its use was generally 
concentrated on offences against property and security of the person (Vogel 2008: 
93).  Broadly speaking, in these cases a guilty plea was offered and this constituted 
the waiver of the defendant’s right to trial. There are generally three types of plea 
bargain: ‘Charge’; ‘Fact’; and ‘Sentence’ bargaining. In the case of ‘charge bargains’, 
the prosecutor drops more serious charges in exchange for a guilty plea for a less 
serious one. Here, the charge dropped does not have to be the most serious and could 
be a lesser one in order to gain convictions for the others. It could be argued when, or 
if, charges are dropped it may be interpreted as saying that these crimes did not 
happen. For example, in cases of sexual violence where there is a lack of evidence due 
to witnesses not coming forward there is a danger that the prosecution may use rape 
charges as a bargaining chip. In such instances, the charge of rape may be dropped in 
exchange for a guilty plea. In the context of war crimes, this may be for crimes which 
traditionally have been thought of as more serious.  
In cases of ‘fact’ bargaining, the prosecutor agrees to present the facts in a particular 
way suggesting that the crime is less serious than perhaps it actually is or could be 
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made to appear given a less sympathetic interpretation of the facts of the case. If this 
were done during an actual trial, this method of bargaining could be seen as glossing 
over the extent and depth of the severity of the crimes committed. Once again, in the 
context of war crimes trials this may have far reaching implications as indicated in the 
case of Bisengimana. 
‘Sentence’ bargaining involves prior agreements with the judge where there is 
a likelihood of a reduction of sentence should the defendant plead guilty. This remains 
the most commonly used concession for defendants who plead guilty and/or co-
operate with the courts.
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2.1 What is Plea Bargaining? 
 
A plea bargain is an agreement in which the prosecutor and defendant arrange to settle 
a case against the latter. This is normally in the form of the defendant pleading guilty 
or no contest to all or some of their alleged crimes in exchange for concessions by the 
prosecutor. These concessions may take the form of a reduction of the charges, the 
dismissal of charges or limiting the punishment imposed upon the defendant. The 
prosecutor will then disclose the facts of the case that involve the defendant in a more 
flattering light. At its greatest plea bargaining can take the form of an immunity 
agreement, where the defendant would be protected from being prosecuted for their 
crimes, in exchange the defendant would cooperate with the prosecution by for 
example giving prosecution evidence. Generally plea agreements allow parties to 
agree on the outcome and settle pending charges.  
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Broadly speaking, there are two types of legal systems, Common Law and 
Civil Law regimes. Countries that utilise Common Law, such as the UK, USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, apply the adversarial system. Under this, courts 
do not seek the truth in the sense of actively mounting a general investigation, but 
only decide if the evidence that the defence and prosecution lawyers produce is 
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. They are 
ideally neutral umpires holding the ring between rival advocates (Cassese 2003: 373; 
Combs 2002: 48). In general, these countries employ plea bargaining as a way to get 
through their large case loads. In contrast, Civil Law countries, such France and Italy, 
use the inquisitorial system. In this system, it is an official’s task to actively collect 
the evidence that goes towards establishing the guilt or innocence of the accused. In 
this instance, it is the courts that play an active role in truth telling (Cassese 2003: 
373; Combs 2002: 41; Zappala 2005: 15). Modern International War Crime Tribunals 
contain elements that can be attributed to both Common and Civil Law. Not 
surprisingly, the result of this is that the International Tribunal structure is something 
of a hybrid of the two systems. 
The process of plea bargaining is often desired by utilitarians who emphasise 
questions of institutional efficacy including the optimal deployment of resources to 
secure the maximum outcomes, included case dispositions, as it cuts down the number 
of trials that the court has to hear. It also, more or less, guarantees a conviction for the 
defendant and it may also be used to illicit additional useful information from that 
defendant relevant to future prosecutions. However, there are a number of dangers to 
using plea bargaining identified as such by non-utilitarian perspectives, most notably 
classic forms of liberalism. For example, an innocent person who finds himself or 
herself accused may feel highly pressured into pleading guilty out of fear of a more 
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severe sentence being passed. These arguments of course are discussed in great detail 
in the following two chapters 
Although the adversarial system originated in England, it is said that the USA 
is now a more adversarial one than the English. In the USA, approximately 90% to 
95% of cases are disposed of by plea bargaining (Combs 2002: 46). In the UK a 
defendant normally decides to plead guilty as they discover that the evidence against 
them is overwhelming. The guilty plea is then usually rewarded with a discounted 
sentence of around one third as the guilty plea is taken into mitigation (Almandras 
2011). It is worth noting that, in the USA, a guilty plea is more likely to be a result of 
a plea bargain or charge bargain (Cassese 2003: 370) consequentially saving the 
state’s resources. There is a strong incentive for an accused to plead guilty. An 
examination of plea bargaining in the UK shall be used as an example to show the 
distinctions between the different forms a plea bargain might take and also to show 
the benefits of each style of negotiation. It should be noted that plea bargains and a 
plea of guilty are two similar but at the same time very different legal mechanisms, 
therefore it is important that the two should not be confused. In this thesis a plea 
bargain shall be referred to when there has been some ‘negotiation’, ‘bargain’, ‘deal’, 
agreement involving either charges, or the facts of the case, and or the sentence a 
defendant may receive in exchange for a guilty plea. Although defendants who enter a 
guilty plea without negotiation are still likely to receive a sentence discount for saving 
the tribunal the cost of a full trial, this is not a plea bargain. In this thesis it should be 
assumed that when plea bargaining is referred to it means that there was some form of 
negotiation in exchange for a guilty plea unless otherwise stated This also lays the 
foundations for the understanding of plea bargaining in the rest of the thesis. 
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2.1.1 Fact Bargaining 
 
 
Fact bargaining refers to when a defendant changes his or her plea from not guilty to 
guilty on the reliance that the prosecution will present the facts of the case in a less 
incriminating light. Again, this is advantageous for the prosecutors as they obtain a 
guilty plea without having to take the risk of a full trial. Presumably, the defendant 
would also benefit from a reduced sentence in exchange for this guilty plea. The 
defendant would supposedly benefit from this kind of bargaining if they are actually 
guilty of a serious crime. 
In cases where the defendant expresses a wish to plead guilty to a charge but 
the defendant’s version of the facts differ from that of the prosecution, or the 
prosecution cannot accept the facts, then, according to the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors, ‘The court should be invited to hear evidence to determine what 
happened, and then sentence on that basis’ (The Code for Crown Prosecutors, 
paragraph 9.3). When this occurs, a Newton hearing is held.  
One of the major concerns about fact bargaining is the lack of checks it has in 
place. For example, if the prosecutor presents facts concerning a defendant’s 
involvement in a crime in a more severe light, then defence counsel would object. 
However, if the prosecution was to present facts in a way that was disproportionately 
flattering to the defendant, then no one would be able to object. The issue being that 
this would result in an unfair bias towards the defendant as it would place them in a 
stronger position. In turn, this could give the impression that the victim has lost their 
‘voice’ in the proceedings. 
 
2.1.2 Charge Bargaining 
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There are two kinds of situations where charge bargaining may be used. The first is 
where the defendant is charged with two or more crimes. Here, it is possible for the 
prosecution to drop one or more of the charges in return for a guilty plea for the 
remaining. The other situation is when the defendant has been charged with a serious 
offence. Here, the prosecution might drop this charge in exchange for a guilty plea to 
a less serious offence. A number of domestic criminal justice studies show that, on 
occasion, there has been a considerable downgrading of charges (Genders 1999; 
Henham 2002). One reason for this could be problems proving intent. For example, if 
a defendant is charged under S 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act, grievous 
bodily harm with intent, they may have this charge downgraded to a S 20 offence of 
the same Act, recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm. It is also quite possible that 
the charge may also be even further downgraded to assault occasioning actual bodily 
harm, S 47 if what is thought to be an appropriate agreement is made. In international 
criminal law an examples may be the ICTY cases of Plavsic and Momir Nikolic where 
the genocide charges were withdrawn upon entering into negotiations with the 
prosecution. A possible reason for dropping such a serious an grave charge might be 
that it is very difficult to prove genocide as a crime, in particular that the defendant 
had the specific intent require to commit this crime. Examples of this are the case of 
Jelisic and Kristic (IT-98-33A), where both defendants where acquitted of genocide 
charges. This form of plea bargaining is beneficial towards the prosecutors as they are 
guaranteed at least one conviction without the risk of a full trial. Within the UK, 
Approximately 60% of contested charges are acquitted (Ashworth and Redmayne 
2005: 271) and the practical reasons for this may include things such as witnesses not 
turning up on the day or trial. It is understandable then that some prosecutors may 
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choose to enter into charge bargaining, especially if they have a large number of cases 
to deal with. Interestingly, it is set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors (2004) that: 
Crown Prosecutors should only accept the defendant’s plea if they think that 
the court is able to pass a sentence that matches the seriousness of the 
offending, particularly where there are aggravating features. Crown 
Prosecutors never accept a guilty plea just because it is convenient. (Para 10.1) 
 
This version of the guidelines does not expand on what it means by ‘convenient’, 
although it is realistic in practice. The way that it is written could possibly give rise to 
uncertainty as to when it is acceptable to charge bargain. Presumably, the convenience 
of the court is acceptable, but the personal convenience of the prosecutor is not. An 
earlier version of this code implies that it is acceptable to accept a plea of guilty to a 
lesser offence if the maximum sentence for the lesser offence is comparable to the 
gravity of the defendants’ wrong doing: 
Administrative convenience in the form of a rapid guilty plea should not take 
precedence over the interests of justice, but where the court is able to deal 
adequately with an offender on the basis of a plea which represents a criminal 
involvement not inconsistent with the alleged facts, the resource advantages 
both to the service of the courts generally will be an important consideration. 
(Code for Crown Prosecutors 1986: Para 11)  
From a defendant’s point of view, the primary advantage or disadvantage would come 
down to whether the defendant is indeed guilty of the crime charged. If so, then 
obviously this type of bargain would be beneficial to the defendant as they would 
plead guilty to either a downgraded charge, or they would get one or more charges 
removed. There is no doubt a guilty defendant would enjoy the benefits of charge 
bargaining but the biggest disadvantage here is when an accused is in the situation 
where they are actually innocent of all the charges but feel compelled to plead guilty 
as a form of ‘risk management’ as if found guilty after a full trial they would receive a 
more severe sentence. Possible examples of this in international criminal law may 
include the ICTR case of Bagaragaza, where the defendant had given ‘too much’ 
information to the prosecutors therefore a plea deal was the only ‘sensible’ solution 
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for the defendant (Interview with Jordash 2010). Also the ICTY case of Kovacevic 
illustrates this, here the defendant had spoken candidly to journalists, not realising the 
impact the statements he made would have on his case, in this case no plea agreement 
was reached (D’amato 2000). 
 
2.1.3 Sentence Bargaining or Pure Plea Bargaining 
 
In instances of sentence bargaining, or pure plea bargaining, defendants would change 
their plea from not guilty to guilty for the purpose of receiving a reduced sentence. 
Within domestic criminal law, S144 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is subject to the 
Sentence Guidelines Council. Here, the sentence guidelines apply to both Crown 
Courts and Magistrates Courts and the guidelines cover the whole range of sentences 
available, such as custodial, fines and community services. Importantly, the Courts are 
required to state that they have reduced the sentence and, although they are not 
required to under the guidelines, it is considered to be good practice to state how 
much of a reduction in the sentence has been agreed due to a guilty plea (Sentencing 
Guideline Council 2007). 
There are a number of moments in the process that a defendant can plead 
guilty. The earliest of these is when a defendant pleads guilty at a ‘plea before venue’, 
which is normally at the Magistrates Court. Here, a defendant will elect to plead 
guilty and if they do the Magistrates Court has the ability to sentence them. However, 
this is only if the case falls within the Magistrates Court’s scope. If not, the case may 
be referred to the Crown Court for sentencing. The second instance a defendant can 
plead guilty is when there is an indication of sentence at the Magistrates Court. Pre-
trial hearings in either the Magistrates Court or the Crown Court are examples of 
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other opportunities where a defendant can plead guilty and receive a substantially 
reduced sentence. 
In 1970, the case of R v Turner [1970] 2 QB321 concerned the role that the 
judge played in the defendants decision to plead guilty or not guilty. In this case, the 
Court of Appeal set forth that Defence Counsel should be free to give advice to their 
defendant about the best approach. Having heard their Counsel’s advice, it is then up 
to the defendant whether they take it or not. The judge and defence counsel should be 
allowed to meet and discuss necessary matters. An example of what might be 
considered a necessary matter is if a defendant is dying but does not know that they 
are dying. The only indication a judge may give as to sentence is that it will take the 
same form whether the defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty through conviction 
(Attorney –General’s Reference No. 44 of 2000 (Peverett [2001] 1 Cr App R416 at 
417). In the Turner case, the defendant, who had a number of previous convictions, 
pleaded not guilty to theft. Trial counsel approached the judge during an adjournment.  
After some discussion, counsel advised the defendant, Turner, if he pleaded guilty he 
would probably receive a non-custodial sentence, but if found guilty after a full trial 
he would receive a custodial one. Turner was under the impression that the judge had 
conveyed this information to counsel, and changed his plea to guilty. The notion that a 
defendant may receive a non-custodial sentence as a result of a guilty plea, compared 
to receiving a custodial sentence after a conviction through the full trial process, 
places enormous pressure on a defendant to plead guilty, even if the defendant is 
actually innocent of the crime charged. The Court of Appeal held Turner’s guilty plea 
to be a nullity. The court believed that improper pressure was put on the defendant to 
plead guilty. 
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When plea bargaining the defendant benefits from a sentence discount in 
particular if he/she is in fact guilty of the original charges brought against them. There 
is also the benefit of receiving a non-custodial sentence instead of a custodial one in 
certain cases. No doubt there will be some defendants who plead guilty due to 
pressure put on them, but are in fact actually innocent of the crimes that they are 
charged with. The pressure that they feel that they are under may take a number of 
forms. For example, the defendants themselves may not believe that that they will be 
able to protest their innocence successfully and so make the pragmatic choice to plead 
guilty in an attempt to make what they might see as the best of a bad situation. 
Although defence counsels are not allowed to place undue pressure on a defendant, 
they are meant to advise them on what their best recourse is: 
Counsel must be free to do what is his duty, namely, to give the accused the 
best advice he can, if need be, in strong terms. It will often include advice that 
a guilty plea, showing an element of remorse, is a mitigating factor which 
might enable the court to give a lesser sentence. Counsel, of course, will 
emphasise that the accused must not plead Guilty unless he has committed the 
acts constituting the offence charged. (Para 321)  
 
It was also stated that, ‘the accused, having considered counsel’s advice, must have 
complete freedom of choice whether to plead Guilty or Not Guilty’ (Para 321).  
Although this case had made it clear that the judge should be prohibited from 
giving indications of what sentence a defendant may receive, this was not always 
followed. This is evident in the case of R V Peverett [2001] 1Cr.App.R.27: 
[t]his case has a lamentable history… it illustrates what can, and too often 
does, happen, if  despite the repeated judgements of this court to the contrary, 
counsel, in cases which are not wholly exceptional, have recourse to the judge, 
in his room, in order to discuss please and sentence.  (Para 417) 
The essential facts of the case are that the offender, a deputy head master at a private 
preparatory school, pleaded guilty at Crown Court before to nine of the sixteen 
offences in the indictment, relating to indecent assault on pupils at the school. He has 
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originally entered a plea of not guilty to all charges, but changed his plea as a result of 
a meeting between defence and prosecuting counsel and the judge. The Judge 
indicated that the circumstances of the case were such that a suspended sentence 
would be justified. Subsequently, the offender was sentenced to a total of eighteen 
months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years, ordered to pay £6,500 in prosecution 
costs and ordered to register under the Sex Offenders Act.  
The court reiterated the rules set out in Turner. In response to the courts 
comments the Attorney General issued guidelines to prosecutors, with regards to 
discussions about sentencing with the judge and accepting guilty pleas (Attorney 
General’s Reference (No. 44 of 2000)). It states that, hearings except those that are in 
the most exceptional circumstances should be conducted in public, including the 
acceptance of pleas by the prosecution and sentencing. The Code for Crown 
Prosecutors sets out the circumstances in which pleas to a reduced number of charges, 
or less serious charges, can be accepted. Where this is done, the prosecution should be 
prepared to explain their reasons in open court. The Court of Appeal has stated on 
many occasions that justice should be transparent, and that only in the most 
exceptional circumstances should plea and sentence be discussed in chambers. Where 
there is such a discussion, the prosecution should at the outset, if necessary, remind 
the judge of the principle that an independent record must always be kept of such 
discussions. The prosecution should make a full note of such an event, recording all 
decisions and comments.  
 Since the decision in Turner there have been significant changes in criminal 
procedure. These changes now allow, to some degree, an advance indication of 
sentence. R v Goodyear [2005] ECA 888, CA is an important case for sentencing 
implications. Namely following a request from a defendant a judge may give an 
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indication as to the maximum sentence to be imposed after a guilty plea. The judge 
may also remind counsel that the defendant is entitled to this in open court. Before 
Goodyear convictions that violated the rules in Turner would be liable to be quashed. 
The very basic facts of Goodyear are that the defendant pleaded guilty to an offence 
of corruption and was sentenced to six months imprisonment, suspended for two 
years, and a fine of £1000. This was in spite of the judge saying to Goodyear’s 
barrister at a meeting in his chambers before the trial began that ‘this is not a custody 
case’. 
The main grounds for the appeal was, that on principle the sentence was 
wrong as the judge should have followed the indication he gave before the trial, not to 
impose a custodial sentence. The suspended sentence was also viewed as improper as 
the offence was not so serious that it could only be justified with a custodial sentence. 
It was held that Crown Courts need no longer follow the rules set out in Turner that a 
judge should not indicate the sentence that he might impose if defendant pleaded 
guilty. The indication must be sought by the defendant within seven days’ notice and 
in writing and then it would not amount to ‘improper pressure on him.’ 
Prior to Turner it was not unusual for counsel to be seen (often separately 
from their solicitors) by the trial judge in his chambers, and for the judge to tell 
counsel his view of the sentence which would follow an immediate guilty plea. The 
37th Archbold (1969) says nothing, and certainly nothing critical, about this practice. 
It was Turner that bought the ‘vexed question of so-called plea bargaining into the 
open (Para 31). The main distinction between this case and that of Turner is that the 
plea bargaining process is now more open and transparent allowing the defendant 
more agency over the process. 
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The majority of countries that have employed plea bargaining into their system 
usually do so to save court costs and in order to maintain the efficiency of the court. 
This practice in common law countries is encouraged in cases where there are long 
and lengthy documents that need to be analysed, such as in cases of corporate crime. 
It is also pursued when pleading guilty would mean that victims and witnesses of 
particularly traumatising crimes are saved from giving evidence. This is interesting 
when one looks at the plea bargaining system India has recently employed.  
Although its legal system is based on that of England, it is only recently that 
plea bargaining has been introduced in the Indian Criminal Procedure Code (Chapter 
XXIA). Its introduction has changed the face of the Indian criminal justice system, 
where trials are forever stopping and starting, and often taking years to get through 
just one case. 
Unlike the Anglo-American plea bargaining system, there are some 
constraining features in the one adopted by India. The use of plea bargaining in India 
is only allowed where it is applicable to offences that are punishable for up to seven 
years, where the offence has been committed against a woman or a child under the 
age of 14, or socio-economic crimes (Ghosh 2006). This is of interest here as it differs 
from most other countries that have adversarial legal systems in the way that it 
engages with plea bargaining. This could possibly be because that country is trying to 
redress gender inequalities within the criminal justice system, as well as in society 
more widely and wants to start to take seriously crimes against vulnerable persons. 
The thinking behind this may also be to use this punishment to act as a deterrence of 
other would be perpetrators, as they would see that the criminal justice system takes 
these charges so seriously that they must have a full trial where there would be no 
concessions received for guilty pleas or expression of remorse. Whereas in the UK 
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and USA plea bargaining where victims are women or children are often encouraged 
to avoid any distress to them. There is also the aspect that socio-economic crimes 
have to have a full trial in India unlike the UK and USA where again plea bargaining 
is persuaded. An example of such a case is that of Michael Kopper (United States v. 
Michael Kopper Cr-560-001), the former Enron executive. India could also be trying 
to curb the amount of corruption that it is so used to within its legal system. It is 
obvious that by using the plea bargaining model, India has adopted that its raison 
d'être is to safeguard the relative efficiency of the criminal justice system. The 
restrictive nature of the Indian model presumably is in place so that the public can 
maintain and gain confidence in a legal system that has, it might be argued, failed so 
many people. 
Systems similar to plea bargaining are now appearing in Continental Europe. 
Although it is still not being used to the extent that it is in the UK and USA, there has 
been a clear increase in negotiated justice over the past 30 years (Ashworth and 
Redmayne 2005: 265). European trials are generally more straightforward than 
Anglo-American ones as their proceedings usually take the form of an inquiry by the 
judge, making them an example of an inquisitorial system. This is achieved through 
the use of a dossier containing a collection of written materials collated by the 
governmental officials investigating the case. All the contents of the dossier are made 
available to both the defence and the prosecution. Evidentiary rules are also not as 
strict as they are in common law countries, with the important exception of trials by 
jury (Bosly 2004: 1403). Here, evidence also does not need to be introduced solely 
through witness testimony. Unlike in the UK and USA, the role of the defence 
counsel is limited, and criminal proceedings are more centred on the establishment of 
truth not the rhetoric of counsel. The proceedings on the whole in continental criminal 
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courts are more ‘Judge orientated’, thus making the proceedings more efficient. This 
is not to say that the role of plea bargaining does not have an increasingly essential 
role in the criminal systems of continental countries. But the practice of plea 
bargaining is far more regulated than in the UK and USA.  
 
2.2 The Potential Dangers of Plea Bargaining 
 
So whilst plea bargaining is highly desired in the context of more everyday court 
proceedings it is also attractive when it comes to war crime trials. Here, as elsewhere, 
plea bargaining can contribute to cutting down the number of trials that a court has to 
hear. It also more or less guarantees a conviction for the defendant and can also be 
used to illicit further information from a defendant. There are also utilitarian 
justifications for plea bargaining in the context of war crimes such as the fact that an 
admittance of guilt may promote reconciliation and restoration in the effected society. 
However, the reduction of a sentence not only challenges the truth telling functions of 
a court but also its capabilities of providing retribution for the community.
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There are however a number of dangers to using plea bargaining and I would 
like to raise these from the outset before returning to them as the thesis progresses. 
These include the potential situation of an innocent person who finds themselves 
accused of a crime feeling pressured to plead guilty out of fear of a more severe 
sentence. There is also a risk of unequal treatment before the court. For example, if a 
defendant can offer evidence on another defendant they may be able to receive a 
lesser sentence than one who does not have such evidence to negotiate with. This 
principle can extend to the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
who may able to receive discounted sentences and have charges they are potentially 
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guilty off dropped in exchange for a guilty plea. As one can imagine for these reasons 
the use of plea bargaining is a very controversial area of study generally. 
No analysis of plea bargaining has engendered as much controversy as 
McConville and Baldwin’s. Their study disclosed that there were a number of behind 
the scenes discussions in relation to defendants entering a guilty plea which on the 
surface seemed not to have been the subject of negotiations. These conclusions 
appeared in the 1974 book, Negotiated Justice: Pressures on defendants to Plead 
Guilty, which involved a large-scale study into the outcome of jury cases in UK 
Crown Courts. In particular, their research focussed on the extent to which plea 
bargaining was used in Birmingham Crown Court and staff of the Institute of Judicial 
Administration in Birmingham assisted in carrying out the research. 
  Negotiated Justice: Pressures on Defendants to Plead Guilty caused such 
controversy that Mr Webster and Mr Napley, who were the Chairman of the Bar and 
President of the Law Society at the time, wrote letters to national newspapers 
claiming that the authors of the book had not carried out suitable research for their 
arguments and had no academic integrity. Indeed, they both campaigned publicly and 
privately to stop the publication of the book. The only way McConville and Baldwin 
could defend their work was to publish their findings so that the public and academics 
could evaluate it themselves. Broadly, their research concluded that plea bargaining 
was used frequently in Birmingham Crown Court and that the plea bargains 
negotiated may not have been in the defendants best interest as the process used to 
obtain these bargains may have gone beyond what was at that time acknowledged by 
English law. The book goes so far as to suggest that some of the defendants felt that 
they had been pressurised into pleading guilty to charges which they believed they 
were innocent of. The implication being that that they were unjustly treated and the 
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authors argued that this was due to institutional structure of the criminal law and the 
operations of the criminal courts.  
A number of other countries, such as India and Nigeria, have recently included 
the use of plea bargaining in their judicial system in order to allow for the smooth and 
efficient running of their criminal justice systems (Famoroti 2009; Ghosh 2006). In 
Europe, plea bargaining can take a number of forms. For example, Italy uses a 
procedure called Patteggiamento Sulla Pen in order to curb long and time consuming 
trials. The Italian system closely resembles the Anglo-American plea bargaining 
system (Combs 2002: 39; Ashworth and Redmayne 2005: 265). Other European 
countries use mechanisms similar to plea bargaining to help the efficient running of 
the criminal justice system reflecting how all-consuming the process has slowly 
become. With this in mind, I will now consider how the use of plea bargaining moved 
from domestic courts to war crime tribunals. 
 
2.3 Plea Bargaining at War Crime Tribunals 
 
Whilst plea bargaining was not accommodated by the Nuremberg Charter, and there 
was no occurrence of it in the Tribunals that were held under Control Council No 10, 
there is evidence of negotiations between potential war criminals and the Allies. Salter 
(2004; 2005; 2007) argues that some of those who could have been charged with war 
crimes had the potential to escape prosecution due to their co-operation with the allies 
and in particular US intelligence. It is well known that General William Donovan and 
Justice Jackson had a temperamental working relationship and this can be seen in the 
proposed plea negotiations that Donovan had presented to Jackson, with the former 
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taking more of a pragmatic approach and the latter being firmly grounded in the ideal 
of the rule of law and opposing what he saw as back door negotiations. In particular, 
they disagreed on the negotiations Donovan entered into with Hjalmar Schahct and 
Herman Goring in which both defendants would give incriminating evidence in 
exchange for concessions, by way of what would now be considered sentence 
bargaining (Salter 2007: 411). Donovan envisaged such evidence and the testimonies 
that came from it would discredit the Nazi regime as high ranking officers would 
testify against each other and was thus a justified strategy. 
When it came to Schacht, it seemed this defendant was sympathetic towards 
the idea of plea bargaining as he had originally made contact with the prosecution. 
Donovan thought this was a good opportunity to put Schacht on the stand and have 
him testify against other defendants. In investigating Schacht, Donovan found, with 
the help of a double agent Hans Gisevius who also was used as a trial witness, that he 
was in fact a member of an anti-Nazi group and, although he worked for Hitler, he 
had actually opposed him since 1936. As part of this, Schacht had been involved in 
the 20 July 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler and had spent time in concentration 
camps for his actions. In this instance, Donovan had proposed a private plea deal 
which caused much controversy as Jackson had doubts that Schacht should benefit 
from such behind the scenes deal (Salter 2007: 419). Whilst there was enough 
incriminating evidence against him, prosecuting Schacht would prove to be difficult 
as Gisevius and other defendants gave evidence that Schacht was not central to the 
regime and had in fact not only opposed Goring’s influence in the Government but 
also Hitler himself.  
Regarding the negotiations surrounding Goring, the defendant was willing to 
testify against a number of other defendants in exchange for receiving an honourable 
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execution before a firing squad rather than what he saw as a dishonourable one, being 
hanged like a common criminal. Goring also agreed to divulge certain information to 
Donovan but only in secret, requesting aspects of the interview be kept undisclosed, 
therefore adding to the conspiratorial and clandestine aspect to their relationship. At 
one point, Donovan and Goring had agreed on a set of questions and subsequent 
answers that they were both happy with, and it was only after this was agreed that 
Goring would take the stand. Jackson opposed this approach stating that defendants 
who wanted to give evidence against another should do so in writing. He believed that 
any testimony based on promises or favouritism would be tainted, particularly 
considering the international arena the trials were to take place in and the nature of the 
crimes being judged (Salter 2007: 423).  
Crucially, these post-World War Two deals were carried out in secret. Modern 
day war crime tribunals have accommodated the criticisms of this in their statutes, 
and, in doing so supposedly ensuring any such actions are more transparent than in 
their historical antecedents. Many of the issues raised in these attempted negotiations 
still apply to contemporary war crime tribunals - the main one being how does such a 
tribunal balance the utilitarian institutional gains of plea bargaining, such as gaining a 
conviction and information which otherwise would be difficult to obtain, issues of 
reconciliation and remorse, with the more legalist notions of rule following and equal 
treatment before the law? 
When the ICTY was set up, Judge Cassese  rejected proposals from the US 
Government that would have enabled the Tribunal to use plea bargaining as a way to 
elicit evidence from defendants (Scharf 2004: 1073). The US said that:  
We recognize that many other legal systems have difficulty with these 
concepts, but we believe that these tool would be helpful in the war crimes 
context for leading prosecutors up the chain of command from the foot soldier 
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who directly committed an atrocity to the military political leader who had 
knowledge of or commanded it. (quoted in Scharf & Schabas 2002: 90) 
 
It was decided that the crimes that were to be heard by the court would be too serious 
to allow for negotiated justice, and therefore they would not be compatible with the 
functions of the Tribunal. Judge Cassese explained at a briefing to members of 
Diplomatic Missions: 
The question of the grant of immunity from prosecution to a potential witness 
has also generated considerable debate. Those in favour contend that it will be 
difficult enough for us to obtain evidence against a suspect and so we should 
do everything possible to encourage direct testimony. They argue that this is 
especially true if the testimony serves to establish criminal responsibility of 
those higher up the chain of command. Consequently, arrangements such as 
plea bargaining could be considered in an attempt to secure other convictions. 
However, we always have to keep in mind that this Tribunal is not a municipal 
criminal court but one that is charged with the task of trying persons accused 
of the gravest possible of all crimes. The persons appearing before us will be 
charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, 
persecution and other inhumane acts. After due reflection, we have decided 
that no one should be immune from prosecution of crimes such as these, no 
matter how useful their testimony may otherwise be. (IT/29, 11 February 
1994) 
The use of plea bargaining was also considered distasteful in the early years of the 
tribunal as a number of ICTY prosecutors came from civil law countries where plea 
bargaining was not widely used. Hence the idea of convictions being received as a 
result of backroom negotiations was thought to be inappropriate (Combs 2006: 84). 
However, a few years after it was established it was thought that the Tribunal might 
actually benefit from the acceptance of guilty pleas as its facilities were slowly being 
overwhelmed by the ever increasing caseload. Whilst presiding over the Erdemovic 
case, Cassese stated that the use of guilty pleas, ‘undoubtedly contributes towards the 
public advantage.’ This statement was made in relation to the logistics of the Tribunal 
and financial difficulties that it then had (Appeals Judgement, Separate and Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Cassese 7October 1997: Para 8). In relation to this change, Henham 
states that the rationale of plea agreements can be seen in the case of Momir Nikolic 
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where the Tribunal was now arguing that the expression of remorse helps with the 
reconciliation of a community, and in doing so was actually contradicting itself 
(Henham 2005:7; Combs 2007).  
When considering the objectives of the International Tribunals it is possible to 
split them into two categories, those with long term aims and those with short term 
goals. Of course, there is considerable overlap between the two, but the reasoning 
behind them differs slightly. For example, a short term goal, such as deterrence, 
would be especially important as there would be a pressing need to stop the 
wrongdoing in the region. As a long term aim something such as truth finding would 
be important. This is due to the fact that after a region has become less volatile, the 
reconciliation process can begin only when the truth is told and retributive justice is 
done. Again, it should be noted that the one of the main objectives of the Tribunals is 
ultimately to encourage peace and reconciliation in the affected areas. However, on 
occasion it looked as if the Tribunals were more interested in the short term aims, 
such as plea bargaining, where charges are dropped or not mentioned and sentences 
were reduced or the full facts of the case were glossed over. Clearly such short term 
aims would undermine the long term aims of the Tribunals. With regards to these 
short term goals, it is understandable why indulging in plea negotiations may appear 
advantageous. For the international community the people who were in power and 
orchestrated the crimes needed to be removed. In turn, this renders plea bargaining a 
relatively quick method of obtaining guilty pleas and information that would 
incriminate high level officials and assist in removing them from power. In such 
cases, plea bargaining does indeed go towards providing justice in the short term. 
The prospects of a reduced sentence and/or charges being dropped in exchange 
for a guilty plea, may also encourage lower ranking defendants to testify against 
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higher ranking ones, especially in cases of command responsibility. Command 
responsibility applies where a defendant is responsible for the actions of their 
subordinates, even though he may not directly have ordered the criminal activity 
(Cameron 2004: 68).
36
 It is easy to see why the use of plea bargaining would be 
desirable in international tribunals as on average the pre-trial and actual trial process 
in one of these tribunals takes just over two years. The Tribunals call many witnesses 
and make extensive use of exhibits and long transcripts. All of these can be avoided if 
the tribunal had broader judicial notice, allowing them to re-use facts that have 
already been established (Scharf 2004: 1080). In addition, there are a number of other 
factors that slow down the trial process, such as fact finding and finding witnesses 
who will testify. This is particularly difficult as individuals are often frightened to 
come forward, and as people have been displaced or relocated this makes it is 
especially difficult to track them down. It is accepted that the trial process is very 
lengthy, costly and complex. Making use of plea bargaining and accepting guilty 
pleas expedites the process and frees up the courts to hear trials that are disputed.  
              The Trial procedures for both the ICTY and ICTR are, for the most part, 
identical. The Tribunals Rules of Procedure and Evidence (PRE/rules) govern the 
procedures by which guilty pleas should be treated. Rule 62(B) of the PRE ICTR 
governs a defendant’s guilty plea. Rules 100 and 101 set out guidelines for sentencing 
when a defendant has pleaded guilty. Rule 62 bis of the PRE deals with guilty pleas 
and Rule 62 ter deals with plea agreements. These rules set out the criteria required 
when accepting a guilty plea or a plea agreement. Rule 100 governs the procedure for 
sentencing a defendant and Rule 101 discusses how the defendant should be 
sentenced. The rules set out here are similar in language to that used in the ICTR 
statutes.  
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2.4 Issues in the Acceptance of Plea Bargains at Tribunals 
 
The case of Prosecutor v Goran Jelsic (Case No. IT-95-10-T (para 25)) states that ‘[a] 
guilty plea is not in itself a sufficient basis for the conviction of the accused’. 
Consequently, the Tribunals should only accept a guilty plea if it is ‘voluntary’, 
‘informed’, ‘unequivocal’ and based on adequate evidence. For the plea to be 
‘voluntary’, the defendant must be found mentally competent to understand the 
consequences of pleading guilty. The plea must result from threats, inducements or 
promises. To be ‘informed’, the defendant must not only understand the consequences 
of the guilty plea but must also understand the nature of the crime the accused is 
pleading guilty to. To be identified as ‘unequivocal’, the guilty plea must not be 
accompanied by anything that contradicts the confession. For example evidence that 
the crime was committed under duress. This is to protect the defendant from giving up 
their right to a trial, (Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemovic (Case No IT-96-22)). The 
Tribunal also added a fourth element, that the plea be based on sufficient factual 
evidence. This would stop defendants pleading guilty to crimes that they did not 
commit, in order to have more serious charges dropped or the possibility of a lesser 
sentence (Jelsic). In these instances, the guilty plea must be genuine and not self-
serving (Henham 2005: 14).
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 It is important to note that not all attempts of plea 
negotiations are successful, it is therefore necessary for there to be a proffer 
agreement, as a preliminary matter. This agreement takes place between the defence 
and the prosecution that if no plea agreement is concluded between the parties, no 
information provided by the accused and no details of the discussions between the 
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parties may be used against the accused during a subsequent trial (O’Sullivan and 
Zecevic 2011: 148).  
           There are a number of ‘mitigating and aggravating factors’ that a trial chamber 
must consider when deliberating an appropriate sentence. These factors become of 
particular interest when determining a sentence when the conviction has been 
obtained as part of a plea negotiation. This is because more consideration may be 
given to a mitigating factor in a plea bargain case than a case in which the conviction 
has come about through a lengthy trial, even though the mitigating factor in question 
may be the same. Rule 101 (B) of the RPE gives the factors the ICTY/R must 
consider, in the case of the ICC Rule 145(2)(b)(i) of the ICC RPE is used. Basically, 
aggravating factors tend to be those that influence the court to increase the sentence. 
These include the voluntary participation of the criminal, the method and severity in 
which this was carried out, and how widespread the crimes where. In domestic courts 
in common law countries not pleading guilty to a crime such as rape would count as 
an aggravating factor as the victim would have to give evidence about what happened, 
therefore reliving their ordeal again. Mitigating factors tend to decrease the sentence 
as they include co-operation with the Tribunal, remorse shown at the crimes 
committed, and voluntary surrender and pleading guilty (Schabas 2005: 169; Zappala 
2003: 201). Certain crimes, such as rape and torture, should also be considered as 
aggravating offences especially if the defendant has aided and abetted their 
commission as the effects of this type of crime on the victim are not only physical but 
also psychological and therefore long lasting. (Dragan Nikolic (Case No IT-94-2). 
           When regarding guilty pleas as a mitigating factor one should consider at what 
precise stage of the proceedings the plea is entered. Dragan Nikolic pleaded guilty but 
did so just before six witnesses were going to give testimonies against him. He had 
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already spent 3 years in custody during which time he had asserted his innocence and 
contested the charges brought against him. In this example, the defendant eventually 
pleaded guilty to murder, rape, persecution and torture, and was not penalised for the 
lateness of his plea and was still given a reduced sentence of 23 years.
38
 In this 
situation, although there was some conservation of resources, there had still been a lot 
of time and money spent over three years obtaining evidence against him and seeking 
witnesses. He did however save victims and witnesses the stress of giving evidence in 
court and being cross examined. The Chamber said the defendant would have 
received a life sentence if it hadn't been for his guilty plea, his remorse and their co-
operation with prosecutors. They also noted that the crimes he admitted were 
essentially the first public account of what took place at Susica, and as such helped to 
establish the truth of what happened there.  In cases such as this, the guilty plea 
seemingly may appear to be rather self-serving. This may be contrasted with the case 
concerning Milan Babic where he not only surrendered himself to the tribunal entered 
his guilty plea very early on in the proceedings, and received 13 years 
imprisonment.
39
 Similarly, Cesic (Case No IT-95-11) pleaded guilty after 16 months 
of confinement but had also done so before any trial proceedings had taken place.
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In both the cases of Plavsic and Babic, the defendants expressed remorse. 
Babic said in February 2006 that his guilt was, ‘a pain that I have to live with for the 
rest of my life.’ Dr Mladen Loncar, a Croatian psychiatrist, testified about the positive 
effects of the guilty plea. The defendant, Babic, had also given evidence in other 
trials, most notably in Slobadan Milosovic’s trial in 2002. This might be compared 
with the case of Kambanda, where the defendant pleaded guilty from the start. 
However, in this case guilty pleas were not considered to be mitigating factors. 
Examples such as these reveal that the use of plea bargaining in international criminal 
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law is continually evolving and it is becoming apparent from the establishment of 
more recent tribunals such as the ICC and the STL that it will, as a legal concept, 
remain within the international criminal jurisprudence. If this is indeed the case, there 
is clearly a need for a more nuanced evaluation of its use and place in international 
law. From this background to plea bargaining I shall now move on to analyse the 
theoretical and philosophical justifications and objections put forward with regard to 
plea bargaining in international criminal law. 
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3. Reading Plea Bargaining Through the Concept of Classic Utilitarianism 
 
The following chapter explores the justifications for plea bargaining using an 
interpretative framework made up of the principles of classic utilitarianism as set out 
by Jeremy Bentham. The aspects of plea bargaining that are deemed to be desirable by 
academics, practitioners and the international tribunals fall broadly under the 
utilitarian aspects of criminal justice systems in the sense of imperatives related to 
optimising consequences widely regarded as optimally ‘beneficial’. These broadly are 
things such as efficiency of resource allocation (given limited time, money and 
organisational capacity), truth telling, and reconciliation. It is therefore not only 
sensible but essential for the theoretical and methodological side of this thesis to 
discuss the justifications (and possible limitations) of plea bargaining as these appear 
when seen through the lens of classic utilitarian theory. I aim not only to justify the 
use of plea bargaining through the principles of this theoretical framework but to also 
analyse how far these justifications can be sustained when subject to critical 
examination, including those from diametrically opposite perspectives such as classic 
liberalism. I have therefore to ask whether even those justifications that are consistent 
with utilitarian principles are nevertheless correct, proper and contextually 
appropriate, and if plea bargaining in the context of international war crime tribunals 
is justifiable not only to utlilitarians. Clearly, even those aspects of plea bargaining 
which are entirely justifiable in utilitarian terms may nevertheless be entirely 
unacceptable to non-utilitarian perspectives on this subject, which qualify or even 
entirely reject its principles. I will divide this analysis into two sections. The first 
offers a brief overview of what classic utilitarianism is in general, as this helps lay the 
theoretical foundations on which is based the wider analysis of plea bargaining in the 
chapter. The second, more applied section sets out an analysis of the justifications of 
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key aspects of plea bargaining through the interpretative framework of concepts, 
principles, beliefs and assumptions of classic utilitarianism. Following this discussion 
of utilitarian justifications of plea bargaining in general, I will look in detail at the 
case of Plavsic to discuss whether the traditional justifications of the process still 
apply to cases heard before international war crime tribunals. 
 
3.1 Classic Utilitarianism 
 
The principle of utilitarianism is concerned with the moral worth of an action. From 
this perspective this is entirely determined by its overall utility both in terms of those 
perpetrating actions and those affected by them. Classic utilitarianism theories, such 
as those put forward by the likes of Bentham and Mill, are therefore concerned with 
the somewhat hedonistic notion that happiness must be maximised. In this regard 
Bentham wrote: 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as 
well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right 
and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their 
throne… The Principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for 
the foundation of that system, the object of which s to rear the fabric of felicity 
by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it deal 
in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of 
light. (Bentham 2004: 65) 
 
Bentham believed that pain and pleasure not only explain our actions but also help us 
define what is good and moral. Key to his ethical system is the principle of utility. 
That is, what is the greatest good for the greatest number? For Bentham: 
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or       
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it 
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose 
interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or 
to oppose that happiness. (Bentham 2004: 82) 
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Fundamentally, the ‘principle of utility’ is that the consequences of any action that 
should be considered (as opposed to the alleged purity or impurity of a person’s inner 
intentions and motivations), and if that action has the best general outcome for the 
most people, then it should be selected and applied. Hence, utilitarianism can be seen 
as ‘future-looking’ as ultimately it is only interested in what has previously taken 
place, even wide spread acts of genocide, in so far as it may affect a future outcome of 
something, such as the removal or mitigation of the causes of genocidal ethnic 
warfare. As such, utilitarianism can be seen as a form of ‘consequentialism’ 
concerned primarily with the policy effects and implications of legal practices.  
Consequentialism is the view that the moral rightness of an act depends on the 
consequences of that act or something related to it such as a rule requiring one to act 
in a particular way. That is to say, if the consequences are good, in the sense of 
optimising the pleasure and life-chances of the majority of affected parties, then the 
act is morally right because ‘the ends justify the means’. It should be noted that 
consequentialism differs from ‘deontological’ systems of ethics, that is those which 
hold that the rightness or wrongness of an action, including a judicial decision, is 
logically independent of its practical consequences, and lays instead within the act 
itself or the circumstances in which that act is carried out such as contractualism.  
 Under the principle of consequentialism, all the possible consequences of an 
action for different groups in society need to be ‘weighed up’ against each other, 
Whichever outcome results in the optimal consequence for all concerned parties is 
deemed to be the morally right one to select. Within the fundamental idea of 
utilitarianism this would be the outcome that achieves the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number, and it is usually thought that the right consequences are those with 
the most tangible benefit for humanity, or at least those parts of with a material stake 
in the issue in question. Whatever the actions that lead to those beneficial 
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consequences are deemed to be moral, while other choices, which lead away from 
them, are judged immoral. For example, some say homosexuality and same sex 
marriage is immoral, but what are the negative consequences that arise from this 
compared with its suppression? To be moral or immoral under consequentialism 
someone with a stake in the issue must be made better or worse off. 
A further example of this that is commonly cited is that of promise keeping. If 
I make a promise I must weigh up the consequences of keeping it against that of 
breaking it. If, on balance, breaking the promise brings about the most overall 
happiness, then that is the morally right thing to do. For example, a manager may 
have agreed contractually to her boss to optimise staff efficiency but may nevertheless 
decide to act sympathetically to an underperforming subordinate who is undergoing 
difficult family circumstances, and therefore ‘cover for her’ in a supportive and 
protective way. Such an act may break a contractual promise but nevertheless be in 
the best interests of most if not all concerned. The issue, as far as utilitarians is 
concerned, is no longer, therefore, the abstract one of whether in all circumstances 
and come what may, every promise must be honoured as a precondition for morally 
correct action. 
Plea bargaining itself may be seen as another example that illustrates 
consequentialism. As mentioned above, consequentialism is where ‘the ends’ (the 
concrete implications and effects of selecting one option over another) is held to 
justify the means (whatever it takes to optimise beneficial outcomes). The end in the 
case of plea bargaining is punishment of some sort, and the means is the act of 
negotiating a plea bargain, combined with the decision that to even consider it in this 
particular case. So the idea that a defendant may not be charged with all the crimes 
that they may have committed (based on the interpretative judgements of criminal 
investigators and prosecutors) is reasonable as the aforementioned end of securing an 
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appropriate punishment is met.  
Nevertheless not all ends have a consquentialist value attached to them, and 
their will often be a range of priorities ascribed to them. Occasionally, it is the way in 
which the end is achieved that holds the positive consquentialist value. Williams uses 
the example of a traveller. Here, he suggests that sometimes it is not reaching the 
ultimate destination that holds the value but the journey itself (Williams 1973: 82). 
Returning to the example of plea bargaining, the end result of securing a conviction 
and the defendant receiving a broadly appropriate type of punishment may not hold 
the most value, as it may be the entire prosecution and trial process that is deemed to 
hold the most good as for instance a display of even-handed justice and public 
accountability. In such instances, the positive consequences that may come out of the 
plea bargaining process include, truth telling, the public expression of remorse for 
crimes committed, and, on some occasions, information or evidence on another 
defendant. Each of these are often cited as justifications for the practice of plea 
bargaining in international war crime tribunals (Tieger and Shin 2005; Combs 2007; 
Jorgensen 2002). In this context, the reduced sentence a defendant might receive is 
outweighed by the benefit of the plea bargain as reducing the punishment and 
receiving information in exchange, increases the overall happiness. According to 
Bentham, ‘it is cruel to expose even the guilty to useless suffering.’ (2004) A 
controversial example of this is that, after the end of World War Two, a number of 
Nazis were shielded from criminal prosecution because of their utility in advancing 
strategic intelligence, providing assistance to war crimes prosecutors, acting as 
penetration agents in neo-Nazi groups and armament goals in the cold war (Ingram 
2006: 120). Of course, in the examples given above there will always be people who 
are aggrieved and who have not personally benefited by the actions taken. The 
essential thing for classic utiliarianism is that each person’s material interests in 
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securing a positive outcome are considered equally and the action that optimises the 
best consequences for the most people is selected as the right one to take. For its 
consquentialist orientation a decision is the right one, and therefore ‘works’ if, but 
only if, the overall perceived likely benefits of an action outweigh the likely costs. 
There is clearly an utilitarian dimension to any form of ‘cost benefit’ analysis 
deployed in, say, a legal system. 
Another important aspect of utilitarianism is that when following its principle 
that and the action that is likely to brings about the most happiness or pleasure is the 
one that should be selected and applied, it must considers everybody’s interests 
equally without discrimination, and in a reciprocal manner. This is implied in Mill’s 
claim that: 
In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the 
ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by and to love your neighbour as 
yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of the utilitarian morality. (Mill 2004: 
288) 
 
In light of this, it should also be noted that utilitarianism is said to be ‘monistic’, in 
that it only has one aim: to increase whatever affected parties understand as their 
measure of happiness, pleasure or overall welfare.  
Bentham believed that the happiness created by an action could be calculated 
by what he called the Felicfic Calculus. The grounds for this calculus were that there 
are always various aspects that need to be considered in order to assess the utility of 
an action. Bentham listed these in chapter IV of An Introduction to the Principle of 
Morals and Legislation (1987). The qualities he identified here included: intensity; 
duration; certainty; propinquity; fecundity; purity and extent.
41
 Bentham, unlike Mill, 
did not distinguish between the quality of pleasures in ranking some above others 
according to traditional high-cultural standards for example, only their quantity and 
intensity. Indeed, he stated that, ‘quality of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as 
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poetry’. In Utilitarianism, Mill (2004) had argued that it was not the quantity of 
pleasure that mattered but the quality. Mill’s notion of utilitarianism distinguishes 
between higher and lower pleasures. Higher pleasures for example being attributed to 
the enjoyment of artistic, cultural, intellectual pleasures; and lower being those that 
human beings share with animals, which is ‘mere’ physical pleasure. He famously 
stated that, ‘better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be 
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’ (Mill 2004: 281). Despite these differences, 
both Bentham and Mill’s notion of utilitarianism might be seen as hedonistic, as they 
only include pleasure, happiness and how to maximize these as criterion for morally 
acceptable judgements and actions. The terms ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ have, it 
would seem, fallen out of favour when applying utilitarian principles. Instead people 
in contemporary societies have more recently tended to use the related term ‘welfare’ 
(or ‘best interests of the people’). However, the basic concepts remain, broadly 
speaking, similar.  
When addressing utilitarianism, it is also important to be aware that there are 
two main variations of this doctrine. The first of these is ‘Act Utilitarianism’, which 
applies to individual acts, and suggests that an act can be considered to be right or 
wrong depending on whether committing that act would create or reduce the sum total 
of happiness. The second is ‘Rule Utilitarianism’, which applies to a system of rules 
that, if followed consistently by everyone, will tend to increase the overall happiness 
or welfare of society. Mill is generally considered as a Rule Utilitarian, as he believed 
that some rules, including legal and constitutional examples, have utilitarian 
justifications. He stated that, ‘To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something 
which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask, 
why it ought? I can give him no other reason than general utility.’ (Mill 2004: 327). 
He also argued that it is sometimes right to violate general ethical rules if doing so 
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would lead to the greatest happiness: 
[J]justice is a name for certain moral requirements, which, regarded 
collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are therefore of 
more paramount obligation, than any others; though particular cases may 
occur in which some other social duty is so important, as to overrule any one 
of the general maxims of justice. Thus, to save a life, it may not only be 
allowable, but a duty, to steal, or take by force, the necessary food or 
medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified medical 
practitioner. (Mill 2004: 337) 
 
Within Rule Utilitarianism there are two variants. The first being ‘ideal’ Rule 
Utilitarianism, which holds that one should regulate ones actions by those rules that 
would maximise welfare if they were generally observed. The second is ‘actual’ Rule 
Utilitarianism which holds that one should comply with the rules actually accepted 
and observed in society in so far as acceptance of the rule maximises utility 
(Simmond 2006: 36). In short, Rule Utilitarianism weighs up a whole system of 
societal rules by how much happiness each produces, whereas, by contrast, Act 
Utilitarianism attempts to evaluate an individuals’ action in the same way.  
A criticism of Act Utilitarianism is that it is very difficult to predict the 
outcomes of actions. To overcome this Bentham suggested a ‘rule of thumb’, which 
was, in a similar situation one should act/behave as they did in a previous situation,  if 
that course of action brings about more happiness. In other words, decision-makers 
should assume a measure of regularity in human affairs based on general patterns of 
past events, which allows a measure of admittedly fallible generalisation. 
Rule and Act Utilitarianism can both be explored through the use of plea 
bargaining. A pertinent example would be a complicated fraud case. In such an 
instance, there could be a large number of complicated documents entered into 
evidence, and there would likely be a number of expert witnesses called to give 
evidence. This would not only take a long time but would also cost a lot of money. 
Hence for prosecutors, entering into a plea deal might be desirable as this would save 
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substantial time and resources, not to mention that it would guarantee a conviction, 
understood as a generally beneficial outcome for all concerned, as the defendant 
would have already pleaded guilty. Here, the fact that a defendant would, as an 
incentive, almost certainly receive a lesser sentence than if they had been convicted 
after a full trial, could be justified by the wider benefits of resource and time saving. 
An Act Utilitarian would support a plea deal in a situation such as this as it would 
create the most happiness by delivering a conviction and saving scarce resources 
which are thereby freed up for other cases. In this instance, and assuming that the 
legal system itself has not established rules about plea negotiations, a Rule Utilitarian 
might object to the use of plea bargaining as it would be seen as undermining the rules 
that had been set in place. Although following the process may not be as 
advantageous as plea bargaining, Rule Utilitarians would still prefer to follow the 
established rules on the basis that this alone optimises welfare. Smart calls this ‘blind 
rule worship.’ (1973: 10) 
In summary, for the purposes of this chapter utilitarianism is concerned with 
bringing the greatest good to the greatest number of people. In relation to plea 
bargaining and international criminal law, the morality of negotiating with a 
defendant who is accused of being responsible for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide will be evaluated by the consequences that it brings. If the 
consequences are good in that they bring the greatest ‘happiness’ to the greatest 
number of people, then under utilitarianism the practice of plea bargaining is deemed 
good and should be encouraged. If the negotiations bring about undesirable 
consequences then plea bargaining is bad and used not be used. Having explored the 
basic elements of classic utilitarianism understood as a theory of moral justification 
relevant to legal decision-making in general, I will now analyse the practice of plea 
bargaining, taking and applying a utilitarian perspective to its use and its legitimacy in 
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the contexts of War Crime Tribunals.  
 
3.2 Utilitarianism in Practice: Plea Bargaining in International War Crime 
Tribunals  
 
There is no obvious criminological basis for punishing an offender who pleads guilty 
less severely than one who elects to go to trial via a non-guilty plea. (Bargaric and 
Brebner 2002: 51). However, there are strong utilitarian reasons that favour 
prosecutor’s employing the use of plea bargaining. The ‘Statement of Purpose’ of the 
Sentence Guideline Council Guidelines (SGC guidelines) sets out the main reasons 
for the use of plea bargaining: 
A reduction in sentence is appropriate because a guilty plea avoids the need 
for a trial (thus enabling other cases to be disposed of more expeditiously), 
shortens the gap between charge and sentence, saves considerable cost, and, in 
the case of an early plea, saves victims and witnesses from the concerns about 
having to give evidence. (Para 2.1) 
 
Many of these justifications and benefits are not just ring fenced for domestic 
jurisdiction and also ring true when it comes to plea bargaining in International War 
Crime Tribunals. Each of these claimed utilitarian benefits will now be discussed in 
turn. 
 
3.2.1 Efficiency 
 
The most persuasive utilitarian justification for favouring the use of plea bargaining is 
that of efficiency.
42
 The main feature of ‘efficiency’ in the context of international 
tribunals is that it reduces the economic pressures placed upon them in a context of 
necessarily limited finances. This is particularly relevant when full trials cost a lot of 
what is in fact often taxpayer’s money.43 A plea of guilty in such instances, as 
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opposed to a full trial, would save considerably on the court’s resources, allowing 
them to focus the use their resources on contested trials. As Dixon and Demirdjian put 
it, plea bargaining is an ‘obvious shortcut to the tribunal’s busy schedule.’ (2005: 694) 
This serves as a good example of the utilitarian reasoning for the use of plea 
bargaining, especially for the tribunals, as most people pay taxes and saving collective 
money increases the general welfare of society. From a utilitarian viewpoint then, it 
would be better to enter into a plea bargain to avoid unnecessarily lengthy trials and 
prevent spiralling trial costs where, on balance, the beneficial side of this overrides 
any likely negative outcomes. Alongside this, the fact that defendants who have 
secured a plea bargaining may give evidence against their co-accused or other 
defendants, would also enable the prosecution to build stronger arguments in other 
cases, and use the resources at their disposal to gather other evidence for these 
possibly higher value trials.  
Cases that are contested are generally in the criminal justice system for a 
longer length of time than those that are disposed of by guilty pleas, thus adding to the 
court’s backlog of cases. This can be seen at the ICTY and the ICTR, where there 
have been numerous extensions to the duration of trials when the tribunals should 
really have been wound up and moved on (Interview with Pittman 2010). A current 
example includes that of ICTY defendant Vojislav Seselj (IT-03-67-T) who has been 
in the Tribunal’s custody since 2003. His trial has been postponed on number of 
occasions for varying reasons such as the defendant’s poor health to the defendant 
been disruptive and at one point this particular defendant went on hunger strike. 
Therefore, another utilitarian aspect of plea bargaining would be that it, in some cases 
at least, contributes to the efficiency and smooth running of the court by freeing up 
time which could be better used to try contested cases. There have been a number of 
judgements in plea bargained cases that cite this to be a valuable justification for the 
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advancement of guilty pleas in war crime tribunals. The ICTY praised the guilty plea 
process for ‘securing administrative efficiency’ (Erdemovic) and for the ‘substantial 
savings of international time and resources’ (Plavsic) as well as ‘saving the 
international tribunal the time and effort of a lengthy investigation and trial.’ 
(Sikirica) (Petrig 2008: 27) Even former ICTY Presidendent Theodor Meron stated in 
2003 that now that the Tribunal is ‘running at full steam’ it ‘cannot try all the 
defendants.’ (Meron 2003)  
This perspective would, therefore, see the extensive use of plea bargaining as 
simply, ‘part of the court’s coming of age.’ (Scharf 2004: 1076) Although the ICTR 
has not been involved in as many plea bargaining cases as the ICTY, it has followed 
suite and claims trial and financial efficiency as the grounds to enter into negotiations 
with an accused.
44
 The SCSL sought to enter in to plea agreements for a number of 
reasons but it is hard not to consider financial efficiency to be the overriding reason 
for the acceptance of negotiated guilty pleas in exchange for reduced sentences as the 
former Registrar stated, when discussing the funding arrangements for the SCSL, ‘that 
the court is not lean and mean, but anorexic.’ (Dougherty 2004: 324; Letter to Kofi 
Annan on Financial Contributions to the SCSL, Human Rights Watch, 21 May 2003) 
Indeed, Scharf has speculated that, ‘[P]lea bargaining is also expected to play a role in 
the operation of other international and hybrid courts, including the special court for 
Sierra Leone, the permanent International Criminal Court and the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal.’ (Scharf 2004: 1070) 
One might argue that the ICTY and ICTR could have operated more 
efficiently if they had engaged in even wider plea bargaining (Interview with Crane 
2009). Indeed, Wayde Pittman has speculated that the ICTR had not entered into plea 
bargaining as much as the ICTY due to the fact there are still a number of fugitives at 
the ICTR. Certainly, if there was a sudden increase in the number of people bought to 
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trial at the same time, as there was in 2005 at the ICTY, this may have result in an 
increased use of plea bargaining at the ICTR in order to decrease the strain on the 
tribunal and the professionals working within would come under (Interview with 
Pittman 2010).
45
 It might be argued that this is evidenced by the case of Damir Dosen 
(IT-95-8).
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 Here, the prosecutorial team entered in to a plea bargain, even after the 
presentation of their case, at the Rule 98 bis stage as the same prosecutorial team was 
concurrently preparing for trial in the Slobodan Milosevic case.  
Other occasions where plea agreements also have the potential to speed up 
trials are where defendants get ill during their trial, or are already in bad health 
slowing down trials because days have to be taken off in order for them to recuperate 
(Interview with Pittman 2010; Interview with Murphy 2010). This is not to say that 
this is universal and it is unlikely that the prosecution in the Mladic case (IT-09-92) 
will consider bad health as reasonable grounds to enter into negotiations with the 
defendant, as beneficial guilty plea have become to the tribunals, it would seem that 
some defendants and their cases are too ‘big’ to be disposed of through a negotiated 
plea. The utilitarian value of any admission of guilt from a defendant as notorious as 
General Mladic would presumably pale in comparison to an actual finding of guilt 
after a full and vigorous trial. It should also be noted that an increased number of plea 
agreements would bring about a greater number of convictions than full trials which 
in itself would be considered as rendering utilitarian benefits such as more 
perpetrators of atrocities being punished, more people being willing to admit their 
culpability, and a shedding of additional light on what happened which in turn helps 
build a more complete record of the events in question (Combs 2007: 45-57). 
 
There are a number of prominent academics, such as Alschuler (1981) and 
Fisher (2003), who believe that generally the sentences received after entering into 
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plea negotiations are inappropriate as they are too lenient. However, the concept of an 
‘appropriate sentence’ may differ depending on what the objectives of the criminal 
justice system in place are. A criminal system that is based on retribution would 
suggest a defendant should get a sentence of what is deserved in relation to the crime 
committed. In such circumstances, offering lower sentences in exchange for a guilty 
plea could undermine the purpose of sentencing a criminal. In a system that adheres to 
the utilitarian justifications for punishing criminals, the sentence received should 
incapacitate the perpetrator, act as a deterrent, or go towards their rehabilitation. 
Hence, lower sentences obtained through plea negotiations may be justifiable. 
However, when ‘rewarding’ defendants for admitting their guilt, it is worth bearing in 
mind that the sentences received should not be so discounted that it would appear that 
persons who elect to go to trial are punished with more severe sentences after 
conviction as, from a utilitarian perspective, it is not proper to punish a person 
excessively. As Mill states: 
[I]t is universally considered just that each person should obtain that … which 
he deserves; and unjust that he should obtain a good, or be made to undergo an 
evil, which he does not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest and most 
emphatic form in which the idea of justice is conceived by the general mind. 
(Mill 2004: 317) 
 
[A]ll punishment is mischief: all punishment is itself is evil. Upon the  
principle of utility, if ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted is 
as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil. (Bentham 2004: 97) 
 
Here, Bentham argues that the sentence handed down to a perpetrator should be 
sufficient to achieve utilitarian goals of punishment. Aschuler asks us to calculate how 
much of a sentence discount would equal the amount of money saved at trial by a 
guilty plea. He states that, ‘even to contemplate an exchange of human liberty (or of 
an interest strong enough to outweigh a defendants interest in liberty) for a purely 
economic benefit may seem to trivialise its value.’ (Aschuler 1981: 671) In light of 
this I feel that it is worth noting that the money saving and speedy trial completion 
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effects that comes from plea bargaining have been important reasons for its 
introduction into the international criminal system not just desirable effects or by 
products of it. Indeed, this is echoed in the statements made and already referred to by 
Wayde Pittman and Professor David Crane.  
 
3.2.2 Other Utilitarian Justifications for Plea Bargaining 
  
There are also a number of other utilitarian justifications.
47
 One is the hope that the 
negotiating defendant will act as a witness for the prosecution in other disputed cases, 
or give vital insider information to the Office of the Prosecutor. This is important on 
utilitarian grounds for a number of reasons that I will discuss later in this chapter. 
Here it is worth noting the fact that through this process there would be a witness who 
was willing to give evidence which once again would save the courts time and 
resources as the prosecution would not have to look further afield for other perhaps 
less knowledgeable witnesses and prepare them for trial. This in turn would no doubt 
work towards the smoother running of the tribunals.  
The notion of a defendant becoming a witness in exchange for a reduced 
sentence is a significant bargaining chip. As former SCSL Chief Prosecutor David 
Crane argues, plea bargaining a defendant, ‘should work for you, and move the case 
along’ (Interview with Crane 2009). With this in mind, at the SCSL the prosecutors 
set out a strategy through which they identified which persons to enter into 
negotiations with, or use as insider informants, and those with whom they would not. 
Reflecting this, Crane said that, ‘plea bargaining was clearly a possibility’ and as part 
of their strategy it was, ‘decided which defendants would be bought into the plea 
bargaining process’ as ‘plea bargaining done without association with the overall 
strategy in some cases may be dangerous, as you don’t know what the ramifications 
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are.’(Interview with Crane 2009) However, as noted earlier, insider evidence obtained 
as a result of the negotiations can help gain knowledge that would otherwise be 
difficult, costly and ultimately time consuming to acquire. Confirming this, Judge 
Antonio Cassese stated that, when asking the former Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY 
and ICTR for advice, she told him, ‘you have to find an insider. If you don’t you’re 
lost.’ (Stuart and Simons 2010: 86) This response highlights that this is an important 
utilitarian factor not only in its own right but that it most definitely aides the 
efficiency justifications for plea bargaining in war crime tribunals. 
There are also a number of other ways in which war crime tribunals can be 
made more efficient without resorting to the use of plea bargaining. Scharf points to 
two very practical measures. The first one is that these tribunals should be more 
selective in issuing indictments, thus reserving international criminal tribunals for the 
highest level of perpetrators. The second is that tribunals should adopt a broader idea 
of judicial notice where facts are generally accepted and do not have to be re-
established again in each new trial (Scharf 2004: 1080). Although these practices may 
indeed help tribunals conserve their resources, they will not do so to the same extent 
as plea bargaining. This is reflected in the fact that whilst the SCSL adopted a number 
of practices and strategies to help tribunals run more resourcefully, these did not 
relieve the prosecution of the desire to enter into plea bargaining if the opportunity 
arose (Interview with Crane 2009; Interview with De Silva 2010). 
 
3.2.3 Showing Remorse as a Utilitarian Factor in Plea Bargaining  
 
Another justification for the use of plea bargaining under the principle of 
utilitarianism is that the defendant may show or express remorse for what they have 
done. This argument asserts that the showing of remorse goes some way towards the 
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rehabilitation of a perpetrator. In turn, this is one of the major utilitarian justifications 
for punishment. Heart-felt apologies may also go towards easing tensions in the 
affected regions and aiding reconciliation. 
 The expression of remorse is a desirable aspect of admitting one’s guilt in 
many jurisdictions, such as in Japan where apologies and other displays of remorse 
are seen as substantial benefits (Combs, 2007: 146). However, showing remorse in 
others, such as in the UK, is not always an essential component. In the context of the 
international tribunals, even when remorse is not publically shown, a guilty plea is 
still considered to constitute a mitigating factor (Para 2.3 of SCG Guidelines). The 
SCG Guidelines suggest that, ‘The maximum reduction will be given only where the 
offender indicates willingness to admit guilt at the first reasonable opportunity’ (Para 
4.3 SCG Guidelines) (emphasis in the original). Significantly, and in contrast to the 
UK, the international criminal courts, when sentencing, do consider remorse to be a 
significant mitigating factor. In fact, they consider it to be of such significance that the 
ICTY has a section on their website entitled ‘Statements of Guilt’ in which, amongst 
other things, defendants express their remorse at their actions not only to the Trial 
Chamber but also to the wider public. So important is this deemed to be that it has 
been made available on-line, and one is able to now watch the defendants give these 
statements on the ICTY’s You Tube channel. When looking at the ICTY’s case law 
regarding guilty pleas, the Court it seems stresses that the display of remorse is a 
mitigating factor as it helps to encourage reconciliation in the (Combs 2001: 151-
152). Therefore if by putting these statements on the internet increasing the audience, 
it would therefore follow that the more people who see these statements the greater 
the potential reconciliatory effect. As a side note, in day to day life we tend to feel 
people who are remorseful when admitting their mistakes are more truthful. In 
relation to international crimes, the statement of facts of the defendants who show 
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remorse may be perceived as more truthful then a defendant’s who is not as 
apologetic. Consequently showing remorse when pleading guilty may well increase 
the overall utilitarian effect of plea bargaining.
48
  
Whilst it is therefore seemingly unquestioned by many that showing remorse 
is a positive thing, Bagaric and Amarasekara (2001) argue that there is in fact no 
strictly doctrinal justification for an offender to receive leniency because they feel 
sorry for their actions. Although their theoretical argument is sound, the actual, real 
life influence of remorse in relation to the practice of sentencing is plain to see, 
especially when positioned in relation to the ideals of utilitarianism.
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 Generally, the 
people that become defendants before war crime tribunals are those who have held 
power and managed to engender popular support for their ideas and actions during 
times of war. Therefore, given their position and ability to organise, encourage and 
implement the war crimes they are charged with, it is then not unreasonable to argue 
that if such a person was to display genuine and public remorse it would potentially 
go some way towards under cutting the ideologies used to justify mass violence as a 
legitimate form of action.    
But what actually is remorse? Bagaric and Amarasekara say that it is, ‘the 
feeling of regret or sorrow for what one has done.’(2001: 364) Although this may be 
true, Tudor, in a 2005 article, has critiqued their position offering a more 
encompassing and workable definition, especially for the purposes of war crimes 
trials, of remorse: 
Remorse is an experience involving a particular complex of dynamically 
interrelated elements of feeling, understanding, desire and will. More 
specifically, it involves the kind of suffering felt by someone who 
acknowledges a wrong they have done to another person, who regrets doing it 
and wishes that they had not done it, who now desires somehow to repair the 
harm done and somehow to redeem themself and who at some stage actually 
wills to action in some way in relation to that end (whether ultimately 
‘successfully’ or not). This complex experience, moreover, takes place over a 
period of time and is not a passing sensation.’ (Tudor 2005: 761) 
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In the scholarship on international war crime tribunals, there is a long standing 
relationship between the issue of remorse and sentencing. In fact, it has been said that, 
‘remorse is a bit of evidence that is important to consider.’ (Interview with Pittman 
2010) This relationship was first established at the IMT where the defendant Albert 
Speer not only pleaded guilty but also expressed remorse and repentance. As a result, 
he was convicted mainly for his use of slave labour and received a relatively lenient 
sentence of 20 years. Benjamin Ferencz, a Nuremberg prosecutor, when asked what 
difference it would have made if any of his accused showed remorse at the tribunal, 
said: 
I think I wouldn’t have tried him. I was prosecuting people who tried to justify 
their crimes. We had many prisoners’ we could have put hundreds of people 
from the Einsatzgruppen on trial. We had identified many. The notion that the 
Nuremberg trials were doing justice is inaccurate. It was only a small 
sampling. 
 
Going on to state that: 
The judges probably would have been more lenient in their sentencing if they 
had seen remorse. One important consideration was always, what excuses did 
the accused have? I think this is one reason why not everybody was sentenced 
to death. (Stuart and Simons, 2009: 22) 
 
In more contemporary war crime tribunals, the issue of remorse was established as a 
mitigating factor in the 1996 case of Drazen Erdemovic (IT-96-22), which 
coincidentally was also the first case to be dealt with by a guilty plea. Tieger points 
out that little attention was given to the objective content of the defendant’s actual 
statement of remorse which stated that, ‘I only wish to say that I feel sorry for all the 
victims in the former [sic] Bosnia and Herzegovina regardless of their nationality.’ 
(Sentencing Judgement: Para.15), stating that the Trial Chamber gave more emphasis 
and time evaluating the sincerity of his remorse (Tieger 2003: 780). This was 
presumably done in order to limit the influence of statements of remorse that were 
self- serving, and to prevent any potential credit given to an unremorseful defendant 
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who has merely given an eloquent public apology, or even to distinguish a defendant 
who is very sorry, but in fact only sorry that they had been caught and not for their 
criminal behaviour. In the case of Erdemovic, the chamber relied on a statement given 
by an ICTY investigator who said that, ‘he had no doubt that the accused’s feelings of 
sorrow and remorse were genuine and real.’ (Tieger 2003: 780) Following this, the 
ICTY continued emphasising and evaluating the genuineness of any remorse put 
before it. In Jelisic (IT-95-10), the court relied upon their appointed psychiatrist who 
did not support any claims of sincerity in the remorse expressed by this defendant. 
The Trial Chamber reasserted, as they did in Erdemovic, the need for the remorse to 
be genuine. When discussing whether he had seen true remorse at the ICTY Judge 
Cassese said, ‘only once I saw remorse, in Drazen Erdemovic.’ He goes on to say that, 
‘genuine remorse, I think, is very important. On that occasion I saw that somebody as 
human as I am happened to commit a crime because he found himself in the 
maelstrom of war ... I know that Erdemovic committed terrible crimes, he killed 
maybe 70 people, but I saw that he was really repenting.’ (Stuart and Simons, 2009: 
87) However, in other instances, the court found assertions of remorse far less 
convincing and acted accordingly. 
 There are of course a number of possibilities why the court found Goran 
Jelisic’s particular expression of remorse wanting, even though the defendant pleaded 
guilty to thirty one charges out of thirty two. Geoffrey Nice QC indicated that there 
had been a number of disagreements that had taken place within the OTP regarding 
his genocide charge (Interview with Nice 2010). Jelisic had not shown any remorse 
before entering his plea, and apparently did not demonstrate any signs of remorse 
when shown photographs of himself carrying out these crimes. This coupled with the 
fact that he introduced himself as the ‘Serbian Adolf’ to his victims (IT-95-10-T: para. 
102-3) probably influenced the Trial Chamber’s assessment that defendant was not 
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genuine in his remorse.  
Therefore, the issue of remorse can be an important one when entering into 
plea negotiations as, to quote Wade Pittman: ‘judges are going to consider it as 
evidence, but the weight they attach to it depends on a person’s credibility.’ 
(Interview with Pittman 2010) In the case of Jelisic, it would seem that the fact that 
the Trial Chamber had found his remorse to be unconvincing was held to be an 
aggravating factor when it came to sentencing. 
There are a number of other ways in which remorse may be expressed rather 
than in court or within a written statement showing sorrow. For example, it may be 
argued that if a defendant pleaded guilty and was willing to work with the prosecution 
they are almost automatically showing remorse in a material way by these deeds 
alone.
50
 Desmond De Silva has noted that in doing so a defendant may be, ‘exposing 
himself and his family to danger’ (De Silva, 2010) and this in itself should be worthy 
of credit which may ultimately be reflected in the sentence received.
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 Two such 
ICTY cases, which serve as good examples, are Drazen Erdemovic (IT-96-22) and 
Milan Babic (IT-03-72). Here both defendants were indeed very contrite and agreed to 
work with the prosecution with both giving evidence in other trials (Interview with 
Pittman 2010; Interview with Nice 2010). This arguably has more advantageous 
consequences as once again it saves the courts resources and helps with gaining 
information and evidence that may otherwise prove difficult, if not impossible to 
obtain.  
It is not easy to see how much this sort of remorse or such statements of 
remorse impact on post conflict societies and, more generally, the general 
international world community. According to Jonas Nilsson, the issue of remorse, if it 
is to have an effect in the affected regions then it ‘depends on how it is done’. He goes 
on to say that ‘a few of them had any effect in the region, some of them where very 
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open but some are very standard, self-serving’ and are performed as something that, 
‘should be done.’ (Interview with Nilsson 2010) This can be seen in a number of 
statements of remorse that have been received by modern day war crime tribunals, 
even to the point that defendants offer to work with the prosecution in order to take 
advantage of any leniency that is available to them, although they may not be 
genuinely contrite. 
 Wayne Jordash considered that in the SCSL judges were easily swayed by 
such self-serving statements of remorse, as, for example, in the instances of Morris 
Kallon and Issa Sesay (SCSL-04-15-T-1269)
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 (Interview with Jordash 2010). Here, 
both defendants had been found guilty after a trial for similar crimes but there was a 
10 year difference in the sentences that they received. According to Jordash, ‘there is 
the remorse that is expressed by the individual and there is the remorse that the 
institution perceives through cooperation with the individual.’ (Interview with Jordash 
2010) This may be indicative of the fact that the SCSL was set up 2002 - some nine 
years after the ICTY. De Silva notes that he and his colleagues had the benefit of 
being able to draw on the experiences of the ICTY. As the prosecution staff at the 
SCSL knew that they would have to be able to rely on insider testimony as well as 
evidence received from defendants in order to achieve ‘justice’ in an economically 
and politically acceptable time frame (Interview with De Silva 2010). 
 
3.2.4 Potential Dangers in Evaluating Remorse 
 
When evaluating the genuineness of remorse there is a number of other factors that 
cannot be accounted for in the actual written law, such as the demeanour, tone or 
conduct of the defendant. Again two examples that illustrate this point are the ICTY 
Erdemovic case, and the SCSL Sesay case. A number of the practitioners I have 
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spoken to who work in international tribunals have mentioned that the atmosphere in 
the court room, a person’s body language and the defendant’s conduct in the Trial 
Chamber all play a part in evaluating their percieved level of genuineness. Evaluating 
the genuiness of remorse can be a very difficult task,
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 and it would seem Trial 
Chambers have on occasion got it wrong. Mrs Plavsic, who was released from prison 
in October 2009, and had previously offered statements of remorse, has since re-
asserted her innocence (Nordren 2009).  
When dealing with the issues that arise during war crime trials, it is hard not to 
identify with the emotions that the participants of that case feel and express through 
non-verbal action, as empathy is a very ‘human’ instinct. The experienced Judge 
should be able to distinguish between genuine feelings of remorse or anguish and 
emotions that have been, ‘put on for show’. Of course, the prosecution also have to be 
experienced when evaluating whether remorse is genuine, or at least if it is useful for 
their case. Desmond De Silva reflects this opinion stating that, ‘the people appointed 
as chief prosecutors of international criminal tribunals are people of great experience’ 
and that they should be, ‘well able to distinguish of those who are really deserving of 
the greatest credit.’ (Interview with De Silva 2010) Of course, people are liable to get 
this wrong. When talking about Plavsic, former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and 
ICTR Carla Del Ponte stated, ‘she got up during her sentencing hearing and read out a 
statement full of generalist mea culpas but lacking compelling detail. I listened to her 
admissions in horror, knowing she was saying nothing.’ (Del Ponte 2008: 161) 
Despite this, at the time the Trial Chamber believed this admission to be genuine and 
felt that it would contribute towards the reconciliation effort in the Former 
Yugoslavia. 
  However, in different cultures there are different customs, principles and 
subsequently different interpretations of body language. If misunderstood or misread, 
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then this could create a potentially disastrous situation. For example a witness not 
looking at the judging panel or counsel when being question may be deemed to be not 
being truthful, or hiding something, but the reality maybe that, in some cultures not 
looking directly at a person is a sign of deference. This is of particular importance as 
the trials are broadcast over the internet and therefore potentially have a very wide 
audience who are also assessing the credibility of witnesses, in their own way. 
This is not to say that in the future that this issue of the policy implications of 
identifications and assessment of ‘demeanor’ or remorse relevant to relevant to 
utilitarian calculus may not cause problems. A particular example maybe, when 
cultural differences are more pronounced between the trial participants, which in turn 
may lead to the misinterpretation of things, such as body language. In order to help 
limit any potential problems, in the future any attention given to the demeanour of 
defendants should rest on substantial and tangible evidence rather than on conjecture 
or speculation (Tang, 578 F.3d at 1276, 1278). Therefore, from a utilitarian 
perspective, the Trial Chamber should not only continue to examine the genuineness 
of any remorse shown but also evaluate this remorse according to specific cultural 
interpretations and differences that may occur between persons in the trial to ensure 
that there is a basis for giving credit to a defendant as part of the overall 
consequentialist balancing of costs and benefits.  
 
3.2.5 Truth Telling and Historical Record 
  
Before looking in greater depth at the role of truth telling in plea bargaining from a 
utilitarian perspective, it is useful to look at the general idea of truth telling in war 
crime tribunals, which of course is one of the main functions and aims of international 
war crime tribunals, as it is hoped that the truth telling function of these tribunals will 
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help create a historical account of what happened. Albie Sachs, a former judge in 
South Africa’s Constitutional Court, has devised four rough categories of truth (Sachs 
2005). The first is ‘microscopic truth’, which according to Sachs, ‘whether in natural 
or social science, involves narrowing the field to a particular frame and excluding all 
variables except those to be measured. In a court of law, we pose and answer a 
particular question in a defined field. You identify, circumscribe and verify.’ (2005: 
np) In other words, it is the truth that lawyers debate and the facts that have to be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt (Harvey 2008: np). In the case of plea bargaining, 
this truth concerning ‘what really happened,’ is negotiated between the defence and 
the prosecution and facts do not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This is 
not necessarily a bad thing as facts that have been agreed upon may present a truer 
version of events than the ones that have been argued and debated over at a 
microscopic level in court. This is true even at the point at which investigations into 
Human Rights abuses are conducted. As Weizman, when discussing the Goldstone 
Report, which investigated Israel’s actions in Gaza in 2009, puts it, ‘[A]ssuming the 
reliability of human witnesses in Gaza would inevitably be contested, the authors of 
the Report opted for an increased emphasis on objectivity.’ (2010: 10) He went on to 
state that: 
[T]he assumption is that, unlike victim testimony the scientific evidence 
produced by expert witnesses is more difficult to contest legally, that the 
testimony of ‘things’ – bullets and missile casing, ruins, medical and autopsy 
reports, tissues showing the mark of white phosphorous cannot be undermined 
by any ‘suspect political subjectivity. (Weizman 2010: 10) 
 
The second is ‘logical truth’. That is, according to Sachs, ‘the generalised truth of 
propositions, the logic inherent in certain statements. It is arrived at by deductive and 
inferential processes, the capacity of language to reflect what is typical in nature as 
experienced by humanity.’ (Sachs 2005: np)  
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Sachs’ third category of truth is, ‘experiential truth’. This kind of truth is 
subjective as, in the context of war crime tribunals, the people often being called as 
witnesses have been steeped in a particular ideology and therefore the ‘facts’ that they 
are testifying to may be biased towards that ideology. Truth in these contexts then is 
rarely objective, and that is why courts of law test and debate it in such detail. When it 
comes to plea bargaining, the truth offered by the defendant may well be biased even 
though the actual crimes that are being admitted to are acknowledged by both parties. 
This would be the case in a fact bargain. This however may be complicated by the 
information that the version of facts the defendant is pleading guilty to maybe one that 
has been put forward by the OTP. As Zecevic explains when discussing the factual 
document that is required as part of the plea deal: 
This document which is drafted by the OTP, contains certain facts and 
constructions which are important for OTP’s theory of that particular case or 
some other future case. The accused are tempted to agree to such facts, even 
though some are obviously outside of their purview or knowledge, because 
they think naively that it can’t hurt them to confirm a thing or two they have 
no knowledge about. Such document on the other hand is a useful tool for 
Office of the prosecution to establish some facts or some constructions which 
will help them further their case in current or some future proceedings, even 
though the OTP according to ICTY Jurisprudence cannot rely on it as 
adjudicated fact. (Interview with Zecevic 2011) 
 
Such a situation has the potential to raise claims of victor’s justice.  
Sachs final concept of truth is ‘dialogical truth’. He describes this thus: 
[W]e all have different experiences of reality, and diverse interests and 
backgrounds that influence the meaning of experiences for ourselves. The 
debate between many contentions and points of view goes backwards and 
forwards, and a new synthesis emerges, is challenged, controverted, and a 
fresh debate ensues. The process is never-ending, there is no finalised truth. 
(Sachs 2005 np)  
 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC), which I shall return to shortly, to 
a certain extent embody ‘dialogic truth’, which is generally are more holistic version 
of what has occurred as all positions in the conflict are heard. It is argued that this has 
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the potential to lead to, ‘opportunities for closure, healing and reconciliation’ (Kiss 
2000: 69). This relates very closely to the notion of Ubuntu which is part of African 
philosophy and is a form of restorative justice. The idea of Ubuntu is that a person 
endures as a person through the recognition of other persons (Graybill 1998: 47). In 
other words, both the victim and perpetrator have to be able to recognise the ‘person’ 
or humanity in the other for Ubuntu. In dialogical truth the victim and the perpetrator 
are able to imagine the position the other was in, and is in presently. Therefore there 
would be no finite conclusion to this process. Dialogical truth may be seen as not 
compatible with judicial proceedings where there is an end to the process and 
guilt/blame is apportioned and someone is punished accordingly.  
   In the final record of an international war crime tribunal, there should only be one 
prospective of what really happened and there should be no room for differing 
positions. By which I mean if a defendant has been found guilty, that is to say that it 
would be generally accepted that certain atrocities occurred, a full final record would 
not leave any doubt for those who wish to deny such atrocities ever occurred. Again 
when to comes to plea bargaining, although compelling arguments have been put 
forward by Combs (2007) for plea agreements to include more restorative elements, in 
reality they never can be truly restorative. This is because there is no possibility for a 
dialogue between the parties to occur. This is due to the fact that in a criminal trial 
each party involved is protecting their own interests, and not that of the wider 
community. Much of the judicial legal process is concerned with finding the 
connections between microscopic truth and logical truth (Sachs 2005). This in turn 
produces a kind of truth but not necessarily the truth. Once plea bargaining is 
introduced, the possibility of even this occurring is diminished as the idea of the truth 
may be even further distorted.
54
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   One of the most candid exchanges with regard to a defendant pleading guilty took 
place in open court at the ICTY in the case of Prosecutor v Kunarac (IT-96-
23&23/1). Although the defendant ended up pleading not guilty and going to trial, he 
initially wanted to plead guilty to one charge of rape as a Crime against Humanity but 
not guilty to three other counts that were concerned with the crime of torture. The 
prosecution stated in open court that they would, in exchange for a guilty plea to three 
counts, were willing to drop the count of torture as a Grave Breach stating that, ‘In 
regard to Article 2 -- count 42 -- we would be ready to withdraw this count, but about 
the other two counts, we would like to have some time for consideration.’ (9 March 
1998) It is clear from subsequent conversations in open court (10 & 13 March 1998) 
that the crux of these negotiations centred around the facts and one of the reasons 
negotiations failed was because the defence and the prosecution could not agree upon 
what the facts were. Dragoljub Kunarac stated, ‘I am the only one who knows the real 
truth. I know why I said yesterday that I was guilty of count 41. I also know why the 
public prosecutor did not drop count 42.’ (10 March 1998) This exchange offers us 
the slightest insight into negotiations as the OTP publicly declared they would drop 
one count one day and the next day refused to drop any counts as they were unable to 
negotiate an agreed version of the facts. It also highlights one of the themes that run 
throughout this thesis that is the matter of truth in this area.  
Different people have different versions of the truth and what the defendant 
may perceive to be truthful may not be what is acceptable as truth within conception 
of legal truth. It should also be noted that when discussing complex crimes where the 
different charges often relate to each other plea bargaining has the potential to prevent 
the ‘whole picture’ of what happened emerging. As Zecevic put it, ‘I am still not at all 
sure if the plea bargaining in the context of war crime tribunals is especially useful 
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tool, as the complexity of crimes is such that it is very hard to take one specific crime 
out of context of other crimes.’ (Interview with Zecevic 2011) 
When considering the role of truth telling in plea bargaining from a utilitarian 
perspective, the truth needs to be of a kind that will be acceptable to most people. This 
means that although there may be issues about the nuances about what is truthful both 
legally and factually, for it to be truly beneficial one must disregard these in order to 
bring about a truth that under the theory of utilitarianism is not concerned with this, 
but is a truth that the public and people in the post conflict society can accept. This of 
course means that Zecevic’s assertions above may be redundant under utilitarianism. 
 
3.2.6 Plea Bargaining and ‘Agreed’ Versions of the ‘Truth’ 
 
It would seem that there are many ways in which the truth can be derived within 
international tribunals. To get a more complete version of the truth and historical 
record, a holistic approach should be taken where there are a number of aspects 
considered together. As Hirsh points out: 
There are many different ways of producing truth: law, fiction, journalism, art, 
memoir, historiography, religion, science, astrology. All have their own rules, 
methods and norms, but also their own claims and purposes. If we understand 
these different approaches to truth-finding as social processes, then we do not  
have to judge that one is authentic and the others fake; but nor do we have to 
judge that they are all equally valid. While they overlap, they all have distinct 
objectives and ways of operating. (Hirsch 2003: 146)  
 
He goes on to argue that the rules that govern these trials create a different method of 
producing a normative truth not a better version of truth (Hirsh 2003: 392). Having 
considered the different forms truth can take, I will now move on to look at the actual 
role of truth telling and the historical record in international criminal tribunals where 
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plea negotiations are concerned using a utilitarian perspective. When a defendant 
admits to their guilt they are saying, or at least recognising, that the alleged crimes 
happened and that they are responsible for them. In doing so, they may offer an 
explanation as to why they committed such crimes and furthermore give information 
about other defendants. In other words, ‘[P]lea agreements can generate a contribution 
to the historical record of inestimable value – the indispensable prospective of the 
perpetrator.’ (Tieger and Shin 2005: 671) This gives rise to a number of restorative 
principles such as providing factual details about crimes that only the defendant could 
know about. For example, why a particular victim was chosen and how they were 
(mis)treated. This may also help to understand why such atrocities took place, 
undercutting the mythologies that encouraged nationalism, racism and other forms of 
hatred. Furthermore, it may highlight the manipulation and propaganda used to 
encourage violence. Such agreements also lead to information about crimes that 
others have committed or the involvement of other would be defendants, hence aiding 
the potential prosecution of other wrongdoers. Reiterating David Crane’s earlier 
assertions that when entering into a plea agreement, ‘you want the witness (defendant) 
to work for you’ as this ‘helps move the case along’ (Interview with Crane 2009).  
Another principle, which is significant from a societal perspective, is that the 
acknowledgement by a perpetrator that they were involved in committing these crimes 
helps undercut any denials that generally can follow on from mass human rights 
violations, and this serves as a utilitarian benefit to overall social welfare (Combs 
2007: 171). This view was eloquently expressed by Desmond De Silva, who said, 
‘now people come along and say, “the Holocaust was invented in Hollywood” it’s 
very strange is it not that the defendants at Nuremberg didn’t say that these things 
never occurred’. He continued, ‘for all those people that came along and said that it 
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was all rubbish, why did the defence at Nuremberg not come along and say it was all 
rubbish?’ (Interview with De Silva 2010) The assumption is that a defendant is telling 
the truth and that goes towards establishing a truthful historical account of what has 
occurred. De Silva believes this is an important aspect of international criminal 
tribunals as they, ‘create an independent record for some awful tragedy that happened 
for the people involved and the crimes that were committed.’ Therefore, for him, 
tribunals, such as Nuremberg, ‘preserve a record of all the terrible crimes committed 
for the record’ (Interview with De Silva 2010).  
In reality, the use of plea bargaining probably only develops a partially truthful 
historical record because defendants plead guilty to allegations that have only the 
vaguest details of the actual nature of the atrocities that occurred (Prosecutor v 
Deronjic).
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 This was the case in Plavsic where the defendant provided information 
on a number of things, some of which were in her own personal knowledge, such as 
‘what Krajisnik said, etc’, and some, which she did not have direct knowledge of and 
‘didn’t see herself’, such as the commission of ‘particular crimes in particular 
localities’ (Interview with Nice 2010). Also, during plea negotiations defence counsel 
and the prosecution can spend months establishing a version of events they both agree 
upon potentially making the historical record an unnatural and synthesised truth 
(Interview with Jordash 2010). When discussing his clients’ and his own experiences, 
Jordash stated that, ‘you’re trying to hatch out the best deal for yourself, there’s truth 
and there’s something a bit less than truth.’ (Interview with Jordash 2010) This can be 
sharply contrasted with a full trial where most of the details relating to the crime, such 
as the who, the what, the when and the how, are admitted into the proceedings. 
Although a full trial does allow there to be more scope for more of the facts of what 
happened to be presented, one should be careful not to attach too much attention to 
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the establishment of a historical record as the truth established at such tribunals. As 
Louise Arbour argued, when speaking of her experiences as the chief prosecutor for 
the ICTY, ‘The courts cannot provide the historical record, because history leaves 
room for doubt, it can be revised. But justice binds itself to a permanent and official 
interpretation of facts, because it has a need for finality.’ (Stuart and Simons 2009: 
28) This sentiment is also shared by Judge Liu Daquin who, when presiding at the 
Vidoje Blagojevic (IT-02-60) trial at the ICTY, cautioned both the defence and the 
prosecutor for their improper conduct and personal attacks on each other in court. He 
said, ‘This is a tribunal – and international court – not a truth and reconciliation 
commission… The massacre in Srebrenica is a very big issue, and historians – not this 
tribunal – should provide answers to many of the questions,’ and reminded the parties 
present that the ‘mandate of the Tribunal is limited in this respect.’ He went on to say, 
‘It is the purpose of this tribunal to determine whether the accused is guilty or not 
guilty in respect of that incident.’ (Transcript 22nd June 2004)  
Such reasoning is not new and can also be found in Hannah Arendt’s critique 
of the Eichmann trial. She too believed that the criminal trial should not introduce 
historical, political and educational objectives, but should only aim to determine the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence: 
The purpose of the trial is to render justice, and nothing else; even the noblest 
ulterior purposes- ‘the making of a record of the Hitler regime…’ can only 
detract from the law’s main business: to weigh the charges brought against the 
accused, to render judgement and to mete out due punishment. (Arendt 1963: 
251) 
 
Another utilitarian aspect of plea bargaining, as already mentioned, is that the 
potential it offers for charges to be dropped or lead to charge bargaining where 
questions of the balance of costs and benefits also come to the fore. This aspect 
definitely impairs the achievement of creating a historic record as certain charges, 
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often the most gravest of crimes, are removed from the court’s agenda (Prosecutor v 
Plavsic, Prosecutor v Momir Nikolic). This does not mean that the agreed upon facts 
and charges are fictional. One of the main features of the plea bargaining process is 
that there needs to be a factual basis to what the defendant is pleading guilty to, and 
this theoretically gives a very narrow scope for untruthful charges and statements. The 
onus then is on the judges to make sure this is upheld, and neither the prosecution nor 
the defence is abusing the plea bargaining process. This therefore means that there 
would need to be a factual basis to the crimes which the defendant is pleading guilty 
to. The defendant would also be able to answer questions that are posed to them by 
the judges or undergo a cross examination. Not only would this give a more nuanced 
version of what happened and why, it would also ensure that that the defendant is in 
fact pleading guilty to crimes committed by themselves and that they are guilty of 
(Interview with Pittman 2010). 
When talking about truth telling in the context of international criminal courts 
it is important not to confuse the role of truth telling with judgements, which of course 
is the primary function of criminal courts. As discussed above, not only are there a 
number of different truths, there are also a number of different versions of the truth 
and different ways of obtaining it. Although one of the purposes of these tribunals is 
to formulate a truthful record of what happened, it does not produce the whole truth 
by any stretch of the imagination. As the prosecution may wish to conceal 
embarrassing aspects of the trials, for example, one of the reasons the ICTY 
negotiated a plea deal with Stevan Todorovic was because they did not want the 
details of his arrest, which was done illegally, to be challenged. No doubt the Trial 
Chamber came under great pressure from NATO to make the allegations ‘disappear’. 
The official press release of the ICTY states: 
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On 13 December 2000 there was a hearing on the joint ex parte and 
confidential motion filed by the Office of the Prosecutor and counsel for 
Stevan Todorovic, dated 29 November 2000. The joint motion reflected a 
negotiated plea agreement whereby Stevan Todorovic would plead “guilty” to 
Count 1 of the indictment, namely persecutions on political, racial and 
religious grounds, as a crime against humanity. The agreement also provided 
that the accused would withdraw all Motions pending before the Trial 
Chamber relating to the evidentiary hearing regarding the circumstances of his 
arrest and his request for judicial assistance. Specifically, he would withdraw 
the allegations that his arrest was unlawful and that SFOR or NATO was 
involved in any unlawful activity in relation to his arrest. (Press Release, 11 
December 2001) 
 
Plea bargaining may also occur when issues pertaining to the case, if disclosed at trial, 
may jeopardise national security or, in the case of Todorvic, embarrass an 
international legal institution. The use of plea bargaining restricts microscopic truth 
telling and therefore prevents a more encompassing historical record. Consequently, 
any truth that is generated through the use of plea bargaining must be concrete. Also 
situations where defendants claim at a later date that they were indeed innocent and 
pleaded guilty for other reasons, as in the case of Mrs Plavsic, cannot occur, and the 
defendant’s guilt cannot be contested at a later date (Nordren 2009).  
Despite these criticisms, even the synthesised truth that comes with plea 
bargaining, along with an admission of guilt, may ultimately generate tangible 
outcomes that need to be included within the overall utilitarian calculus of costs and 
benefits in relation to the consequences of different options. It may be a powerful 
creator of a historical record that is acceptable to post conflict societies and the world 
in general as some blame and responsibility has been acknowledged and punishment 
apportioned. So whilst guilty pleas and negotiated justice do not produce the truth 
they do, if done genuinely, produce a truth that is not only acceptable for the courts 
but also the people the courts wish to bring justice to. As Oscar Wilde said, ‘the truth 
is rarely pure and never simple.’ (Wilde 1895) 
111 
 
 
3.2.7 Plea Bargaining, Truth, and Reconciliation, within Post Conflict Societies 
 
Many commentators argue that one of the outcomes of international criminal justice 
that needs to be included in any utilitarian calculus is that it has the potential to bring 
about reconciliation in the post conflict societies they work with. For example 
Graham Blewitt, former Deputy Prosecutor at the ICTY, holds that ‘[t]he ICTY was 
established, in part, as a measure for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, through its ability to contribute to reconciliation in the territorial States torn 
by violence and disunity.’ (Blewitt 2006: 151)56 Reconciliation is a consequentalist 
aspect of plea bargaining, and this is a factor important mainly in International War 
Crime Tribunals where whole societies are coming to terms with mass violence and 
atrocity. Admitting guilt and culpability for the crimes that have occurred have 
contributed towards helping communities to find closure, allowing them to move 
forward without animosity towards their previous enemies. Coming to terms with the 
atrocity that has occurred, according to Dr Alex Boraine, the former vice chair of 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is a precondition for 
reconciliation since defendants who acknowledge their responsibility may show 
victim communities that they accept the role that they have played in their suffering. 
Boraine himself, testified in the Plavsic case that the reconciliation aspect of plea 
bargaining is only effective if the facts of the crimes are disclosed fully and the 
victims are put at the centre of the proceeding instead of the defendant whether that be 
judicial or non-judicial proceedings such as a truth and reconciliation commission 
(Plavsic, Judgement February 2003, Paragraph 75-77; Schuon 2010: 222).  
There has, over the past few years, been some debate about the reconciliatory 
effect of plea bargaining in War Crime Tribunals defined as a positive benefit to 
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overall social welfare (Henham 2003, Henham and Findlay 2005, Combs 2007). With 
Jorgensen asserting that an acknowledgement of guilt is arguably more significant for 
reconciliation than a finding of guilt (Jorgensen 2002: 406).  
One important, yet predictable, factor to consider when discussing utilitarian 
justifications of plea bargaining is that this practice does in fact increase the sheer 
number of convictions. This occurs in a context where for many including victim 
groups that is or should be precisely the central aim of such tribunals namely, to 
ensure that as many of those responsible for war crimes are punished, rather than only 
a small sample receiving exemplary justice. Furthermore, as an increase in the number 
of convictions could indeed aide post conflict societies feeling safer and having more 
confidence in the criminal justice system that has been imposed upon them. Of course, 
this would be through the utilitarian justifications of punishment that would lead to 
incapacitation, deterrence and rehabilitation. Also, the increased number of 
convictions may make it more difficult for people to revise history, and possibly help 
communities to come to terms with the knowledge that their politicians and leaders 
had used nationalist propaganda to manipulate them.  
Having put forward this argument of a positive outcome relevant to utilitarian 
cost benefit analysis, we also need to recognise the possible limitations of plea 
bargains in specific contexts. For example, it is interesting to note that Slobodan 
Zecevic, who was involved in two plea bargains at the ICTY, said, ‘I am pretty sure 
that the victims perceive the plea bargains as a way out for perpetrators and they are 
very unhappy about it. There is still a fierce opposition for plea bargains in the region. 
On top plea bargains do not help reconciliation in the post conflict societies.’ 
(Interview with Zecevic 2011) This sentiment is echoed by Moghalu who, when 
debating the reconciliatory effect of having full trials where evidence is heard and 
debated, says, ‘[D]eep seated resentments – key obstacles to re-conciliation – are 
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removed and people on different sides of the divide can feel that a clean slate has been 
provided for.’ (Moghalu 2004: 216) 
When considering the effect of individual defendants pleading guilty the issue 
of reconciliation only became an explicitly reasoned factor after the Plavsic case. 
However, this does not mean that reconciliation was not a mitigating factor in other 
guilty plea cases. It was, but it was only merely asserted as one, and never reasoned as 
one (Schuon 2010: 222). In Plavsic, the prosecution justified their lenient sentence 
recommendation by saying the guilty plea was ‘an unprecedented contribution to the 
establishment of truth and a significant effort toward the advancement of 
reconciliation’ (Plavsic Sentencing Brief, Paragraph 24). When reflecting on the 
defendant’s guilty plea, the Trial Chamber felt that by acknowledging her crimes Mrs 
Plavsic did indeed promote reconciliation (Plavsic Judgement February, 2003, 
Paragraph 77). Even Alex Boraine testified to the positive reconciliatory effect Mrs 
Plavsic’s admission of guilt had on her. This was not just a solitary case as this train 
of thinking went on in other cases. In Obrenovic (IT-02-60/2-S) the prosecution 
determined that this defendant’s guilty plea, ‘represents a significant effort towards 
the advancement of reconciliation.’ (Sentencing Brief, Paragraph 280). In other cases 
the Trial Chambers have felt that reconciliation is also aided by guilty pleas as they 
help establish a true record of events. The case of Momir Nikolic is an example of this 
where the Trial Chamber referred to a statement given by a survivor of the Srebrencia 
massacre who spoke about the effect of Nikolic’s guilty plea: 
The confessions have bought me a sense of relief I have not known since the 
fall of Srebrenica in 1995. They have given me the acknowledgement I have 
been looking for these past eight years. While far from an apology, these 
admissions are a start. We Bosnian Muslims no longer have to prove we were 
victims. Our friends and cousins, fathers and brothers were killed – we no 
longer have to prove they were innocent. (Prosecutor v Nikolic (IT-02-60/1-S 
Section A, Judgment, 2 December 2003, Paragraph 146) 
 
Similarly, in the Deronjic case, a victim testified to the beneficial attributes of his 
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guilty plea: 
I saw Miroslav Deronjic plead guilty on television. The Bosnian Muslims in 
the community that I have spoken to, felt relieved because he admitted his 
guilt. This is a positive thing and can heal the wounds of the community 
provided that he is punished adequately. (Prosecutor v Deronjic IT-02-61-S 
Judgment, 30 March 2004, Paragraph 238) 
 
In the cases of Milan Babic and Momir Nikolic the victims have also expressed that 
pleading guilty has positive reconciliatory effects.  
 Schoun (2010: 224) points out that whilst the ICTY does recognise that there 
is a reconciliatory effect of pleading guilty taking it in to consideration when deciding 
what sentence to pass, the tribunal does not assert this formally in its case law. 
Instead, it uses words such as ‘may’ promote reconciliation (Cesic IT-95-10/1-S) or 
‘can’ (Momir Nikolic) and ‘has the potential to strengthen the foundations for 
reconciliation’ (Miodrag Jokic IT-01-42/1-S, Judgement, 18 March 2004, Paragraph 
77). Whilst this aspect could be better asserted by the use of more precisely defined 
words, the ICTR has generally followed suit. One exception is the case of Prosecutor 
v Bisengimana (ICTR-00-60-T) where the Chamber held that the defendant’s plea 
‘will assist the administration of justice as well as in national reconciliation.’ 
(Judgement, April 13 2006, Paragraph 128) Therefore, when sentencing a defendant 
the Trial Chamber should be clear in terms of what factors they consider to be 
mitigating and aggravating and how much weight they are giving to each. Therefore 
making the sentencing process more transparent, not only for the parties involved in 
the trial but also the victim communities and the general public, will create a better 
understanding of why a certain sentence was given. This, in turn, offers the possibility 
of stopping the feeling that the sentences handed out are too lenient and places other 
defendants who follow in a better position to make informed decisions as to whether 
they will plead guilty or not. 
 The supposed reconciliatory effects of plea bargaining are considered as 
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mitigating factors when establishing an appropriate sentence for a defendant. Alex 
Boraine, in Plavsic, stated that full disclosures of the facts are needed for 
reconciliation to take place. However, this does not always happen when dealing with 
plea bargains. The very nature of plea bargains suggests that the prosecution and the 
defence agree upon a version of the actual facts, agree on what witnesses should be 
called, and not to mention that the plea itself has been negotiated. This is done in 
order to reach a mutually beneficial outcome, and the notion of promoting 
reconciliation is only an afterthought, although a very influential one.  
 
3.2.8 Plea Bargaining and Truth and Reconciliation: Utilitarianism in action 
 
It has been the case in a number of post conflict societies that the governments’ 
establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, such as the ones seen in South 
Africa and Argentina. As already touched upon, this is where people have been able 
to come forward with information about the crimes committed without the fear of 
criminal prosecutions. On the whole, this has been seen to be a successful endeavour 
with some eighteen countries choosing to set up Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions of some sort. This has enabled the establishment of a truthful record of 
what happened, why it happened and how it happened in the hope that this process 
would bring closure to the people affected, and in turn bring some form of justice. The 
commissions also act as a learning tool from which people can learn how not to repeat 
the past human rights violations. 
 A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set up in Sierra Leone which 
worked alongside the SCSL. This TRC was headed by Bishop Joseph Humper, from 
the United Methodist Church.
57
 The Commission was established as a condition of the 
Lome Peace Accord in order to, ‘create an impartial historical record of violations and 
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abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed 
conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to 
respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to 
prevent a repletion of the violations and abuses suffered.’(The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, Parliament of Sierra Leone, 2000) 
 There are also a number of community based grass roots initiatives that take 
place which are aimed at helping people reconcile their differences and move forward. 
Ultimately, the reasons for criminal proceedings are based around retributive themes 
and the need for some sort of punishment. This is the case even with defendants who 
pleading guilty where there is still a strong element of retributive justice as they are 
sentenced for the crimes committed. By in large then, such institutions are concerned 
with retributive justice. However, they are usually coupled with a lack of any actual 
concrete evidence concerning any positive role of reconciliation after a guilty plea. 
Hence, I would argue that, when determining a defendant’s sentence afterwards, the 
Trial Chamber should not, at least not by reference to utilitarian criteria, regard this as 
one of the major mitigating factors that they consider. Indeed, just as the chambers 
recognise that there may be a positive effect on reconciliation they should not pass 
sentence as if there is automatically a positive effect on the resolution process when a 
defendant pleads guilty. Likewise, if a Trial Chamber does believe the defendant’s 
contrition and that the guilty plea has had a positive effect regarding the reconciliation 
they should then state this in their judgement and not just in the sentence they hand 
down. This is not to say that TRC’s are not desirable, but it is worth noting that David 
Crane, former Chief Prosecutor of the SCSL said that, in South Africa, the TRC 
encouraged people to, ‘come and tell the truth, and if they came and told the truth and 
admitted there guilt then there was no prosecution, and that is a plea bargain.’ 
(Interview with Crane 2009)  
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   Although a plea of guilty is normally met with a sentence reduction, the reasons 
why one would enter into plea negotiations can be very different to the rationale for 
testifying in front of a TRC. When it comes to plea bargaining, it is rarely the case 
that a defendant pleads guilty solely for the reasons that they want to tell the truth. 
There are of course exceptions to this (Erdemovic) but normally there is a level of 
discussion that takes place before the guilty plea regarding what facts will be 
submitted to the courts. However, in the case of a TRC people are, ‘able to say their 
piece and get their agony off their chest and tell the world what they felt and what 
they were involved in, without any penalties.’ (Interview with De Silva 2010) There is 
potentially a greater chance of reconciliation when the person is admitting their 
involvement in atrocities and is testifying in their own words. This allows for a realist 
truth rather than the agreed upon forensic truth that criminal trials and plea bargains 
bring about. 
War crime trials do not automatically help in the reconciliation process as they 
are not a panacea to the problems in a post conflict society. The tribunal’s work must 
be complemented with other transnational justice initiatives, and community based 
programs for it to aid reconciliation. This is also true when admitting guilt and giving 
insider evidence does not aid post conflict societies’ reconciliation processes. When 
reviewing the case law governing guilty pleas and plea bargaining there a 
disproportionate amount of consideration to the role of reconciliation when sentencing 
and what the Trial Chambers are willing to commit to in their judgements. This can be 
shown by the victims outside the BiH State Court in the case of Dusan Fustar (IT-20-
65). After initially pleading not guilty to charges brought against him at the ICTY, his 
case was referred to the BiH State Court, pursuant to Rule 11 bis of the ICTY’s Rules 
of Evidence and Procedure. He then entered in to a plea deal and pleaded guilty to 
crimes against humanity during his time as a shift commander at the Keraterm camp, 
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and received a nine year sentence. Clark notes, from her first-hand experience of 
being present in court the day Fustar’s co-accused were sentenced, that victims held a 
peaceful demonstration outside against the plea deal Fustar had entered into 
brandishing banners stating, ‘Sudite umjesto da trgujete’ (Judge [war criminals] 
instead of trading [with them]). She states that the victims had not been sufficiently 
informed about the plea deal due to poor communication, particularly with regard to 
the court’s outreach programme (Clark 2009: 436).   
 
 
3.2.9 According the Interests of the Victims and Witnesses   
 
Although normally associated with plea bargaining in domestic jurisdictions, it is also 
true that its use in war crime tribunals obviates witnesses and victims from going 
through the trauma of giving evidence in court and ‘this must have merit’ (Interview 
with Khan 2010; Bohlander 2001: 161). Certainly, where there are a considerable 
number of potential witnesses, most of whom dread retelling their stories, a utilitarian 
is likely to regard the avoidance of such a possibility as falling on the benefits sides of 
the cost or benefit divide that forms part of their calculus. There have been a number 
of cases where this was considered to be a substantially advantageous effect of plea 
bargaining. For example, in the case of Zelenovic (IT-96-23/2) the Trial Chamber said 
the defendant’s guilty plea spared his victims from reliving their trauma when giving 
evidence especially as some has been raped and tortured (TC, Judgement, 4 April 
2007, Para. 49). Also, relieving witnesses from giving evidence may also be 
advantageous when they are unable to articulate the harm they have received. This 
may be due to their young age when they witnessed the crimes in question, or in the 
case of child soldiers, where there were exceptional circumstances which may result 
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in such witnesses not being able to understand the full legal consequences of their 
actions. It can also become very distressing for such witnesses to give evidence when 
they do not understand the actual nature of the questions being asked during direct 
and cross examinations due to cultural, educational and language differences between 
them and the trial staff (Combs 2010, Interview with Taku 2010; Interview with 
Zecevic 2011). This is also true when it comes to insufficient translations and 
witnesses cannot answer the questions asked of them or give answers that, when 
translated, may mean something different (Combs 2010: 78).   
    As Zecevic suggests, the credibility of witnesses is affected by problems with 
translations, ‘my experience at the ICTY is that it is extremely hard, if possible at all, 
for Judges to fully and correctly assess the credibility of the witness testimony if they 
don’t speak the language of the witness.’ (Interview with Zecevic 2011) This of 
course may prove to be very distressing for witnesses. Therefore, in these situations 
sparing witnesses from giving evidence is a compelling utilitarian justification for 
using of plea bargaining. De Silva reiterated that pleading guilty is a mitigating factor, 
arguing that, ‘when you have traumatized people, women who have been raped many 
times, children who have had their arms hacked off, others who have seen their 
parents hacked to bits before their eyes… It’s even worse when you have a defendant 
who may be guilty, who instructs his counsel to attack these people who might have 
suffered enough,’ he goes on to say, ‘these people, if found guilty, are deserving of no 
mercy at all.’ (Interview with De Silva 2010)  
However emotionally charged and persuasive these comments are, it is very 
important from a liberal perspective for the tribunals to treat defendants equally. In 
other words, if a defendant pleads guilty to certain crimes, their sentence should not 
be substantially different to another defendant who may have been found guilty of the 
exact same crimes and which were carried out under similar circumstances.
58
 
120 
 
Similarly, in cases, such as those associated with the Srebrenica trials of Momir 
Nikolic (IT-02-60/1-S) and Dragan Obrenovic (IT-02-60/2-S), the victims and 
witnesses would be recalled a number of times across a number of cases. Not only 
would these repeated appearances, where they would be questioned in detail about 
their ordeals, cause considerable strain, they could also cause serious disruption to 
their ‘normal’ everyday life due to the repeated requests to give evidence at 
international trials. 
For all this, commentators such as Moghalu suggest that providing evidence is 
a cathartic process giving a voice to the victims, he argues that, ‘[W]hen justice is 
done, and seen to be done, it provides a catharsis for those physically or 
psychologically scarred by violations of international humanitarian law.’ (Moghalu 
2004: 216)
59
 This process allows victims to partake in the trial proceedings and, ‘their 
side of the story’ to be heard.’ This eventually brings about closure, as Rauxloh 
argues, ‘the public exposure at trial is part of the satisfaction brought to the victims 
and an important part of the justice process.’ (Rauxloh 2011: 13) This process is 
obviously denied if a defendant enters into a plea bargain. In this vein Clark asserts 
that, ‘especially in the context of mass atrocities, the criminal trials also serve as an 
official venue for the acknowledgement of the victims’ injuries.’60 (Clark 2003: 103)  
It should be noted here however that international criminal proceedings are not meant 
to be therapeutic to the witness. 
  The future of plea bargaining in international criminal law is set to enter 
unchartered ground under the rules of the ICC regarding the interest of the victims as 
the rules shift to allow for victim participation.
61
 This, according to Murphy, ‘will 
change the landscape’ and may make ‘negotiations much more complicated, as 
victims may say that a case can’t be resolved without A, B, C and some provision for 
the victim.’ (Interview with Murphy 2010) The ICC may also order the presentation 
121 
 
of additional evidence despite the accused entering into a guilty plea, but this will 
only be done if it is in the ‘interest of justice.’ This provides a sensible balance 
between the need for victims to testify in order to properly determine the facts and the 
benefits of saving victims the distress of giving evidence. Petrig emphasizes that this 
may also change the self-perception of the victim in a positive way. She argues that, 
‘the mere act of re-conceptualising oneself as a participant of a criminal trial and 
possibly even as the holder of rights can offer a sense of empowerment.’ (Petrig 
2008:23) If this is the case, those undertaking the process must be aware that 
excluding the voice of the victims in the plea bargaining process may further continue 
the cycle of victimhood within effected communities.  
Sparing victims the trauma of testifying and cross examination has 
traditionally been a strong utilitarian justification for plea bargaining. This still is a 
very pervasive argument especially in domestic jurisdictions, where generally there is 
only one victim. In international law there are normally many victims of a particular 
crime and the victims in the ICC STL and ECCC have been given an enhanced role 
within criminal proceedings. They have now been given the right to be heard and 
represented by counsel within the actual proceedings. This is still a new concept and 
in relation to plea bargaining victim participation is still uncharted territory. I now 
turn to see how victims may be integrated into the plea bargaining process.   
 
3.2.10 Integrating Victims into the Plea Bargaining Process 
 
Traditionally there have been no formal rights for victims in international criminal 
proceedings and this is particularly true with respect to plea bargaining. The only 
consideration victims are given in plea bargaining practices is that it saves them from 
giving in court evidence. Seemingly, there has been some effort to rectify this by 
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allowing victims to have a role in trial proceedings. The ECCC, STL and ICC
62
 have 
all introduced the concept of victim participation. To date the only time this has 
actually been put in practice has been at the ECCC where victim groups have been 
represented by counsel. The most prominent case is that of Kaing Geuk Eav, alias 
Duch (Case 001). Duch, a former member of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, was the 
first defendant at the ECCC and to date the only one to plead guilty in front of this 
particular tribunal. However, there were a number of complications surrounding his 
guilty plea including the fact that the ECCC has no provisions for accepting guilty 
pleas and that the defendant must undergo a full trial. It is worth pointing out here that 
no negotiations had taken place between Duch and the prosecution (Roux 2009).
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Nevertheless, it is worth looking at how the civil parties operated in this context and 
how they were perceived in this trial as Francois Roux one of Duch’s defence lawyers 
has said in an interview with the Cambodian Tribunal Monitor that he felt that they 
had been confusing their roles and had started to act as prosecutors (Roux 2009). 
The notion of victim participation comes from the civil law model, and like 
many legal concepts that have been transplanted into the international legal system 
from a domestic one there is some form of confusion as how such concepts work, 
both in theory and in practice. It is important to remember that this concept is still in 
its infancy in international criminal law and has yet to be modified and tailored for 
this arena. Karim Khan who was the lawyer for the largest civil party group in the 
Duch case said that initially he was sceptical of victim participation but in the end he 
was ‘shocked by the effects of and how meaningful the legal representation was for 
the civil parties themselves.’ (Interview with Khan 2010) 
Although this inclusion goes some way to embrace victims in the trial process, 
and therefore indicates a shift towards restorative justice principles, but it has yet to be 
seen how and if victims would play a role in the actual negotiation process when it 
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comes to plea bargaining. There has been some discussion in the past about increasing 
the involvement of victims in plea negotiations in domestic criminal systems which 
ranges from very minimal involvement to being part of the actual negotiation process 
(Welling 1987). It is therefore worth examining the different forms victim 
participation could take and assessing their pros and cons from a utilitarian 
perspective and their suitability in the context of international criminal justice.  
 The first suggests that victims may be informed of the negotiated plea and be 
present in court when the negotiated plea is tendered in court. This of course does not 
actually afford the victim anything more than is already in place as they, who remain 
part of the public, are already allowed to attend open court sessions and when the plea 
bargain is tendered it becomes part of the public record. The second form of 
involvement would actually allow the victims to participate in the proceedings. This 
potentially has a much greater impact so before going into what form this could take I 
will look at the ways in which this would impact on the interest of the parties 
involved. 
 Drawing on Welling’s (1987: 309) argument, in such a situation the victim 
groups would have two interests. The first being that of restitution, which would 
require the charges the defendant is presented with to fall within the scope of what 
allows this. This in turn would mean restrictions on which charges could be 
negotiated and dropped. Alongside this, there is also the reality that in international 
criminal law restitution only takes the form of the return of property and therefore this 
would be a very rare situation. The second interest is retribution. This is where, in the 
opinion of the victims, the defendant gets a sentence that correlates with the gravity of 
their guilt. This creates the possibility of limitations being placed on the defence and 
prosecution’s ability to negotiate a sentence bargain. When it comes to the 
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prosecutions stake in the negotiation, there could be the possibility of an involvement 
from victim groups which could help them achieve their goal of reflecting the harm 
caused by the defendant (Welling 1987: 310). This approach would allow the 
prosecution to be better situated when bringing charges and achieving a conviction for 
serious crimes.  
 It may also be argued that victim groups may disrupt negotiations as they may 
find certain concessions unacceptable, especially as there are almost certainly 
instances where the defendant has offered helpful confidential information to the OTP 
which the victim groups would not be informed of.
64
 To reiterate this in turn would 
leave the victim groups feeling like they had been ignored, or even victimised again, 
as their testimonies have seemingly not been considered in any meaningful way. Such 
a response may render the whole process confrontational, making the idea of entering 
into negotiations for a defendant a risky one and something that puts them off 
pleading guilty (Welling 1987: 310), reiterating Murphy’s comments above. In 
opposition to this argument, one can say that if victims are able to consult with the 
OTP about the plea bargain then the prosecution would be in a better position to 
achieve their goal as they would have more information than they would without 
working closely with the victim groups. However, making the bargaining process 
unequal in this manner would be a clear disadvantage for the defence and might be 
seen as operating against notions of justice for all sides. 
From a utilitarian viewpoint the interests of the broader society must also be 
considered (Welling 1987: 309). If the victims are represented and involved in the 
process then the judges, as decision makers, are able to make better informed 
decisions due to the increased amount and potentially a better quality of information 
that would be presented to them. An involvement in the proceedings gives victims a 
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platform to present their side of the story allowing everybody to participate in the 
trial. This may also then resonate in post conflict communities, alleviating any 
feelings of alienation and disillusionment, leading to greater engagement with the 
community and increasing the confidence that they and the wider world have in the 
tribunals. Looking at the rules of the ICC and the other tribunals, victim groups are 
able to influence two features of plea bargaining. Firstly, they could influence whether 
the chamber accepts the plea bargain or not. For example, if after hearing the evidence 
from the victim groups it believes that the plea negotiation has distorted the facts too 
much then they may reject the deal as in the case of Momir Nikolic. The second area 
where victim participation is likely to have the most influence is in deciding what 
sentence may be given. Here, the testimonies that the victim groups give would 
provide the judges with more information when deciding issues such as culpability, 
aggravating and mitigating factors. The victims then may be able to express an 
opinion on these and how much weight should be given to them, in turn influencing 
and expressing an opinion on the sentence the defendant might receive. Although, as 
argued, victim involvement in the actual negotiating process would give a voice to 
victims potentially resulting in the post conflict society feeling connected to the 
tribunal, the reality is that it would potentially create a three way bargaining process 
that would be too complex and possibly more time consuming thus also working 
against one of the utilitarian drives of plea bargaining.   
3.3 Case Study: Prosecutor v Biljana Plavsic (Case No. IT-00-39&40-PT) 
 
 
In the sphere of International War Crime Tribunals the plea agreement in the case of  
Prosecutor v Plasvic (Case No.IT-00-39&40/1-S) has engendered a great deal of 
controversy, and whilst this was not the first plea bargain to have occurred in the 
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ICTY or international war crime tribunal, it certainly one of the most discussed. For 
that reason it is worth considering it a little further here.  
 Biljana Plavsic was the Serbian representative on the Presidency of the 
Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the early 1990s. She was also 
the co-president for the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and later 
became president of Republika Srpska (Serbian Republic). Perhaps with a nod to that 
other infamous strong female leader Margaret Thatcher, during her political career she 
was known as the ‘Serbian Iron Lady’, in her case this was due to her strong 
nationalist views. Although Plavisic was not the most blameworthy leader, she did 
play a more than significant part in encouraging the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian 
Muslims from the region she was responsible for, stating in an interview that: 
In order not to have any fear as to what will happen, I would prefer us to 
cleanse Eastern Bosnia of the Muslims. They have introduced the term ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ to denote a perfectly natural phenomenon and qualified it as a war 
crime. Muslims originate from the Serbs, but it is spoiled Serbian genetic 
material which has converted to Islam and then naturally from generation to 
generation has condensed. It has deteriorated further. (Biljana Plavsic in 
Robertson: 2002, np) 
 
Plavsic, alongside her co-defendant Krajisnik, was indicted with two counts of 
genocide and complicity in genocide and six counts of crimes against humanity. After 
surrendering herself voluntarily to the ICTY she pleaded guilty to one count of crimes 
against humanity and the other charges were subsequently dropped. Before the 
Plavsic trial plea bargaining before the ICTY had consisted of sentence reductions 
only in exchange for a guilty plea, so this was the first ICTY case to use charge 
bargaining (Scharf 2004: 1074). At her sentencing hearing, the prosecution 
recommended a term of between fifteen and twenty five years imprisonment. 
However, the Trial Chamber subsequently sentenced Plavsic to just eleven years after 
taking into account a number of factors, such as her voluntary surrender and guilty 
pleas amongst other things. 
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3.3.1 Utilitarian Justification for the Plea Bargain in Plavsic 
 
I will now look at some of the utilitarian justifications for the plea deal in the 
particular case of Plavsic. Though many of the utilitarian justifications of plea 
bargaining can be applied to the Plavsic case, it is worthy of note that as Plavsic is a 
war criminal she does not have just one victim. She was responsible for the pain and 
suffering of whole societies of people and for planning some of the gravest atrocities 
in Bosnia. Yet, even in her case one might argue that most of the general utilitarian 
justifications for plea bargaining still stand. 
 From an Act Utilitarian stance, entering into a plea bargain in a case such as 
Plavsic would be the right thing to do. It would bring about the greatest happiness to 
the most people as without the agreement a large number of expert witnesses would 
be required to testify and that would not only cost a lot of money but would also take 
a long time, thus delaying any convictions that might be received by the Tribunal. 
Even though there has been much controversy over the short prison term Plavsic 
received, an Act Utilitarian would argue that a conviction has been obtained and that 
at least some justice has been served.
65
 However, some utilitarian perspectives would 
not accommodate the plea bargain so easily. A Rule Utilitarian would believe that the 
rules and procedure of the Tribunal have been undermined. Presumably the rules and 
procedures are in place as they bring about the greatest happiness to the greatest 
number of people hence forgoing a full trial in favour of a guilty plea belittles not 
only the rules in place that would bring about a conviction but also the process itself. 
For example, plea bargaining would bring the burden of proof down below ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt’. However, general classical utilitarian justifications for the 
implementation of the plea bargain in the Plavsic case do exist and I now want to turn 
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to these below. 
  There is no doubt that Plavic’s voluntary surrender and guilty plea relieved 
the Tribunal of the financial burden of a full trial. The saving of the costs and 
resources of the Tribunal is one of the most compelling utilitarian justifications for the 
plea agreement in Plavsic. The average trial takes over a year and costs over $50 
million (Combs 2002: 90), therefore not only would forgoing the trial process save 
money but so would the defendant’s voluntary surrender since money was not used to 
actually arrest her. The Tribunal stated, ‘a guilty plea before the beginning of the trial 
obviates the need for victims and witnesses to give evidence and may save 
considerable time, effort and resources.’ (Plavsic Para 66) 
 Another justification arising as a consequence of this plea bargain is a 
conviction has been obtained. One of the main aims of the ICTY is to ‘render justice’ 
(Cassese 1994: 48). Even with charges removed and her sentence lowered, Plavsic 
ultimately has been punished and has had to serve a prison term, although an eleven 
year imprisonment with a chance of parole may be seen as a form of token justice. In 
fact she was released from prison on 27 October 2009 after serving six years. At the 
time of Plavsic’s trial only the defendants convicted of genocide were those 
responsible for the massacres at Srebrenica (Combs 2007: 65, 74), and maybe if she 
had not entered a guilty plea but had opted to have a full trial she may have been 
acquitted of this charge. Therefore a utilitarian would argue some justice is better than 
none at all. It is also worth noting that Mrs Plavsic was 72 years old at the time of trial 
so it may be possible if she had stood trial she may not have been able to complete the 
process due to ill health and old age. 
 One of the features of this case is that the defendant expressed remorse for her 
actions. This illustrates that being remorseful goes some way towards the 
rehabilitation of the defendant and therefore contributing to the reconciliation of the 
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region, which is a strong utilitarian justification of plea bargaining in war crime 
tribunals. When Plavsic admitted her guilt to one charge of persecution as a crime 
against humanity she also admitted a five page document detailing the facts of this 
charge. The defendant also went so far as to give an explanation as to why she 
behaved in the manner that she did (Plavsic: Para 609). It can be argued that here 
Plavsic contributed to the historic record in doing so as to find out why such atrocities 
occur can only be answered fully by those who committed the crimes, or where 
present, when objectives were determined and orders given (Tieger and Shin 2005: 
671). The historic record is enhanced by such insider detail, allowing for the change 
in perception of events. Other defendants may also give evidence regarding fellow 
defendants, although Plavsic did not choose to do this. Conversely, one might argue 
that the defendant only admitted responsibility to one charge in order to get the others 
dropped. If so then this impairs the historical record, instead of enhancing it, This is 
because her role in the atrocities could be downplayed if one only looks at the historic 
record of her punishment in years to come.  
 Apart from the judicial efficiency that plea bargaining offers, the next most 
important potential utilitarian effect of Plavsic’s guilty plea lies in its contribution 
towards reconciliation. Plavsic’s post conflict conduct and guilty plea were presented 
to the court as a significant and essential contribution towards reconciliation by a 
number of prominent witnesses. The Trial Chamber recognized that:  
[A]cknowledgement and full disclosure of serious crimes are very important 
when establishing the truth in relation to such crimes. This, together with 
acceptance of responsibility for the committed wrongs, will promote 
reconciliation. In this respect, the Trial Chamber concludes that the guilty plea 
of Plavsic and her acknowledgement of responsibility, particularly in the light 
of her former position as President of the Republic Srpska, should promote 
reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region as a whole. 
(Prosecutor v Biljana plavsic Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/ 1-S : Para 67) 
  
Although this was not the first guilty plea to be heard by the ICTY, it is certainly the 
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most controversial. One of the outcomes of this plea bargain is that the ICTY has seen 
an increase in the number of guilty pleas it receives since this case.  
  Central objections to the justifications above are, most importantly, that the 
eleven year sentence that Plavsic received is too lenient a sentence for the criminal 
responsibility of the defendant and would seem to be disconnected to any retributive 
ideals that the ICTY has. However, it is widely accepted that a guilty plea from a 
defendant, especially a high ranking one, is of great value to the reconciliation of the 
region, but one might still argue that the sentence received should reflect the crime 
committed more than an admittance of guilt or remorse shown.  
In Plavsic the sentence is so low that it may seem like the defendant was being 
rewarded for her guilty plea more than being punished for her crimes. There is 
certainly no doubt that Plavsic’s guilty plea saved the Tribunal time, money and 
resources, but in this particular case where the defendant was a leader during the 
conflict judicial efficiency seems to have taken over the interests of those effected by 
the conflict. However in the defence of the plea agreement in the instant case, it is 
observed that plea bargaining is a reconviction measure, where the defendant actually 
admits their culpability. In the realm of international law where immunities and 
amnesties are relatively commonplace, it is difficult to waive responsibility of the 
crime once guilt has been admitted. A guilty plea, whether received due to a plea 
agreement or not, makes it difficult for post-conviction measures to take place, such 
as a pardon, especially when the defendant has given details of the crime they have 
said they committed. 
There were a number of factors that were taken into account when Plavsic was 
sentenced; some were explicitly mentioned in her sentence hearing, whilst others are 
just my speculation. I shall now look at them and try and see if her sentence would 
have been altered if these factors had been different.  
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3.3.2. The ‘What If…’ Scenarios 
 
When sentencing Mrs Plavsic (Case No.IT-00-39&40/1 (Febuary 2003) there were a 
number of mitigating factors the Tribunal took into consideration, including her 
voluntary surrender and post conflict conduct. In this section I shall look at the factors 
the Trial Chamber took into account when passing an 11 year prison term in order to 
consider if the outcome of the sentence would have significantly differed if these 
factors did not exist. This will lend some insight into what in general is considered 
when sentencing takes place, and how much weight these factors receive.  
The first factor I shall consider is her voluntary surrender. Plavsic was the first 
defendant who was in a superior position during the war, which ultimately enabled 
her to surrender herself to the Tribunal. Although this held some benefit for Plavsic 
when it came to sentencing, it was her guilty plea and post conflict conduct that held 
most weight (Plavsic: Para 110). This indicates if she had not surrendered herself the 
sentence she would have received would not have been much greater than the eleven 
years she actually got. 
 The second factor I will look at is Plavsic’s post conflict conduct. This, along 
with her guilty plea, was the main feature considered when sentencing her. Following 
the war, Plavsic played an important role in the implementation of the Dayton 
Agreement and actively worked towards promoting peace in Bosnia (Plavsic: Para 
578-79; Combs 2003: 932). This was backed up by a number of high profile witnesses 
who gave evidence in favour of Plavsic’s conduct after the war. In light of this, if 
Plavsic had continued with her nationalist policies, and not strived for peace, 
presumably her sentence would have been significantly greater than that which she 
received. 
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  The next factor I will look at is that of the defendant’s guilty plea along with 
her expression of remorse. By doing this she accepted responsibility for her actions:  
I have now come to the belief and accept the fact that many thousands of 
innocent people where the victims of an organised, systematic effort to remove 
Muslims and Croats from the territory claimed by Serbs ….our leadership, of 
which I was a necessary part, led an effort which victimised countless innocent 
people. (Plavsic: Para 601) 
 
According to the Tribunal, this had a great impact on the reconciliation process, 
stating that this was, ‘an unprecedented contribution to the establishment of truth and 
a significant effort toward the advancement of reconciliation.’ (Plavsic: Para 24) 
The reconciliatory effect of her guilty plea was the main focus of her 
sentencing hearing and the guilty plea without the accompanying apology would 
probably have had little effect on the reconciliation process in Bosnia. Of course, if 
she had not pleaded guilty in the first place it would be unlikely that she would have 
received such a lenient sentence. There is also the matter of judicial efficiency that 
plea bargaining has; as opposed to contesting them and going to trial it saves time and 
resources. 
Another issue the Tribunal took into account when sentencing Plavsic was her 
age, as when convicted she was 72. The defence argued due to her age if sentenced to 
longer than eight years Plavsic would in effect be serving a life sentence thus 
violating the prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ (Plavsic: Para 651). 
Although the Tribunal rejected this, they did bear in mind the defendants advanced 
age. If Plavsic were 30 years younger when convicted would she have received the 
same sentence? When the judges came to pass sentence her age was not the most 
persuasive reason for her lesser sentence but it did hold some relevance during her 
sentencing. To Plavsic, her age was one of the most significant factors to entering into 
negotiations with the OTP (Interview with Nice 2010). Theoretically then, if she were 
42 years old when convicted the sentence she would have received would not have 
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been much greater than the one she actually got. 
An interesting comparison to this case is the one of Momcilo Krajinsk (Case 
No.IT-00-39), who was Plavsic’s co-inditee. Krajinsk was 58 years old at the time of 
his trial, he also did not plead guilty to any crimes, maintaining his right to trial. 
Unlike Plavsic who surrendered herself to the Tribunal Krajinsk was arrested at his 
home, and did not work towards peace during the post war period. After his trial 
Krajinsk ended up being sentenced to twenty seven years, sixteen years more than 
Plavsic. 
What is also interesting is that at the time Plavsic was the only woman to have 
appeared before the ICTY and this, of course, caused problems as once charged 
Plavsic was bailed as there were no female holding facilities at the ICTY. It could be 
possible that the fact that the defendant is a woman could have indirectly worked in 
her favour when sentencing.  
  Another factor that may have had an effect on the sentence was the fact that up 
until that point the only defendants successfully convicted of genocide by the ICTY 
were those involved in the massacres at Srenbenica. If there had been other 
defendants convicted of genocide, in particular high level ones, then maybe the 
prosecution would not have dropped the genocide charge. By comparison, Plavsic’s 
coinditee Momcilo Krajinsk, who contested his genocide charge, was acquitted of this 
charge due to insufficient evidence (Combs 2007: 65, 74).  
With the exception of Carla Del Ponte, who is Swiss, the lawyers involved in 
the Plavsic case where from countries with adversarial legal systems in place, that is 
the USA, UK, Canada and Australia. No doubt these lawyers would have at some 
stage in their careers encountered plea bargaining. Therefore one might suggest that if 
the lawyers had not been from adversarial legal backgrounds then the plea 
arrangement may not have taken the form that it did. For example, if one of her 
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defence lawyers was Serbian maybe they would have encouraged her not to plead 
guilty to any of the charges and maintain her innocence. This may be due to 
ideological views held by the lawyer as well as the lack of knowledge and experience 
of plea bargaining. As already noted, Plavsic had a number of high profile witnesses 
that gave evidence supporting her guilty plea and her conduct after the war. The 
witnesses included former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, former Deputy of 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation commission Alex Boraine and Nobel Peace 
prize winner Elie Wiesel. It is clearly hard not to be impressed on one level by 
Plavsic’s witnesses and if they did not have the ‘high international reputation’ that 
they have, or even if these testimonies were not present, it would be interesting to see 
how much consideration the ICTY would have given them and if the outcome of 
Plavsic’s sentencing would be different as a result. 
 
3.3.3 The Plavsic Case Nine Years On 
 
At present, the reality is that the Plavsic case remains one of the most controversial 
examples of plea bargaining in the field of war crimes tribunals. It is, therefore, 
important to reflect on how the utilitarian justifications for this particular plea bargain 
‘hold up’ now that Mrs Plavsic has been released. The issues that arise here are also 
those that arise generally in discussions surrounding the use of plea bargaining in 
international tribunals. First and foremost, in a series of magazine interviews with 
Plavsic whilst she was still incarcerated in Sweden, it has emerged that she believes 
herself to be innocent and was happy retracting her confession (Nordgren 2009). On 
pleading guilty, she told interviewers that, she had been pressurised by one of her 
lawyers, a Canadian, Kratan Simic to plead guilty (Nordgren 2009). Both of these 
assertions significantly undercut the statement of remorse and apology she made at 
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her trial. These statements, that where lauded as significant contributions towards the 
reconciliation process by the expert witnesses who testified on her behalf, it would 
seem were cleverly written and constructed to manipulate not only the Trial Chamber 
but also the people of the Former Yugoslavia. This, of course, can be seen as the 
harshly realistic and practical face of plea negotiations. As the practice of plea 
bargaining increases, then it is possible that the defendants entering into negotiations 
may not be doing so out of contrition but for mere pragmatic self-serving reasons. No 
doubt in her situation Mrs Plavsic and her defence team knew this was the best thing 
for her to do (Interview with Nice 2010). In light of this, international criminal 
tribunals who wish to use plea bargaining as a judicial tool should bear in mind the 
possibility of defendants back tracking on their guilty pleas and apologies when 
released. One way tribunals can operate cautiously is by not making over reaching 
statements during judgement and sentencing hearings, and to be more measured when 
assessing the beneficial ‘by products’ of plea bargaining such as reconciliation, the 
value of expressions of remorse and truth telling. 
In the Plavsic scenario matters where not helped when Milorad Dodik, the 
Premier of Republika Srpska at the time when Mrs Plavsic was released, publically 
welcomed her back to Belgrade. He had also set about changing the law so former 
Presidents where to be given honorary Presidencies, including Biljana Plavsic. If these 
plans had indeed gone ahead Plavsic would have been entitled to a car, allowance and 
security guard (Dalje.com 2009). Again, actions such as these would go towards 
undermining any of the reconciliatory effect the guilty plea may have had. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
It must be pointed out that the utilitarian justifications for plea bargaining discussed 
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above do not exist in isolation and overlap with each other to deliver their utilitarian 
benefits. The most compelling reason for plea bargaining remains that it is financially 
efficient and is a simple way to dispose of complex cases that ordinarily would take a 
number of years to complete and would prove expensive to conduct.  
 Other reasons for engaging in plea bargaining, that are much more in line with 
restorative justice mechanisms, such as truth telling and reconciliation have only a 
limited effect, despite their appeal and support. With regards to truth telling, the 
utilitarian justification is limited by the idea of negotiated truths that are present in the 
statement of facts, were the truth here is agreed upon in private. The practice of 
charge bargaining also have the potential to distort the truth, as charges are removed 
from the indictment in order to obtain a guilty plea. It can be argued that the notion of 
plea bargaining in general may compromise any truth telling capabilities of the 
international tribunals. Taking the Nuremberg trial as an example, where there was no 
plea bargaining. The trials that took place amassed a large volume of documents and 
evidence, which decades on still serve as part of the historical record, and are open to 
be viewed and for scholars to analyse, there for still contributing to the truth telling 
function of these trials. To reiterate Mr Jordash’s statement Plea bargaining offers a 
form of truth if not the full truth (Interview with Jordash 2010). 
Reconciliation is also another utilitarian justification of plea bargaining. 
Where this may well be a seductive inducement to encourage plea bargains the issues 
that exist range from the mere notion of what reconciliation is and how it is measured 
as it is an abstract concept. This however does not mean that there has not been some 
reconciliatory effect from plea bargaining. For example the defence in Dosen (I-95-8S 
Judgement 13 November 2001 Para. 186) reported claims that there has been some 
reconciliatory effect due to the defendant’s guilty plea.  
 Conversely victims groups have been critical of the ICTY sentencing. For 
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example, reacting to a fifteen-year sentence for Dragan Zelenovic, a Bosnian Serb 
accused of massive atrocities against Bosnians, Bakira Hasecic, President of the 
association Women Victims of War said, ‘The tribunal openly sided with the defence 
of war criminals.’ (Subotic 2009: 133) The reality of international tribunals then is 
that they cost a lot of money and any cost saving mechanism that renders convictions 
quickly and sufficiently will always be a welcome part of international proceedings. 
This factor, however important, should not overshadow the fact that international 
tribunals need to maintain contact with victim groups and the post conflict societies in 
general. Ultimately then, any of the utilitarian benefits of plea bargaining, with the 
possible exception of efficiency, will have no long lasting effect if the courts’ 
outreach programmes do not inform communities about the negotiations and educate 
them to what they are and why they were agreed (Clark 2009). 
Boraine’s assertion, made in his testimony in the Plavsic case, that guilty pleas 
and plea negotiation processes must put the victims in the centre of the proceedings 
for them to have any kind of reconciliatory effect (Plavsic, Judgement February 2003, 
Paragraph 75-77). The main problem with this is that in most criminal proceedings it 
is not the victim that is central but the defendant. The main issue with regards to 
reconciliation is that defendants who plead guilty are able to retract their statements 
afterwards in the media whilst still in prison, or when released. This has been the case 
with Mrs Plavsic. This severely undercuts any reconciliatory effect that there may 
have been. It also has the potential to instil mistrust in the guilty plea process as after 
Mrs Plavsic’s retractions people may feel that a defendant is being disingenuous when 
admitting guilt. 
Despite this there are compelling utilitarian justifications that trials are more 
efficient when plea bargains are employed and so ultimately utilitarian justifications, 
‘must be given importance over the rule of law’ (Interview with Khan 2010). Khan’s 
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argument, championing a utilitarian perspective, highlights one of the main issues 
plea bargaining raises, that is the notion that it undermines a defendant’s rights 
afforded to them under the rules and laws that govern the tribunals which in turn are 
informed by the concept of the liberal rule of law, as utilitarianism treats people as a 
means rather than individuals. Therefore plea bargaining then potentially undermines 
a number a defendant’s rights such as the presumption of innocence, equal treatment 
and a right to a fair trial. Generally then, whilst tribunals find the reduced running 
costs and increased efficiency as desirable effects of plea bargaining they do not 
believe it to be a sole justification to enter into plea agreements. As noted in Nikolic, 
when discussing the plea bargain the trial chamber had to, ‘to divorce itself from the 
administrative efficiency argument.’ (Henham 2005: 216) Stating that: 
The Trial Chamber notes that the savings of time and resources due to a guilty 
plea has often been considered as a valuable and justifiable reason for the 
promotion of guilty pleas. This Trial Chamber cannot fully endorse this 
argument. While it appreciates this saving of Tribunal resources, the Trial 
Chamber finds that in cases of this magnitude, where the Tribunal has been 
entrusted by the United Nations Security Council – and by extension, the 
international community as a whole – to bring justice to the former Yugoslavia 
through criminal proceedings that are fair, in accordance with international 
human rights standards, and accord due regard to the rights of the accused and 
the interests of victims, the saving of resources cannot be given undue 
consideration or importance. The quality of the justice and the fulfilment of 
the mandate of the Tribunal, including the establishment of a complete and 
accurate record of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, must not be 
compromised. Unlike national criminal justice systems, which often must turn 
to plea agreements as a means to cope with heavy and seemingly endless 
caseloads, the Tribunal has a fixed mandate. It’s very raison d’être is to have 
criminal proceedings, such that the persons most responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law are held accountable for their 
criminal conduct – not simply a portion thereof. Thus, while savings of time 
and resources may be a result of guilty pleas, this consideration should not be 
the main reason for promoting guilty pleas through plea agreements. 
(Prosecutor v. Nikolić Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Paragraph 67 (Dec. 2, 2003) 
 
This highlights that even though international criminal justice values the utilitarian 
effects that plea bargaining offers utilitarian theory itself does not sit well into the 
international legal system, which is based upon liberal democratic values (Bass 2000). 
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Therefore reading plea bargaining through utilitarian theory only gives a partial 
analysis of this particular mechanism and its place within the international legal 
context. Hence it is necessary to tackle the concept of plea bargaining from the liberal 
view point, which is diametrically opposite theory to utilitarianism. The next chapter 
tackles this, offering a different critical perspective on the use of plea bargaining in 
international criminal tribunals. 
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4. Reading Plea Bargaining through the Classical Liberal Concept of the Rule of 
Law  
 
The following chapter will look at a range of potential criticisms of plea bargaining 
using the classical liberal principle of the rule of law as an interpretative perspective 
and ultimately as a criteria for evaluation. I will do this in two parts. The first provides 
a general overview of the ideology of the liberal rule of law focussing on those areas 
that are especially pertinent to plea bargaining, such as formal equal treatment, rule-
following and the presumption of innocence. The second will examine the application 
of these liberal perspectives in relation to specific instances of plea bargaining and 
examine how, in the context of war crime tribunals, such instances of negotiated 
justice may be interpreted as going against the implications of traditional classic 
liberal conceptions of the rule of law. 
This chapter therefore sets out to answer the critique that admitting ones guilt 
in such contexts constitutes a transgression of the liberal norms usually afforded 
individuals through the Tribunals’ statute and other principles of international law. A 
detailed analysis of this overarching issue will highlight what aspects of the rule of 
law may be violated, in the plea bargaining process. Alongside this, I will also 
consider whether forgoing a trial impacts upon the due process rights afforded to a 
defendant? Within this chapter, I will also ask if the use of discretion by prosecutors, 
when entering into negotiations, and judges, when accepting guilty pleas and 
sentencing defendants, takes place in a transparent and clear manner, and is one that 
allows defendants to make informed decisions about entering into negotiations and 
what to expect of the process? Finally, I will examine whether all defendants are 
indeed ‘equal before the law’, as classic liberalism requires, when they enter into plea 
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negotiations, or are some given more favourable treatment depending on the nature of 
the information they are able to provide the OTP. Whilst I will address these issues 
theoretically, I will also draw extensively on my interviews with trial professionals 
who have worked with and within the international tribunals. Their insights, drawn 
from their experiences, offer valuable perspectives regarding if and how liberal norms 
and the defendants’ rights are potentially breached in the process of plea bargaining 
and, if so, to what extent. 
As noted in the previous chapter, factors such as expanding caseloads and 
limited resources offer a possible reason for war crimes trials to be truncated by the 
guilty plea process. For the most part, the judges and lawyers in these trials accept this 
because plea bargaining does enable criminal systems to operate in a more efficient 
and timely manner. This is not to say that this is a ‘fool proof’ solution. There are, of 
course, a number of criticisms of plea bargaining, especially in relation to war crime 
tribunals, and the main objections one encounters are generally based, often 
implicitly, upon liberal principles. Legal concepts and assumptions of liberalism are 
firmly rooted in the idea of private ‘autonomy’, meaning that the liberty and freedom 
of an individual, typically considered in isolation, is held to take precedence over 
prevailing definitions of the ‘broader interests’ of society-at-large, The latter, which as 
we have already seen are prioritised by utilitarianism, includes an interest in 
maintaining an efficient and cost-effective system of criminal justice. The basic 
liberal principle here being that, as John Stuart Mill puts it, ‘the only freedom which 
deserves the name, is that pursing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not 
attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.’ (Mill 1989: 18) 
Here, we have a classic statement of the liberal individualist imperative to promote 
rights absolutely, such that only rights-authorised actions that impede the exercise of 
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the rights of others can qualify or restrict the exercise of private autonomy. Here, only 
rights, not social obligations, can ‘qualify’ rights, not wider social responsibilities to 
optimise the realisation of social interests by realising collective and group needs. It is 
even misleading to speak of rights being qualified or restricted because the general 
ideological policy is the optimise rights-realisation across society as a whole by 
restricting all limitations upon the individual's exercise of private autonomy, even 
those that stem from rights themselves. 
 
4.1 Defining the Rule of Law 
 
The idea of the ‘rule of law’ has a long history and can be traced back to the Middle 
Ages where examples of its origins included the contests between Popes and Kings 
for supremacy, Germanic customary law and the Magna Carta (Tamanaha,2004: 15). 
Since those times, the rule of law has been embraced across the field in liberal 
democratic countries and is firmly rooted in liberal ideology. On the political right, 
there is Hayek, who places the rule of law at the heart of development policy (1960); 
whilst on the left, Marxist historian E.P. Thompson (1975) characterised in positive 
terms. He argued that, ‘the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions 
upon power and the defence of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims, seems to 
me to be an 'unqualified human good.’ (Thompson 1975: 266-267)66 Before moving 
on it may be useful to consider in some detail what are they both actually talking 
about. 
The rule of law defines a basic moral framework by underwriting the 
legitimate exercise of state/public power. This framework presumes that each person 
under all circumstances has ‘free will’ and can, therefore, be treated as responsible 
agents who act within the structure of clearly understood and commonly accepted 
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laws. In doing so, it projects and upholds the values of ‘individual freedom’ and 
‘responsibility’ and is, therefore, based on the idea that an individual has personal 
‘autonomy’ or the capacity to exercise informed choice. It can, however, also be 
characterised less idealistically by the term ‘legal domination’ (Weber 1968: 121).  
In the classical liberal terms of John Stuart Mill, ‘the sole end for which 
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number, is self- protection.’ (Mill 1989: 15) Accordingly, ‘the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.’ (Mill 1989: 15) In other words, 
‘coercion’ and paternalistic intervention by the state could only be allowed to prevent 
harm to other persons. In short, for the liberal tradition rooted in Mill, the optimisation 
of individual rights is a supreme value and, by implication, criteria for assessing the 
operation of any aspect of the criminal justice system, including of course plea-
bargaining. 
In additional to rights optimisation, liberal ideologies typically give central 
importance to their distinctive understanding of the 'rule of law', a doctrine that has 
both direct and indirect implications for how we assess both the theory and practice of 
plea-bargaining. As one might expect of a concept that has been in circulation for so 
long, over time there have been a number of incarnations of the rule of law. In his 
1888 book Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, the Englih jurist 
A.V. Dicey gave the first concise, what one might call contemporary, analysis of the 
term as manifested in ‘liberal democratic’ societies, such as the UK and USA. 
Although Dicey did not originally conceive the rule of law, he can be credited for 
popularising it as a concept of key importance within ‘liberal democracy’.  
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Dicey’s conception offered three defining principles. The first being that there 
can be no punishment without a clear grounding within a pre-existing law, as Dicey 
believed this type of legally uncontrolled discretionary punishment to be incompatible 
with the rule of law: 
The ancient veneration of the rule of law has in England suffered during the 
last thirty years a marked decline. The truth of this assertion is proved by 
actual legislation, by the existence among some classes of a certain distrust 
both of the law and of the judges, and by a marked tendency towards the use 
of lawless methods of the attainment of social or political ends. (Dicey 1982: 
iv) 
 
The second principle is that ‘everyone is equal’ before the ordinary law. Whilst in his 
third principle, he described what he believed to be the underlying source of the rule 
of law, which he thought was a product of, ‘judicial decisions determining the rights 
of private persons in particular cases brought before the Courts.’ (Dicey 1982: 115) 
F.A. Hayek has also identified the rule of law as an integral part of liberalism 
and he too gave a very influential definition of it in his book The Road to Serfdom 
(1994) emphasising the important role of this doctrine in ensuring predictability and 
certainty. Following Dicey’s belief that discretion was incompatible with the rule of 
law, he stated: 
Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its actions is 
bound by rules fixed and announced before-hand, rules which make it possible 
to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in 
given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge. (1994: 80) 
 
In this more recent version of the liberal rule of law doctrine, citizens are supposed to 
know what actions they are allowed to take without being subjected to interference 
from the government. This is known as ‘legal liberty’ as the prior knowledge of what 
is permissible is the basis of this negative right (Weber 1968). 
 Hayek also believed that all theories of the rule of law must have three things 
in common; they must be general, equal and certain. According to Hayek, laws are 
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general when they are set out in theoretical terms and should be applied to all 
individuals equally (Hayek, 1955: 34). That is, laws that encroach on citizens’ liberty 
should be regulated only by general rules, as distinct from ad hoc and situation 
specific administrative measures. The purpose of these general rules is to promote a 
genuine public good, and therefore they must not victimize any specific group or 
person. In order to explain this feature more fully, Hayek used Rousseau’s version of 
generality. He stated that: 
When I say that the object of laws is always general, I mean that the law 
considers the subject in the round and actions in the abstract and never any 
individual man or one particular action. For instance, a law may provide that 
there are privileges, but it must not name the persons who are to enjoy them: 
the law may create several classes of citizens and even designate the 
qualifications which will give entry into each class, but it must not nominate 
for admission such and such persons; it may establish a royal government with 
a hereditary succession, but it must not select the king or nominate a royal 
family; in a word, anything that relates to a named individual is outside the 
scope of legislative authority (1960: 170). 
 
Hayek went on to state that the separation of powers between the legislature and the 
judiciary can be attributed to generality and, because of this feature, law can be set out 
in advance and in abstract terms. In turn, this makes the separation of powers between 
the legislature and judiciary an integral part of the rule of law (Tamanaha 2004: 66). 
  More recently, Kofi Anaan, the former UN Secretary General, gave a 
definition of what he believed to be the rule of law and its contemporary role, which 
for him includes a wider variety of elements which included respect for 
internationally sanctioned human rights standards. He stated that: 
A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public 
and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as 
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, 
fairness in the applications of the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the 
application of the law, separation of powers participation in decision-making, 
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legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal 
transparency.  (Annan 2004) 
 
I will now turn to those aspects of the rule of law that are especially pertinent to plea 
bargaining. 
 
4.1.1 Formal Equality 
 
The second principle identified by Dicey asserted that no person was above the law 
and that everybody, irrespective of their status, is subject to the ordinary laws of the 
land. Dicey argued that no public official should receive any special immunities or 
privileges, stating: 
[N]ot only that . . . no man is above the law, but (what is a different thing) that 
. . . every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary 
law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. . . . 
[T]hough a soldier or a clergyman incurs from his position legal liabilities 
from which other men are exempt, he does not (speaking generally) escape 
thereby from the duties of an ordinary citizen. (Dicey 1982: 112) 
 
This suggests that public officials, except the Monarch, who breach the law should all 
be held equally accountable by ordinary causes of actions before the ordinary courts 
in the same way as all other citizens of the state. This meant that, for Dicey, people in 
positions of power would not receive any special privileges and immunities and they 
would be subject to the law as much as ordinary citizens. Fundamentally, this position 
argues that everyone should be treated equally and that equality, in the sense of equal 
rights
67
 and formal equality of opportunity as  a distinct form, goes hand in hand with 
the ideology of liberalism and, in particular, the liberal rule of law.  
In liberal theory, all people possess equal political rights and everyone is 
entitled to equality before the law, which in turn insists that the government take an 
unbiased stance on what they think 'the good’ is. A relatively recent, and 
controversial, example of this took place in Israel and involved the former president 
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Moshe Katsav. In 2007, Katsav entered into a plea agreement when he was initially 
charged with the rape of a former employee. The rape charge was dropped as he 
agreed to plead guilty to three other crimes: sexual harassment, forcible indecent 
assault and harassing a witness. A number of petitioners have argued that the Attorney 
General, Menachem Mazuz, had presented enough evidence for the attachment of a 
rape indictment, and so wondered why the rape charge was dropped. Mazuz offered 
two reasons for this, the first being that the rape charge was used as a bargaining chip 
in order to obtain a conviction for the other charges, he stated that: 
The rape charges were not simple, and we could not state with certainty that 
we would have achieved a conviction … however, we thought there were 
grounds for an indictment on rape charges. That was the lever for creating the 
plea bargain. (Weitz 2007: np) 
 
The second, and most important, reason Mazuz gave was that because of the high 
profile status Katsav had in Israeli society a conviction for rape and a lengthy public 
trial would be bad for Israel’s image internationally. He argued that: 
Without the plea bargain, there would have been a two- or- three years trial 
and no one could promise us how it would end. Israel would have paid an 
image price, since such a trial would have damaged the public interest. (Weitz 
2007: np)  
 
This, in conjunction with the fact Katsav received a suspended sentence and had to 
pay compensation, seems to violate the liberal model of the rule of law as set out 
above, especially as the charges carried a total maximum of ten years. 
On the surface, Dicey’s statement is an assertion not of distributive or 
substantive equality in the sense of equalising out social inequalities but rather 
‘formal equality’. Under the latter, all defendants in criminal proceedings are 
supposed to be ‘treated alike’ procedurally and everybody has ‘equal opportunity’ 
because of an absence of discrimination or special privileges including head of state 
or diplomatic immunity from criminal prosecution. The fact that an individual is a 
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serving or former President should, in principle at least, be irrelevant with regard to 
how he or she is treated by the criminal justice system. Here, formal equality differs 
from substantive equality in that in formal equality everyone is treated alike, for 
example, equality of arms, whereas, under substantive equality people in different 
situations or circumstances are treated differently in order to equalise their position in 
recognition of those substantive differences. A familiar example of a legal measure 
designed to achieve substantive equality is positive discrimination in favour of 
historically disadvantaged groups; a policy that flatly contradictions the formal 
equality asserted by Dicey’s rule of law. In the example of plea bargaining a possible 
form of positive discrimination could be that defendants who do not have as much 
incriminating evidence to give the prosecution as high ranking defendants  may still 
be encouraged to plead guilty in exchange for a lesser sentence. This may then work 
towards the utilitarian benefits of trial efficiency and achieving a greater number of 
convictions that the plea bargaining process brings. 
In the context of plea bargaining the equal treatment principle is violated 
because, defendants who claim to have especially useful and admissible information 
to offer the prosecution case may receive far more generous concessions in exchange 
for this information when compared to those who do not. Those closest to the central 
decision-making of a genocidal regime may, by that fact alone, be in a better 
bargaining position than someone further removed. When discussing procedural 
equality, such as the equality of arms, both the prosecution and defence have equal 
rights with regards to receiving and obtaining evidence from each other. When 
discussing plea bargaining generally an inequality arises in the bargaining power as 
the prosecution are usually more experienced with the court or tribunal’s procedures 
regarding these negotiations. 
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With regard to this, Hayek argued that ‘equal’ in this context meant that all the 
laws should apply equally to all persons, ‘as true laws should not name particulars, so 
it should not single out any specific persons or groups of persons.’ (Hayek 1960: 78) 
Later he modified this view suggesting that certain legitimate rules may only apply to 
a specific group of people. However discrimination against people by the government 
must be held up on rational grounds, keeping in line with the standard that each 
person’s interests are treated with equal respect and importance. Such a perspective is 
consistent with the notion of the public good, consequently in part supplementing 
formal equality with some measure of substantive equality. An example of this would 
be the laws prohibiting rape, which in many common law systems can only be 
committed by males (Hamowy 1978: 291; Baumgarth 1978: 21). These rules are only 
legitimate if they are approved by a majority of people who are in, as well as out, of 
the differentiated group. This is because Hayek believed it is important in practice to 
be able to foresee how a law will affect particular people. Indeed, He argued that, ‘this 
does not mean that there must be unanimity as to the desirability of the distinction, but 
merely that individual views will depend on whether the individual is in the group or 
not.’ (Hayek 1960: 184) 
 It should be noted that Hayek believed that the outcomes of substantive 
equality were inconsistent with the rule of law, believing the law should apply to all 
equally and benefit no one individual. Substantive equality violates the rule of law, 
according to Hayek, as there is an endless number of different of situations that could 
arise which would make it impossible for all of them to be governed by general rules 
which have been set out in advance. In addition, the difference in treatment for one 
person to another generally violates the formal requirement for equality. Even if 
society was able to equalise opportunities for all its citizens, inequalities would still 
exist, for example, those based on differences in character or ability. In such 
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situations, it would be impossible to make adjustments for every unequal difference 
that may occur and it would also be difficult to regulate them with the rule of law 
standards that they should be equal, general and certain. Hayek acknowledged how 
unfair this disparity could be arguing that: 
A necessary and only apparently paradoxical result of this is that formal 
equality before the law is in conflict, and in fact incompatible, with any 
activity of the government deliberately aiming at material or substantive 
equality of different people, and that any policy aiming directly at a 
substantive ideal of distributive ideal of distributive justice must lead to the 
destruction of the Rule of Law. To produce the same result for different 
people, it is necessary to treat them differently... It cannot be denied that the 
Rule of Law produces economic inequality all that can be claimed for it is that 
this inequality is not designed to effect particular people in a particular way. 
(Hayek 1994: 87) 
 
As mentioned above, the third principle that Dicey championed focused on the source 
of the law. He noted that this aspect of the rule of law was specific to England stating:  
The general principles of the constitution (as, for example, the right to 
personal liberty, or the right of public meeting) are, with us, the result of 
judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases 
bought before the courts. (Dicey 1982: 115) 
 
This defines constitutional law as not the source but the consequence of the rights of 
individuals afforded to them by the courts. It is here in the third principle that Dicey 
stresses the significance of the role of ordinary courts and the importance of public 
and judicial as distinct from private executive or administrative dominated hearings. 
He asserted that the English constitution is characterised by the rule of law owing to 
this feature. He chose to illustrate this with the example that, in his opinion, England 
had a freer press than other countries. Dicey felt this was due to the fact that the libel 
laws in place acted as the main control on the press and such cases were heard in the 
ordinary courts of the land before judges and juries and, therefore, they were not 
directly subject to governmental control (Dicey 1982: 146-168).  
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A liberal criticism of plea bargaining that relates to this principle highlights 
the unacceptably private context in which these takes take place, and the lack of 
transparency of decision making. Plea negotiations are generally held in private as 
possibly some of the information being exchanged is of a nature that cannot be 
disclosed, or may jeopardise another trial. Examples of such information may be 
information that may pertain to national security issues or information that, if 
disclosed, may reveal confidential information that is relied upon in another trial. 
Even here there may be circumstances that disclosure could reveal embarrassing 
information, as in the case of Todorovic where the manner in which the defendant was 
arrested was brought into question. From the point of view of the Tribunal entering 
into negotiations with this defendant, it would have saved much of this information 
being disclosed and analysed in court thus preventing much embarrassment and 
upholding the Tribunal’s integrity. Another reason that negotiations are held in secret 
may be to do with how the prosecution encourage a defendant to plead guilty, 
possibly by overcharging as shown in the Israeli case mentioned above. The problem 
this then poses is that by their very nature the prosecution and defence have already 
decided on the outcome before the suspect even becomes a defendant. An example of 
this can be seen in the ICTY case of Erdemovic, discussed below. This is not to say 
that the content of the negotiations should be disclosed as the negotiations are taking 
place, as amongst other things, this would severely undermine the defendant’s right to 
be the presumption of innocence (O’Sullivan and Zecevic 2011: 151).  
To sum up, equality under liberalism requires everybody to be treated the 
equal respect and dignity, and everybody has the right to equality before the law. 
When discussing plea bargaining this means that everybody should be offered the 
same opportunity when it comes to entering negotiations, regardless of their ‘ranking’ 
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within the criminal enterprise. The equality standard can also be extended to aspects 
such as bargaining power or position. Both the defence and prosecution must be 
equally equipped when it to the bargaining process. 
 
4.1.2 Presumption of Innocence 
 
Another concept included in the rule of law which can be undermined by the practice 
of plea bargaining is the ‘presumption of innocence’. This is perceived as a legal right 
that the accused has placing the burden of proof upon the prosecution. Therefore, 
when accused persons decide to plead guilty, they waive their right to be presumed 
innocent of the offences for which they are charged, and there is no longer a case for 
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt. The idea of the presumption of 
innocence is rooted in European judicial cultures (Henham 2005: 160), and most 
states adhere to it or have similarly enacted principles. For example, in Italy the 
principle that an accused must not be presumed guilty has been adopted into the 
country’s constitution (The Italian Constitution cf Art. 27 quoted in Zappala 2005: 
83).  
Cassese notes that generally there are three parts to this principle: (i) The 
defendant must be treated, within and outside criminal proceedings, as being innocent; 
(ii) The burden of proof is on the prosecutor, so the defendant may limit themselves to 
rebutting the evidence but do not have to actually prove their innocence; (iii) In order 
to actually find the defendant guilty of the crime charged, the court must be convinced 
of their guilt according to a certain standard of proof. In civil law countries this is 
normally ‘L’intime conviction du juge’, that is the Judge’s innermost conviction, and 
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in common law countries it is, ‘finding guilty beyond a reasonable doubt’ (Cassese 
2003: 390). 
    In short, the rule of law is as pertinent now as it was in medieval times. It 
might be argued that, whoever is defining this doctrine, the rule of law basically 
comes down to three core and distinct points. Firstly, the law must apply equally to all 
persons without any prejudice or discrimination and it should be general in its 
application and implemented consistently and, most importantly, it should be capable 
of being clearly obeyed. Secondly, no one is above the law and the law applies to the 
sovereign and the instruments of the state with the law being applied by an 
independent judiciary. These features underpin the distinction between the rule of law 
(which is objective, impersonal and neutral) and dictatorial rule by means of law 
(which is potentially biased, ad hoc and unequal). Thirdly, that power exercised by the 
government must not be arbitrary, or discard the notion of rule of man. It should be 
noted here that the idea that laws should not be arbitrary does not mean that there 
needs to be a particular purpose to the law, although of course they should clear, 
accessible and certain. So, it is clear that in contemporary Western legal tradition the 
rule of law is the basis of human rights.
68
 Of which the presumption of innocence is 
deemed so vital a right that it is enshrined in Article 11 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. Under the liberal rule of law plea bargaining a war crimes suspect 
very quickly becomes a war criminal, losing this very important right. 
 
4.1.3 Due Process 
 
Other important principles that are entrenched in the rule of law are a defendant’s 
right to the presumption of innocence and ‘due process’. Today, ‘due process’ is 
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supposed to help ‘fair’ procedures in court by ensuring that public officials have 
limitations imposed on their powers, hence aiding the ‘right to a fair trial’69. Liberals 
could argue that the primary objective of due process is discovering the truth, as 
opposed to simply obtaining a conviction (Nasheri 1998: 4). In common law 
jurisdiction this is achieved by the defendant having their guilt or innocence decided 
in a strictly adversarial proceeding where evidence is open to scrutiny by the defence 
and cross examination by the prosecution. In civil law jurisdictions, by contrast, the 
inquisitorial role is carried out by the judge, who presumably applies the same level of 
scrutiny to the evidence presented. In other words, due process requirements are 
designed to ensure a fair trial, which is important because fair hearings allow for a 
reasonable interpretation of the law and the nuanced application of the law (Allen 
2001: 8).  Respect for due process requirements are especially important in tribunals 
where defendants are accused of crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity 
and other war crimes carrying severe punishment and massive social stigma to 
someone convicted of these offences. This is because it acts as a kind of ‘quality 
control’ over these proceedings. Such measures may cut down on the quantity of 
cases a tribunal can hear. However, liberals claim that when a full trial is conducted it 
does give more of a qualitative and fairer outcome and sense of justice (Nasheri 1998: 
5), as all the evidence and witnesses have been heard and scrutinized in open court. 
The potential for wrongful convictions can also arise if due process requirements are 
not met. The role of due process is also of importance to the control of discretion, as 
the danger to autonomy that Dicey and Hayek warn about in relation to arbitrariness 
becomes less of an issue when due process is followed (Allen 2001: 126). Hence the 
due process principle features in sound judicial decision making. 
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4.1.4 Discretion 
 
The first of Dicey’s principles was that no man could be punished, or lawfully 
interfered with, by the authorities unless in circumstances when the law has been 
breached. As he put it: 
No man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods 
except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner 
before the ordinary Courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law is 
contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by persons 
in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint. (Dicey 
1982: 110) 
 
By this, Dicey was suggesting that a person could not be punished without there being 
an objective application of established rules or pre-existing, politically neutral law. 
Put simply, the rule of law is a power regulator. It is also in this regard that 
governmental officials’ exercise of their discretionary powers with a view to constrain 
or restrict or privilege specific individuals would be acting inconsistently with the rule 
of law. Therefore, all actions carried out by a government, including prosecutors, 
must be specifically authorised by law, making governments more rational and their 
policies more humane, but this is only the case if the laws themselves are humane. 
This limits the scope of a ‘rule of man’ to situations occurring that displaces the rule 
of impersonal law, under which there is no limit to what  rulers can do, or even how 
they implement their policies. Often in such circumstances, power exercised by a ruler 
comes from ‘rule by law’. This is an instrument of government where the government 
itself is above the law but citizens remain bound by legitimate laws. The rule of law 
differs from this as it encourages an independent legal order that does not depend 
upon the law’s instrumental capabilities but on its degree of autonomy and the extent 
to which the law is distinct to other potentially influencing factors such as religion. In 
other words, the objective of this principle is to protect all individual citizens, 
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including defendants who remain presumed innocent, from the unaccountable and 
arbitrary exercise of state power. Therefore a person must not be held criminally 
liable or punished without there already being a law so holding, hence the ban on ex 
post facto laws.
70
 In the instance of plea bargaining an example of this would be 
where a defendant is charged with a vague offense, such as conspiracy, without there 
being enough evidence to obtain an actually conviction after conducting a full 
criminal trial. However the defendant is still charged with this crime in the hope that 
s/he will plead guilty to another charge in exchange the prosecution will drop the 
earlier charge that was only articulated as a leverage device.  
In a similar vein, the third principle in Hayek’s formula was that rules must be 
certain. He believed this to be of vital importance, stating, ‘There is probably no 
single factor which has contributed more to the prosperity of the West than the 
relative certainty of the law which has prevailed here.’ (Hayek 1960: 183) Certainty, 
for him, entails that the persons who are subject to a law should be able to predict 
what rules will govern them and their conduct as well as how they may be applied. 
This would make ‘it possible to foresee with certainty how the authority will use its 
coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the 
basis of this knowledge.’ (1960: 80) People should know in advance which actions 
would open them up to the risk of governmental sanctions. Therefore, one knows 
what actions are permitted and can be carried out freely, ‘when we obey laws in the 
sense of general abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to us we are 
not subject to another man’s will and are therefore free.’ (1960: 153) This means that 
a government cannot change the law or create new rules of use regarding its 
application to suit their own prejudices. 
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 The notion of there being standing and generally applicable law in existence 
was also crucial to the thinking of John Locke.
71
 Dicey argued that the use of 
discretionary power by governmental officials in order to impose constraints on 
individual citizens is inconsistent with the rule of law. He believed that discretion and 
the principle of legality were poles apart arguing that the role of the judge in legal 
proceedings was merely to announce the law (Dicey 1989: 183). This is because 
unregulated discretion creates a serious threat of arbitrariness, therefore putting the 
rule of law in danger. Consequently, in this situation it cannot be claimed that no one 
is punishable or ‘can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct 
breach of the law established in the ordinary legal manner before ordinary courts of 
the land’ (Dicey 1989: 183-4). Here, both the idea and practice of discretion 
contradicts the principles of liberal legality as it gives the appearance that the 
application of the constraints on citizens is not in keeping with specific rules thus 
allowing for a potential act or action to be an offence on one day but then a legitimate 
act the next. 
 Hayek agreed that in this context the law and discretion were polar opposites. 
However, he did acknowledge that officials within modern day governments must 
exercise some discretion in order to function efficiently. He equated discretion to 
arbitrary will, concerning himself more with the administrative officials whose actions 
may impact on private citizens and their property. Thus, he believed that if this 
discretion was carried out by officers in accordance to legal rules possessing the 
qualities of generality, equality, certainty and any coercive action against an 
individual was only warranted by a justifiable view of the public good, then they 
would not violate the rule of law (Hayek 1960: 212-217; Allen 2001: 125). 
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 However, Hayek acknowledged that whilst no legal system may be able to 
adhere to his three principles at all times, they can still preserve the rule of law and 
liberty as a guiding ideal. He states that: 
When we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid down 
irrespective of their application to us, we are not subject to another man’s will 
and are therefore free. It is because the lawgiver does not know the particular 
cases to which his rules will apply, and it is because the judge who applies 
them has no choice in drawing the conclusions that follow from the existing 
body of rules and the particular facts of the case, that it can be said that laws 
and not men rule. (Hayek 1960: 153) 
 
In light of this, it is generally accepted that governments must exercise a certain 
amount of discretion in order to function efficiently when applying rules, as the 
application of laws require a certain amount of discretion to deal with unanticipated 
situations. According to Hayek, this type of action falls within the scope of the rule of 
law if the exercise of discretion is itself governed by rules that are general, equal and 
certain (1960: 211- 217).  
 Using this theoretical frame of reference just outlined, I will now turn to how 
the use of plea bargaining in war crime tribunals might be seen as operating against 
the principles and assumptions asserted by the classical rule of law. 
 
4.2 Classical Liberal Rule of Law Objections to Plea Bargaining 
 
It is from the perspectives offered by the concept of the rule of law that one can begin 
to identify and place in a wider intellectual and ideological context some of the 
objections to the idea and practice of plea bargaining within the field of the 
international war crime tribunals. As noted, the second aspect of the rule of law as 
made by the liberal tradition is that the law applies equally to all persons. From such a 
position, one might argue that not only should the law provide equal protection to all 
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but that it should be implemented and applied in a manner that makes all persons 
capable of following it. 
 
4.2.1 Equal Treatment and Plea Bargaining 
 
When discussing plea bargaining, there are a number of varying circumstances where 
the standard of equal treatment before the law is clearly violated. For example, 
generally defendants that can offer the prosecution insider knowledge are often able to 
extract more favourable treatment when it comes to the actual plea deal and 
sentencing as the amount of information that the accused can offer acts as a 
bargaining chip to entice greater concessions in return - and hence leniency (Tieger 
and Shin 2005: 677-678; Henham and Drumbl 2005: 56; Rauxloh 2011: 10). A 
common example of this in domestic jurisdictions is a drug dealing ring where the 
defendant who is relatively low down in the organisation, such as a street dealer, 
would not be able to give as much helpful evidence, or information, generally 
regarding persons ‘higher up’ in the ring. However, a person who is close to the 
leadership would be able to give evidence or information that could lead to the 
conviction of a person who is in charge of the enterprise. This in turn, might provide 
kudos for all those involved in the prosecution. In such an instance, it is likely that the 
person who has the most incriminating information would be able to negotiate a 
‘better deal’ with a greater reduction in sentence or even have charges dropped,72 
and/or have the facts of the case presented in a less damming light. A similar situation 
may arise in war crime tribunals, here with respect to joint criminal enterprises 
(JCE)
73
 where a defendant who has insider knowledge of the command structure 
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within a militia faction may receive a more favourable deal than say a ‘foot solider’ 
who has no such knowledge to barter with.   
Asserting this very point, Rauxloh has argued that plea bargaining should only 
be entered into if the defendant is able to offer new evidence that would contribute 
towards the reconciliation process of the affected region and/or contribute towards 
evidence gathering against a high ranking perpetrator (Rauxloh 2011: 21). Although 
this is highly desirable from the OTP’s viewpoint, it does however undermine equal 
treatment standards as prescribed by the rule of law. Take for example a defendant 
who is willing to cooperate fully with the tribunal and is genuinely contrite but is 
unable to offer any meaningful new information that could either help with the 
reconciliation process or help secure a conviction of another wrongdoer.  The 
likelihood then, is that this person would either not be able to enter into negotiations 
with the OTP or would receive only a minimal discount in their sentence compared to 
other defendants who are able to offer more.  
With respect to plea bargaining within war crime tribunals, the arguments put 
forward above can on face value be illustrated by the cases of Rajko Cesic (IT-95-
10/1) and his co-accused Goran Jelisic (IT-95-10). The former entered into a plea 
agreement with the prosecutors, after initially pleading not guilty to the charges 
brought against him, in exchange for a promise of a lenient sentence. He then pleaded 
guilty to all charges against him which were ten murders and two instances of sexual 
assault. In this case, the prosecutor recommended a sentence of between thirteen to 
eighteen years imprisonment and requested a sentence of thirteen years be imposed,
74
 
the Trial Chamber handed down a sentence of eighteen years. In contrast, the 
defendant Jelisic, who was eventually charged with thirty-two counts; fifteen of 
crimes against humanity; sixteen of violations of the laws or customs of war and one 
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of genocide, pleaded guilty to thirty one of them against the advice of this counsel 
(Combs 2007: 62). He did however contest the charge of genocide and although he 
was acquitted of the charge he still received a forty year sentence which has since 
been upheld by the Appeals Court Chamber (Case No. IT-95-10-T). 
  So, although Jelisic pleaded guilty,
75
 it would seem that he did not benefit 
from this with regard to sentence reduction in the manner that his co- accused and 
other defendants had. This example appears to emphasise the highly selective and 
discretionary manner in which prosecutors and judges can deploy plea bargains, 
highlighting the violation of the equal treatment principle championed in the rule of 
law, which insists that like cases’ to be decided in a ‘like manner’ (Ewald 2010: 383). 
The implications of this are that cases, in particular plea bargained cases are not 
treated equally in international law. 
 
4.2.2 Plea Bargaining and Sentencing Equality 
  
Within the ICTR, there have also been issues regarding the equality of sentences 
received for defendants that have entered into plea bargains and those who have not 
.Chief Charles Taku when discussing his experiences in the cases of Bisengimana 
(ICTR-00-60) Semanza (ICTR-97-20) and Runambarara (ICTR-00-59) stated that: 
The Indictment against Laureant Semanza whom I defended at the ICTR 
alleged that he perpetrated the crimes of Genocide, Complicity to Commit 
Genocide, Conspiracy in Genocide, Crimes against humanity, extermination, 
Torture, murder, Article 3 to the Geneva Convention and additional Protocol 
2; in all 14 Counts, with Paul Besengimana and Juvenal Rungambarara. 
Finally Semanza was tried separately because the other two had not been 
arrested. However, the allegations against them were retained in Semanza’s 
indictment. Semanza was tried and convicted to 25 years at trial level, 
increased to 35 on appeal. However, the two others made plea bargains with 
the Prosecutor who dropped the charges of Genocide against them. The plea 
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bargains agreement also indicated that they did not perpetrate the alleged acts 
of genocide, complicated in genocide or conspiracy with Semanza as alleged. 
They confessed to lesser crimes and were sentenced to very lenient sentences 
of about 12 years each. Rugambarara admitted to command responsibility as 
well as Paul Besingimana, none actually incriminating Semanza in any serious 
way. (Interview with Taku 2010) 
 
This level of variation and discrepancy is not grounded in legally significant factors 
and highlights first hand why there is a perceived unfairness and inequality when it 
comes to plea bargaining. Of course, these issues also arise frequently in domestic 
legal systems but seem to draw much more criticism in the context of serious crimes 
such as war crimes where the sentences received are very much in the public eye. 
Likewise, the Foca (IT-96-23/1-2) case also highlights the level of inequality 
with regards to sentencing and the dropping of charges in the context of the war crime 
tribunals and this case is one of the most perplexing in this regard. Amongst other 
things, the decision at this trial highlights the level of injustice that victims of the 
crimes perpetrated are subjected to when plea bargaining is entered into. This is a 
landmark case as it was the first time sexual assault was investigated as torture, 
enslavement and as a crime against humanity (IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment 22 
February 2001). The original indictment named a number of defendants, three of 
whom where tried separately, and two who died so proceedings against them had been 
stopped. The three defendants who were tried together, Kovac, Vukovic, and Kunarac, 
all pleaded not guilty in the end, even though Mr Kunarac had tried to enter into 
negotiations with the prosecution, ultimately failing to come to an agreement 
(Prosecutor v Kunarac (IT-96-23/1) 10th March 1998).  
The defendant in Zelenovic (IT-96-23/2) had entered into a plea bargain, 
concerning the charges he would admit guilt to and the sentence recommendation, 
whilst waiting for the judging panel to give a decision on the referral process back to 
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the courts in BiH under Rule 11 bis. As a result he pleaded guilty to rape and torture 
receiving only 15 years imprisonment. Zelenovic’s codefendants Jankovic and 
Stankovic (IT-96-23/2) who were referred back to the BiH court, received 34 years 
and 20 years respectively after trial. This would indicate that had Zelenovic decided to 
contest the charges against him he could well have received a much longer sentence. 
The other three defendants Kovac, Vukovic, Kunarac received 20 years 12 years and 
28 years that Zelenovic was initially charged with. Zoran Vukovic was found guilty of 
two counts of rape and torture which was considerably less than the several counts of 
rape and torture that his two co-defendants were found guilty of. The defendants in 
the Foca case were all convicted as part of a JCE that involved the gang rape of a 15 
year old girl. It is, therefore, of interest to note the gap in sentence the defendants who 
pleaded guilty received as compared to those who did not. The judges in the Foca 
case were not ‘happy to draw comparisons between the cases,’ Zelenovic pleaded 
guilty to rape, the other defendants in the other cases also committed rape. Wayde 
Pittman points out that the disparity in sentencing could well be down to personal 
circumstances (Interview with Pittman 2010). What is interesting is to think about is 
what sentence Dragoljub Kunarac would have received if negotiations had not 
collapsed compared to what he actually received, and why it was acceptable to 
negotiate and enter into a charge bargain with Zelenovic years later and not Kunarac. 
On the face of it, it would seem that Zelenovic received a more favourable sentence 
due to his guilty plea. It is also possible that the judges applied some of the utilitarian 
justifications of plea bargaining discussed in the previous chapter and therefore 
awarded Zelenovic a lesser sentence as he saved the courts time and resource amongst 
other things. this indicates that in certain cases pragmatic justifications for sentencing 
takes precedent over the equal treatment provisions afforded to defendants under 
liberalism.   
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4.2.3 Plea Bargaining and Equality before the Law  
 
The idea of equal treatment before the law also extends to instances where persons are 
charged with the same crime but where one defendant chooses to plead guilty and 
offer information on their co-accused, whilst the others decide to contest the charges 
against them. Here, the defendant who pleads guilty is generally more likely to 
receive a more favourable treatment in the form of a reduced sentence and possibly a 
reduction of charges than the other defendant. This would seem to clearly amount to 
‘unequal treatment’ before the law. An interesting example of this can be seen in the 
ICTY cases of Plavsic (IT-00-39&40/1) and Momcilo Krajinsk (IT-00-39), who was 
Plavsic’s co-inditee, and charged with similar offences. He did not plead guilty to any 
crimes, maintaining his right to full trial, unlike Plavsic who gave up her right to trial 
and entered a guilty plea. After his trial, Krajinsk was sentenced to twenty seven 
years, sixteen years more than Plavsic’s eleven. 
In international criminal courts the current situation is that the higher ranking 
the criminal the more information they can offer, even in another defendant’s trial. 
Therefore, if they give the prosecution evidence they will be given a ‘better deal’ than 
a lower ranking perpetrator who cannot offer nearly as much information
76
 (Tieger 
and Shin 2005: 674).
77
  
  Punishing defendants on the pragmatic basis of administrative efficiency and 
negotiation is, of course, different to punishing defendants on the gravity of the 
specific crimes that they are guilty of. The use of plea bargaining moves away from 
the notion that all perpetrators need to be punished on a strictly principled and legally 
explicable basis, particularly if they receive sentence discounts or charges are dropped 
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(Henham and Drumbl 2005: 56; Olusanya 2005: 82). The Tribunals seem to look at 
the quality of the information that is given, but if an accused cannot offer such 
information then, one might argue from a liberal perspective, they should not be 
comparatively penalised as this in effect amounts to discriminatory treatment.
78
 If one 
is evoking the rule of law in its liberal incarnation, then this would suggest that there 
needs to be in practice an equal treatment of defendants before the court where all 
defendants are treated equally and receive the same rights and benefits as all others.  
In my interview with him, Sir Desmond De Silva stressed that the people who 
are appointed as Chief Prosecutors of international criminal tribunals, ‘are people of 
great experience’ and so would be ‘well be able to distinguish those who are really 
deserving of the greatest credit’. He clearly felt that, due to their experience and their 
perceived calibre, they are able to see which defendant is the most contrite and helpful 
to the prosecution (Interview with De Silva 2010).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
In spite of these points, Zappala argues that it would be interesting to see 
whether it can ever be possible to uphold ‘equality’ in the phase of the execution of a 
judgment. (2005: 217) In other words, if two defendants were convicted of the same 
crime, and then sent to different states to carry out their sentences, would they be 
treated equally with regard to early release and treatment in prison? In light of this, it 
can be argued that even the treatment they would receive in prison, or which 
particular prison they are sent to, may also throw up issues of equal treatment. In 
relation to international war crimes tribunals, the case of Plavsic (IT-00-39&40/1) 
once again offers itself as an appropriate example. By all accounts, Plavsic served her 
prison term in a Swedish prison that is equipped with horse riding facilities and a 
solarium,
79
 whereas, in sharp contrast, other convicts who have committed war crimes 
will almost certainly not be experiencing as comfortable an imprisonment. Often, 
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when negotiating the terms of a plea bargain, the location where a defendant is to 
serve their sentence can a relevant factor (Prosecutor v Bagaragaza (ICTR-05-86)). 
Even the relocation and protection of a defendant’s family are considered to be 
important bargaining tools, and often they are treated unequally in this regard as well. 
(Prosecutor v Babic (IT-03-72)) But, this may be due to the danger a defendant’s 
family may be put in if they agree to give evidence and work with the OTP. For 
example, Chief Taku observed that for his cooperation Moriss Kallon’s family would 
have been relocated to Canada (Interview with Taku 2010). When it comes to plea 
bargaining it is difficult to treat defendants equally as the reasons for entering into 
negotiations can be pragmatic. For example, if the OTP receives insider information 
from one defendant whilst another is unwilling or unable to provide such information 
the latter runs the risk of not receiving the offer of deals that match their co-accused 
who may simply have had more to bargain with.  
 
4.2.4 Plea Bargaining and the Equality of Arms 
 
Another type of ‘equal treatment’ liberalism insists upon for a defendant to receive a 
‘fair trial’ is the notion of ‘equality of arms’. This standard is particularly important in 
hearings in adversarial jurisdictions. It basically means, ‘that each party must be 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case – including his evidence – under 
conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.’ 
(Dombo Beheer B.V. v The Netherlands Judgment of 27 October 1993, Series A No. 
27. Paragraph 33)   
The essence of the negotiation that takes place during a plea deal presents 
itself with a number of potential inequalities. In general, the prosecution is the party 
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that is in the more advantageous position during a plea deal. This is, by and large, 
because the prosecution work within the tribunals and therefore are more acquainted 
with the rules and procedures of the courts. Another factor that may arise is that the 
prosecution have more money to spend on witnesses and other trial professionals, than 
defence counsel.
80
 Murphy pointed out that in general the prosecution has access to 
much more information about the crime locations, victims and potential witnesses.  It 
has also been rumoured that at the ICTY the OTP had ‘over three million documents 
stashed away in the basement,’ of which ‘only a handful made their way to the 
defence’, Murphy went on to say that many of these documents were not even 
translated. (Interview with Murphy 2010)  
There is also the issue of adequate space and working environment. For 
example, Professor D’amato noted that when trying to negotiate a plea deal for his 
client (Prosecutor v Kovacevic (IT-97-24-T) at the ICTY, the rooms in which defence 
counsel where expected to work during trials were cramped. When he asked if the 
plea negotiations could take place in the OTP offices he was informed that they were 
‘off bounds to defence counsel’ (D’amato 2000: 3). ICTY defence counsel are housed 
away from the main building and they are provided with small offices in the actual 
ICTY building to use only during trial (McMorrow 2007: 152). This not only makes 
negotiating sensitive deals, where much confidential information can be revealed 
practically difficult but it potentially makes the day to day working life of defence 
counsel very isolated and difficult, if not impracticable. In a similar vein, Peter 
Murphy described how when he first started his duties as defence counsel at the ICTY 
there were certain parts of the ICTY building, ‘that defence counsel were not allowed 
in’ as you needed a pass or a key, such as the cafeteria. In fact, it is only recently that 
defence counsel have been allowed to use the cafeteria, after it was relocated to a 
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public area of the ICTY building following a fire (Interview with Murphy 2010). 
Again, such discrimination highlights the impractical working environment that 
defence counsel have to endure as well as any, ‘social isolation’ that they may 
experience due to this (McMorrow 2007: 152)  This, in turn, leads to the sociological 
assumption that despite its rules and procedures, the practice before the Tribunals is 
unequal. Tulken argues that these inequalities mirror already existing structural 
arrangements in society (Tulken 2002; Henham 2005: 103). As he puts it: ‘During 
proceedings, all the inequalities of the parties are reproduced- inequalities of 
condition (social origin, socio-economic level and cultural group), but also… 
inequalities of position.’ (Tulken 2002: 678) 
In principle, the defence has the right to be treated equally in order to be on a 
‘level playing field’ with the prosecution. The principle of ‘equality of arms’ also 
focuses on the right to obtain and receive evidence from the opposing party, the right 
to call one’s own witnesses and to question witnesses. However, O’Sullivan and 
Montgomery have argued  that this principle, with particular reference to an accused’s 
right to cross examine a witness, has steadily been ‘eroded away’ as a result of a 
number of amendments in the RPE and decisions handed down by Chambers at the 
ICTY (O’Sullivan and Montgomery 2010). The fundamental principle is a general 
one - that all parties must be treated equally with regards to trial procedure. It should 
be noted, however, that this is a procedural equality and does not cover acts outside 
the control of the Trial Chamber, such as investigations, interrogations and arrests 
(Prosecutor v Tadic Case No. IT-94-1-A). When deployed as a legal criterion, this 
principle highlights potential instances where there may not be equal bargaining 
power between the defence and the prosecution.  
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Theoretically, such inequality can be alleviated by the defendant appointing, 
or having appointed if indigent, counsel who understand the plea bargaining process 
and who are able to negotiate effectively on behalf of the defendant.
81
 This is of 
significance where defendants themselves are not familiar with the notion of plea 
bargaining, as for example in the case of Prosecutor v Joao Fernandes (Dili District 
Court, Special Panels for Serious Crimes, 2001/02). If the plea negotiation process 
takes place after the indictment, but before a guilty plea is entered, then this gives 
more bargaining power to the defendant, especially with regards to sentence and fact 
bargaining. This then goes some way toward equalizing the bargaining power 
between the two parties, even if it remains very difficult to achieve full equality. In 
practice, any inequality that does transpire must, according to liberal ideology, then be 
compatible with a notion of justice that is grounded in the politics of equal protection. 
This is because here equality leads to a political emphasis on personal autonomy that 
is the defendant’s autonomy (Donnelly 2003: 44).  
In summary, this implies that there are a number of ways in which the defence 
are unequal to the OTP in the international tribunals. From the interview responses 
and evidence presented above it can be inferred that many of the material inequalities 
between the two parties can also have a manifest effect on the outcome and success of 
a plea bargain. The more recent tribunals such as the STL have taken steps to remedy 
this by establishing a Defence Office that has equal investigatory and procedural 
powers as the OTP. But it is yet to be seen if this does anything towards making the 
plea bargaining process more equal between the parties.  
 
4.2.5 Plea Bargaining and the Presumption of Innocence 
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In international law, the principle providing for the presumption of innocence was not 
explicitly provided for in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals (Zappala 2005: 83). It 
was however provided implicitly as it was granted in Justice Jackson’s Opening 
Address for the United States at IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. He stated 
that, ‘we accept that [the defendants] must be given a presumption of innocence’ (at 
Paragraph 117; Zappala 2005: 83). This presumption has, however, been expressly 
stated in statutes of the more recent war crimes tribunals, such as Article 21 (3) ICTY 
and Article 20 (3) ICTR.
82
  These have set a high standard in this regard, stating that, 
‘The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the 
provisions of the present statute.’  
The ICC has also made provisions for this in Article 66 of its statute. Indeed, 
the presumption of innocence has been enshrined in a number of other international 
instruments, such as Article 11 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). This states that ‘[e]eryone charged with a penal offence has the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law’, Article 14 paragraph 2 of 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and Article 6(2) of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) also discuss the importance of 
guilt being proved by means of a fair and public trial. The latter states, ‘[E]veryone 
charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law’ (ECHR, Art 6 (2)). The notion of the presumption of innocence has 
been afforded considerable importance in criminal systems and, therefore, not 
surprisingly it is taken very seriously in international criminal law, where media 
coverage and public perception often assumes that persons indicted by such tribunals 
must indeed be guilty of something. The issue of the presumption of innocence was 
brought to light by defence counsel in the opening statement of the case of Prosecutor 
v Oric (IT-03-68-T): 
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If I may illustrate the presumption of innocence in another way, and I say this 
also for the benefit of those following this trial, there may be members of the 
public watching today who may know little of criminal justice or indeed of 
this case who will be looking at Naser Oric in the dock and thinking: what’s he 
done? Well, that’s precisely what the presumption of innocence isn’t. A better 
question would be: I wonder why the prosecution is bringing this case? (Page 
263, line 1-7) 
 
With this in mind, it is worth also noting the controversy at the SCSL when Geoffrey 
Robertson QC, a judge in the Tribunal’s Appeals Chamber, was disqualified from 
serving on the RUF case due to comments he had made about the RUF in his book, 
‘Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle For Global Justice’, prior to his 
appointment to the SCSL. He had stated that, ‘[T]he RUF had perfected its special 
contribution to the chamber of war horrors, the practice of “chopping” the limbs of 
innocent civilians.’ (Robertson 2002: 466) Although prohibited from serving as a 
judge on the RUF case due to this perceived bias, he was however, allowed to 
continue as a judge at the appeals chamber. (SCSL Press Release, 13 March 2004). 
There has been much discussion regarding whether pleading guilty and the 
waiver of the right to trial does in fact infringe upon Article 6 of the ECHR.
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 A 
decision in the case of X v United Kingdom (1972) 40 CD 64 would suggest that as 
long as there are satisfactory safeguards and the judge is confident that the accused 
understands the consequences of pleading guilty, then Article 6 (2) would not be 
infringed. This is backed up by Professor David Crane who when asked about this 
asserted that a defendant has a right to plead guilty if they so choose. He went on to 
stress that the crimes a defendant pleads guilty to are reviewed in open court, and, if 
necessary, questions are asked about the fact of the specific crimes the defendant is 
pleading guilty to. After this has taken place, if the trial chamber does not believe that 
the admission of guilt is voluntary, informed and unequivocal a plea of not guilty is 
entered, resulting in a full criminal trial (Interview with Crane 2009). A potential 
concern regarding the waiver of the right to trial and the presumption of innocence is 
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raised whenever a guilty plea is entered (Radosavlijevic 2007: np). In other words, if a 
defendant facing a severe sentence is given an offer that is ‘too good to refuse,’ then 
there would be a potential breach of Article 6(2) ECHR. Deweer v Belgium (1980) 2 
EHRR 439 is often cited as an example of this. Here, the defendant was offered a fine 
in exchange for a guilty plea but, if they contested the charges and were found guilty 
after a trial, there was the prospect of serving a lengthy prison sentence.  
Traditionally, issues around what sentence a defendant should receive are 
considered only after the issue of guilt or innocence has been determined. However, 
when dealing with plea bargaining, the determination of guilt is largely dependent 
upon the substantive consequence of conviction. This gives rise to the notion that if a 
defendant is offered a favourable deal, then they would probably waive their rights 
and plead guilty. This could occur even if they are factually innocent because 
accepting the deal may be the ‘better of two evils’ in terms of the type or length of 
punishment the defendant may receive. More telling in this regard are the sentiments 
expressed by Wayde Pittman who suggested that, international criminal tribunals had 
at least the same, if not more, measures in place to protect the rights of defendants, in 
particular their presumption of innocence, than domestic courts (Interview with 
Pittman 2010). 
When discussing the issue of pleading guilty and the problems that this may 
pose with regards to the defendant’s right to be presumed innocent, the ICC’s rule on 
accepting guilty pleas seems to have made provisions for safeguarding this right. In 
particular, Article 65(4) of the ICC statute attempts to tailor traditional rules on guilty 
pleas to the specific demands of international justice (Zappala 2005: 88). This rule 
exhibits a more holistic approach to the issue of pleading guilty. It does so by taking 
into account the interests of all persons involved so the Trial Chamber can request that 
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evidence surrounding the basis of the guilty plea be presented to them before 
accepting the plea of guilty from the defendant.  This is because there is a prevailing 
duty of the chamber to determine the truth beyond the allegations made by the parties; 
in other words, beyond a reasonable doubt.  Amongst other things, this does go some 
way towards protecting the defendant’s right to the presumption of innocence by 
making sure that the accused is not pleading guilty to a vague charge that has been 
bought against them only in an attempt to exert pressure upon them to plead guilty, 
and/or that they understand to what they are pleading guilty to.  Despite all the 
safeguards in place, one still cannot ignore the fact that the use of plea bargaining 
moves away from the articulation of guilt or innocence, and replaces it with a 
sentence based upon a compromise. 
Another controversial matter surrounding the presumption of innocence that 
may influence a defendant when deciding whether to plead guilty or to defend 
him/herself, is the conception of judicial notice. This is governed by Rule 98 (B) of 
the RPE,
84
 It is relevant because tribunals have allowed for the use of adjudicated 
facts from other proceedings to be used in a current case.
85
 In a bid to be judicially 
economical, the tribunals and courts have adopted this practice from the civil law's 
inquisitorial system (Knoops 2005: 27). The implication of Rule 98(B) is that the 
Trial Chamber accepts the facts as true, hence the prosecution does not have to admit 
any more evidence relating to these facts as, ‘the types of facts falling under Rule 
94(B) must be confined to those which are so notorious as to be beyond any 
reasonable dispute between people of good faith.’ (O’Sullivan 2001: 338) The relation 
of this to plea bargaining is that if the onus of the burden of proof moves to the 
defendant, it potentially places the latter in a situation where they feel that they cannot 
possibly disprove ‘facts’ which the tribunal has already deemed to be true. There are a 
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number of ways in which a defendant’s right to the presumption of innocence is 
infringed upon. Specifically for this thesis, when an accused is approached by the 
OTP with a possible negotiation the presumption of innocence is violated as they 
already have accepted the guilt of a defendant, potentially putting the defendant in a 
position that they feel they will not be able to defend, or will receive a longer jail 
sentence if they did contest the charges. 
 
4.2.6 Plea Bargaining and ‘Due Process’ 
 
One of the recurring liberal ideological criticisms of plea bargaining is that the latter 
violates a defendant’s claimed right to ‘due process of the law’. Again, connected to 
the classical liberal conception of the rule of law, the right to a fair trial, under Article 
6 of the Human Rights Act, is strongly connected to the notion of due process.
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 In the 
context of the international war crime tribunals, the main due process objection to 
plea bargaining is that to secure a conviction the prosecution does not have to prove a 
case beyond a reasonable doubt as the defendant has already entered a guilty plea. 
This can be seen as manifesting a number of potential violations of liberal beliefs, 
values and principles.  
As already discussed, defendants who choose to exercise their right to trial do 
not receive the same concessions if convicted than those who chose to plead guilty. In 
jurisdictions that rely on the mass production of ‘excessive’ guilty pleas to get through 
their caseloads, such as USA, there is the fear that charges may be bought against a 
defendant simply in the hope that the accused will be pressured into pleading guilty. 
In other words, the prosecution will ‘over charge’ the defendant for tactical reasons. 
Here, the prosecutor could make vague but serious allegations against the defendant in 
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the hope that they will plead guilty. Pleading guilty to a lesser charge, by way of a 
charge bargain, instead of contesting the original one ensures a conviction for the 
prosecution, and the defendant potentially escapes a lengthy prison term. It would 
seem on the surface that some sort of justice has occurred.  However, from a liberal 
perspective, this form of overcharging is a way of manipulating and coercing 
defendants at the expense if their individual rights, including a right to exercise free 
and informed choice. Within legal systems where this is common practice, defence 
lawyers too risk becoming part of such manipulation. As such, it raises liberty issues 
related to the value of ‘freedom of choice’ and personal autonomy. As Alschuler 
recognises: 
[O]vercharging and subsequent charge reduction are often components of an 
elaborate sham, staged for the benefit of the defence attorneys. The process 
commonly has little or no effect on the defendant’s sentence, and prosecutors 
may simply wish to give defence attorneys a “selling point” in their efforts to 
induce defendants to plead guilty. (Alschuler, 1968: 95) 
 
Conversely, one may argue when entering into a plea bargain, ‘the individual’s rights 
are being watched out for by the judge and defence counsel.’ (Interview with Crane 
2009) This then eliminates the possibility of abuse, regarding overcharging and 
pressurising a defendant into pleading guilty, with the defendants' due process rights 
remaining intact. With the practice of plea bargaining now being an accepted legal 
mechanism it may be time that the international community looks toward issuing due 
process rules that should be followed when plea bargaining. Currently there are no 
formalised rules protecting the defendant’s rights if they chose to admit their guilt, 
which has the potential to allow coercive practices into the negotiation process. 
 
4.2.7 Plea Bargaining and Coercion  
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Coercion challenges liberal projections of ‘private autonomy’. There is no apparent 
indication from the cases or the interviews I have conducted that the ICTY and ICTR 
coerce defendants into pleading guilty. That is to say, in conversation counsel were 
confident that the defendants are not pressurised into pleading guilty. Whilst this may 
be the case, there are a number of other reasons imposed by the prosecutors on a 
defendant which may lead them to plead guilty. Chief Taku explained that in the 
ICTR, in particular, he felt that defendants underwent very lengthy pre-trial 
detentions, which made the prospects of entering into negotiations a very compelling 
prospect: 
In international Tribunals, where the minimum standards of fair trial 
guarantees stated in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, article 20 of the ICTR Statute, Article 17 of the Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and article 21 of the ICTY Statute, are hardly 
applied, compounded by the sheer trauma and length of pre-trial detention as 
well as the paucity of resources placed at the disposal of an accused to ensure 
an illusory equality of arms in effecting a credible defence, he/ she is 
compelled to submit himself / herself to a plea bargain in the hope of 
mitigating his/ her  suffering in the judicial system. Some of the accused have 
waited in pre-trial detention without a hearing for close to ten years. Others 
were arrested prior to investigations being initiated to find evidence to 
prosecute them. Applications for bail pending trial are almost always rejected. 
(Interview with Taku 2010)  
 
Although this is not overt coercion, in the sense that a prosecutor is pressuring a 
defendant in the interview room, there is an argument that certain defendants may feel 
that they are in a hopeless situation solely due to the length of time they have spent in 
pre-trial detention, rather than feeling they will not be able to defend the charges 
against them. At the ICTY, Murphy explained that, although prosecutors offered very 
attractive deals to defendants they were still able to say no as, ‘at least two of my 
defendants were offered deals very readily by the prosecution.’ (Interview with 
Murphy 2010) In one case, the deal was dependent upon the, ‘the defendant giving 
evidence against X and Y’, in exchange the prosecution told him; ‘you can pretty 
much go home.’ Murphy went on to state that the prosecution would, ‘ask for a 
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nominal sentence and the defendant could go home in a year’, but that his client said 
that whilst he may ‘be home in one year but dead in eighteen months.’ (Interview with 
Murphy 2010)  
    This insight into threats of violence against defendants and the families of 
those who give evidence, highlights how dangerous giving insider evidence can 
actually be. Even tempting concessions prove not to be worth the risks attached to 
negotiating with the prosecution. Murphy further points out that the only way 
negotiations with the prosecutor would have been possible would have been if 
defendants in vulnerable circumstances were offered witness protection. As it 
happens, Murphy’s client said he would rather serve his sentence and then go home, 
all be it eventually. (Interview with Murphy 2010) It would also seem that the 
prosecution took a similar approach with the defendant Obrenovic (Prosecutor v 
Obrenovic (IT-02-60/2)), where the offered him a number of plea bargain 
opportunities during the pre-trial phase (Karganovic no date: 181). 
 Of course, there may be instances where the defendant and their counsel have 
perceived the prosecutors conduct as coercive, such as in the RUF trial. Although 
there may well be good cause for arguments of coercion, there is also a strong 
argument that cultural practices may have been the cause for this confusion. Also, 
again in the Obrenovic case, the conduct of the OTP may be perceived as coercive, 
especially for those who do not come from an adversarial legal background (a point 
discussed more fully in the next chapter). Karganovic states that after this particular 
defendant had refused offers to negotiate, a deal was struck between the OTP and co-
defendant Momir Nikolic. A message was sent to Obrenovic a few days before the 
trial was to begin, stating that if he was to negotiate with the prosecution he would 
receive a very generous deal, ‘for dropping out of  the trial and saving the court its 
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time and resources.’ (Karganovic no date: 181) The OTP also insinuated that if he 
wanted to change his mind later on the ‘quality of the offer would decline 
dramatically.’ (181) This may well have led the defendant to feel that he should plead 
guilty, as opposed to plead not guilty as he would know that this is just how 
prosecutors from adversarial backgrounds go about procuring a guilty plea. 
Karganovic also explains that in his opinion the prosecutor’s conduct during the 
bargaining process was indeed coercive, ‘The methods of exerting pressure that were 
applied by the prosecutor were diverse, but the pressure was fierce. I suppose that 
systematic intimidation would be the most accurate description of the conduct and 
atmosphere which marked these “discussions.”’ He went on to say that this resulted in 
‘an extremely unpleasant and threatening atmosphere.’ (182) Again, it must be 
stressed that the conduct of the prosecutor is not inappropriate in the jurisdiction that 
he came from, America. Nor is it improper under the laws of the international 
criminal tribunals, but it does, never the less, have the potential to cause distress and 
confusion to a person who is not from such a legal and cultural background. Coercion 
when plea bargaining removes the defendant’s choice when it comes to deciding 
whether to plead guilty or not. This is in conflict with the liberal democratic 
grounding international tribunals are built upon which champions itself on rights and 
the free will and personal autonomy of the defendants. (Bass 2000) 
 
4.2.8 Plea Bargaining and ‘Wrongful Convictions’ 
 
From a liberal perspective, the above scenario also has the potential to give rise to 
‘wrongful convictions’ as defendants may feel that all is lost and there is far too much 
evidence against them, and as a result plead guilty to a lesser charge in order to obtain 
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a shorter jail term. This can occur although they are indeed innocent of the charges 
brought against them. Once again, this is of great importance in the context of 
international war crime tribunals. The charges that are bought in such hearings are, of 
course, of a very serious nature and not only do the persons and societies affected by 
these alleged crimes need some sort of justice, so do the persons accused of these 
crimes. Indeed, liberalism would focus on the rights of defendants, especially given 
those issues of personal liberty and state powers are at stake. By this, liberals 
generally mean that if a person is going to be tried for a crime against humanity they 
should be done so fairly and with a sense of justice being done for individual 
defendants. Due to the serious nature of these crimes, defendants who are accused 
should be tried with all their due process rights intact and without the fear that they 
will, in effect be punished for contesting the charges against them. In such instances, 
liberals would argue that there is no real justice if, for the sake of cost cutting and 
efficiency people are convicted of crimes they did not commit, or have charges of the 
crimes they actually did commit dropped.  
Another feature of wrongful conviction that potentially contradicts liberal 
ideals is that defendants who have entered in to plea bargain may be required to give 
evidence for the prosecution, in the case either of a co-accused or another defendant, 
as part of their overall deal. This testimony runs the risk of being inaccurate, or 
completely false, in order to receive greater benefits for themselves, as they would be 
seen to be co-operating with the prosecution. Slobodan Zecevic corroborated this 
when discussing the factual document that is required as part of the deal, stating that: 
This document which is drafted by the OTP, contains certain facts and 
constructions which are important for OTP’s theory of that particular case or 
some other future case. The accused are tempted to agree to such facts, even 
though some are obviously outside of their purview or knowledge, because 
they think naively that it can’t hurt them to confirm a thing or two they have 
no knowledge. (Interview with Zecevic 2011)
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A number of accused have acted in this way in various war crime tribunals even when 
they have run the risk of jeopardising their family’s safety as well as their own. This is 
not to say that international courts do not take due process very seriously. Former 
President of the ICTY Theodor Meron stated, ‘there can be no cutting corners when it 
comes to due process.’ (Meron 2003)  
There are other aspects of plea bargaining that suggest another level of 
inequality and unfairness and suggest the very real possibility of a wrongful 
conviction. Prosecutor v Jokic (IT-01-42) is a pertinent example. In this case the 
defendant Miodrag Jokic, pursuant to a plea agreement by way of charge bargaining, 
pleaded guilty to six counts in the indictment and was sentenced to seven years 
imprisonment. However, when his co-accused Pavle Strugar (Prosecutor v Strugar 
((IT-01-42) decided to contest the charges brought against him evidence came to light 
that the alleged victim of the cruel treatment he was supposed to have inflicted had in 
fact only received surface wounds.  
These revelations led to this particular charge being dropped. The prosecution 
then went on to drop other charges with respect to property damage (Prosecutor v 
Strugar Decision on Defence Motion Requesting Judgment on Acquittal Pursuant to 
Rule 98 bis, June 21, 2004 (IT-01-42-T)).
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  It would therefore seem that Jokic 
admitted guilt to crimes that the prosecution could not even bring to trial let alone 
prosecute successfully. This type of situation is rarely highlighted as often it is a space 
that charges that can be proved are dropped in exchange for evidence and, more 
importantly, a cheaper more efficient way of disposing of cases. On the one hand, the 
type of situation in the Jokic case indicates that there may have been a possibility that 
the prosecution knew, or at least might have known, that there was not enough 
evidence to gain a conviction in this case. Therefore, on its face, this would violate the 
equality standard that is afforded to the defendant under the rule of law, and it raises 
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serious questions about the fairness of plea bargaining in these trials. On the other 
hand, it could equally be argued that this is just a part of plea bargaining, and a 
defendant should never plead guilty to a crime that they have not committed. It is 
difficult to know what inspired this particular defendant to plead guilty to crimes that 
the prosecutor would not be able to prove due to the private nature of the negotiations. 
This highlights the very real issue that defendants may plead guilty to crimes that they 
did not in fact commit or have knowledge of. This in itself is a very troubling aspect 
of plea bargaining. 
 
4.2.9 Plea Bargaining and the Lack of Transparency 
 
Liberalism insists that justice be seen to be done, taking place in public. Due to the 
lack of transparency, the clandestine manner in which guilty pleas can be negotiated 
violates the due process principles prescribed under the doctrine of the rule of law. 
These negotiations often take place behind ‘closed doors’ and the contents of them are 
not revealed to the public. This element of privacy can lead to a number of problems. 
For instance, it breaches the liberal ideology that affords individuals the right to 
receive a fair trial by protecting them from entering guilty pleas due to coercion. If the 
guilty plea was not voluntary, informed and unequivocal, this contradicts the liberal 
ideas of autonomy and personal freedom. Another aspect that would violate the due 
process rights of a defendant is if irrelevant or inadmissible evidence is used to 
procure a guilty plea from them.
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The issue of transparency is not limited to public trials, or even information 
that the OTP may have but is not disclosing it to the defendant in the hope that they 
will enter into negotiations. At times, the issue of transparency in plea bargaining is 
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much more complicated. When talking about his experience working as counsel in the 
Plavsic case, HHJ Murphy said that the defendant had four lawyers, the lead counsel 
and a co-counsel negotiated with the prosecution whilst he and another lawyer 
prepared for trial, as they, ‘had to get ready for trial, as there was no great confidence 
that it (the negotiations) would be successful.’ (Interview with Murphy 2010) Due to 
the uncertainty surrounding the plea bargain and the controversial nature of this 
particular agreement, ‘the prosecution asked that there should be a wall within the 
defence team’, the two lawyers negotiating with the OTP ‘were not to discuss the 
progress of the negotiation.’ (Interview with Murphy 2010) This shows the exact 
extent of the lack of transparency that takes place during negotiations even if it might 
be understandable that there has to be a certain amount of confidentiality, as some 
information given to the OTP is too sensitive to disclose to the public.  
Murphy stated that in the Plavsic case the ‘wall’ was placed between the 
defence counsels as the prosecution:  
[W]ere worried about the possibility of confidential material being leaked.’ 
Understandably at times information that is exchanged in negotiations is not 
made public due to the sensitive nature of such information that at times may 
raise issues of, say, national security . Nevertheless, it is remarkable, even 
perhaps peculiar, that defence counsel working on the same case would be 
precluded from major aspects of the case. The counsel were updated about the 
plea negotiations in Plavsic insofar as the lead counsel would ‘report back’ 
and say things like we are ‘making progress on a possible agreement. 
(Interview with Murphy 2010)  
 
Arguing that, the defence team could not abandon preparations for trial as the plea 
negotiations, ‘went on for a number of months and was a very drawn out process’ and 
that there was, ‘no great confidence that it would be successful’ (Interview with 
Murphy 2010). Murphy’s experiences with the Plavsic case highlight how 
temperamental such negotiations can be. The transcripts of the, already discussed, 
Kunarac case shows how quickly negotiations can collapse. For the time being it is 
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unlikely that we will know the true extent of negotiations when it comes to crimes of 
such gravity and sensitivity but suffice to say that the lack of transparency also has the 
potential to frustrate Judges. In a report by the IWPR it is stated that: 
Judge Schomburg, for example, wants the judges at the tribunal to have access 
to more information - a feature of the civil law landscape in his native 
Germany. There, the prosecutor is duty bound to give all relevant evidence to 
the judges, who can demand that an indictment be amended or re-issued if 
they feel it is incomplete. No such obligation exists within the framework of 
the tribunal. 
This led Judge Schomburg to display visible anger in the courtroom last 
spring, while presiding over the case of the Bosnian Serb politician Miroslav 
Deronjic, indicted for his role in the ethnic cleansing of eastern Bosnia in 
1992. 
In his witness statement, Deronjic spoke at length about events in Srebrenica 
in 1995, but the prosecution did not charge him with any crimes relating to 
that period - a decision that provoked Judge Schomburg’s admonishment. He 
criticised the prosecution for indicting Deronjic for only a small part of what 
appeared to be a much greater scheme. 
When the chamber sentenced Deronjic solely for his role in the events of 
1992, Judge Schomburg dissented. But in an earlier interview with IWPR, he 
admitted that trial chambers, in principle, have limited opportunities to 
contradict the parties when both sides agree. 
“If both [the defence and the prosecution] say ‘we have no disagreement’, then 
we have no chance of establishing the extent of a defendant’s guilt,” he said. 
(Rachel S 2005) 
 
As already mentioned, one of the justifications of plea bargaining in such crimes is 
that it helps to illicit important sensitive information in order to convict another in 
exchange for concessions. It is something of an open secret that persons who have 
committed terrible crimes and caused much pain and suffering receive concessions, 
often disproportionate to their culpability as they make themselves invaluable to the 
prosecution in the information and evidence they are able to give. 
The amount a defendant is ‘willing’ to cooperate with the Trial Chamber 
raises an interesting question. If this is unknown, then judges do not know how much 
weight to give to this mitigating factor when deliberating sentence. In turn, this 
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presents a further problem in that, due to the lack of transparency, a defendant may 
not be able to successfully appeal the decision on both procedural and substantive 
grounds. This also raises questions as when the sentence is pronounced, both after a 
plea bargain or a full trial, only a total sentence is pronounced. It is therefore 
impossible to see how each conviction is broken down, and how the conviction is 
reflected in the actual length of the sentence (Hola and Smeulers and Bijleved 2011: 
413). Although this lack of transparency can be viewed as a general complaint against 
international sentencing practices in general it is also of particular importance when it 
comes to plea bargaining.  
As this particular lack of transparency also opposes the rule of law as one of 
the main premises of plea deals is that there are negotiations over recommended 
sentence, which of course are done in private. This does not allow defendant to know 
that pleading guilty to some crimes over others leads to a greater sentence, or how 
much of a difference in sentence they might expect. Even the amount of gravity a 
mitigating factor is given is also unknown. This makes assessing what sentence length 
one might get difficult in relation to the exact contribution in sentence length each 
charge that has been admitted and any mitigating or aggravating factors that may be 
present, potentially reducing it to a guessing game. 
Liberal norms may also be violated by the principle actors involved in a trial, 
i.e. defence and prosecution lawyers involved in the defendants case. Here, there is 
the real possibility that the parties involved may compel a defendant to waive the 
rights afforded to them through human rights laws and international treaties, by 
pleading guilty, thereby removing any element of free choice. However, Professor 
David Crane asserted that when plea bargaining a defendant pleads guilty to a 
reduction in the number of years they will serve in prison, hence they are not giving 
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up any rights, he argued that, ‘he can always say no and choose to enter a plea of not 
guilty’ or the judge can say ‘I don’t think you are guilty on that charge or series of 
charges’ and a plea of not guilty is entered for the defendant (Interview with Crane 
2009). An example of liberal objections can be seen here as defendants who have a 
low level of understanding of their rights and the plea bargaining process are 
prevented from opting for full trials because of the undue pressure they are placed 
under. This is shown quite clearly in Prosecutor v Joa Fernandes Dili (District Court 
Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Case No. 01/00.C.G.).
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 In this case, the defendant 
did not understand what exactly he was pleading guilty to and the implications of 
entering a guilty plea, let alone the circumstances under which a plea of guilty should 
be entered.  
 From the classic liberal standpoint of Mill and Hayek, the very nature of plea 
bargaining might be considered objectionable as it inevitably includes a (comparative) 
‘threat’ of receiving a harsher sentence if convicted after a full trial. There have been 
a number of studies that have examined this issue within domestic jurisdictions, 
namely, McConville and Baldwin’s book Negotiated Justice: Pressures on defendants 
to Plea Guilty (1974). The authors of this work suggested that some of the defendants 
they interviewed felt that they had been pressured into pleading guilty to charges 
which they themselves believed they were innocent of, leading to the implications that 
they were unjustly treated.
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Unfortunately, there has been no such work done in this regard in the world of 
International War Crime Tribunals. The ICC has the benefit of time to be able to 
develop their plea bargaining process, which other tribunals and courts have not had 
(Interview with Crane 2009). It would be interesting to see once the ICC is in full 
swing with a number of completed trials completed how the prosecutors, who are 
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employed by the Court, manage to approach plea deals with defendants and their 
counsel without resorting to coercive methods, if indeed they do. 
92
  
 
4.2.10 Discretion, Uncertainty and Plea Bargaining 
 
Liberalism generally insists that legal certainty, stemming from the predictable 
application of objective legal rules is one of the necessities for a rule of law governed 
state. By contrast, a state where legal decisions stem from the exercise of subjective 
discretion of the decision-maker, there can be no such certainty. In the last paragraph 
of his book Sociology of Law, Weber commented on the part discretion played in law 
in becoming almost common place, ‘inevitably the notion must expand that the law is 
a rational technical apparatus, which is continually transformable in the light of 
expediential considerations and devoid of all sacredness of content.’ (Weber 1978: 
895) In most legal systems, officials within the criminal justice system are given a 
broad remit when it comes to decision making and, arguably, therefore discretion 
forms the basis of plea bargaining. When plea bargaining originally began to be 
adopted into cultural practice in the USA it was during a period of Whig leadership 
1830-1860, its popularity was due to its informal and discretionary nature and the 
increase in the amount of control the Whigs had over sentencing policy (Vogel 2008: 
220). This is, therefore, a central dilemma for defendants as they should be able to 
receive and rely on advice from defence counsel concerning what laws, if any, have 
been breached, and what the expected legal outcome may be. One might argue that 
such concerns also apply to plea bargaining as it allows the defendant to make an 
informed decision when deciding whether to plead guilty or not. There are a number 
of ways in which discretion can take place when plea bargaining, the following 
sections will analysis these under the lens of the liberal rule of law.  
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4.2.11 Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining 
 
In most domestic criminal justice systems there are a number of legal bodies, such as 
the police, prosecutors, judges and juries, that are expected to exercise discretion 
when deciding who should be subjected to criminal penalties and who should escape 
them
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 (Findlay and Henham 2005: 135). The results of which are the direct outcome 
of human decision making (Ewald 2010: 383). This is also true of war crime tribunals 
as it is the OTP that decides if an individual should be arrested and ultimately brought 
to trial, and whether allegations should even be investigated given the limited 
resources available. They also decide whether or not to offer or accept a plea deal and 
what will be the terms of such an agreement. This is usually based on factors such as 
the probability of obtaining a conviction, the nature of the alleged offence and the 
character of the defendant. There may also be a host of non-legal factors, such as the 
composition and orientation of the prosecution staff and the cultural and legal 
background of the lawyers involved
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 (Ewald 2010: 383). Jordash comments that, one 
should take into account who is actually in the prosecutorial team, as if there is 
someone who is: ‘determined to make his name, then it is difficult as you’re not going 
to be able to plead out the case’ due to reasons of professional vanity. He goes on to 
add that ‘of course there are some prosecutors and defence counsel who believe you 
should not plead’ on a matter of principle, be that legal or personal (Interview with 
Jordash 2010; Interview with Pittman 2010)  
    Nilsson also suggested that the makeup of the prosecutorial staff influences the 
use of plea bargaining. When talking about the fact that the ICTY had seen more 
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defendants enter into a plea negotiation than other war crime tribunals, he speculated 
that it could not have been a coincidence that more ICTY cases are disposed of by 
way of guilty plea than other tribunals, ‘it was due to the efforts and the initiatives 
taken in the prosecutor’s office … it was probably due to something internally.’ He 
also stressed that the ICTY was not more open to guilty pleas than the ICTR 
(Interview with Nilsson 2010). Here, Judges use their powers of discretion in 
determining whether the accused is guilty or not, as well as the severity of the 
punishment imposed on the defendant.
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In international criminal law there is another element that adds to the 
discretionary nature of the law, prosecutorial discretion. I have already touched upon 
this earlier, but it requires a little more attention and discussion here. The prosecutor 
is entrusted with a vast amount of discretion throughout the whole judicial 
proceedings. It is they who decide who to investigate, who to use as an insider 
witness, and who to prosecute. They also have a large amount of discretion when it 
comes to plea negotiations. Of course it is the defendants choice whether or not they 
wish to plead guilty or to contest the charges against them, but it is the prosecution 
who normally have the end say in what the agreed fact will be and how many charges 
to drop and so on (Prosecutor v Kunarac). International criminal law now also has an 
interesting standard; that is it is in the ‘interest of justice’. This standard is afforded to 
a prosecutor under Article 53 of the Rome Statute which allows the prosecutor not to 
initiate an investigation or prosecution if it is in the interest of justice. Not only does 
this standard facilitate discretion but it also can be applied across a great variety of 
subject matters.
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In discussing what charges to bring and indeed who to prosecute for which 
particular offences, it is worth looking at the aspect of the duty to prosecute in a little 
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more detail and its relationship with plea bargaining. In international criminal law, the 
prosecutor is bound by a number of legal instruments to prosecute certain crimes, 
making plea bargaining on the surface incompatible with these laws and treaties. One 
of the most compelling duties to prosecute concerns the crime of torture. The duty to 
prosecute this particular crime falls under another of different legal instruments. For 
example, the obligation to bring to court falls under the UN Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Article 4 
(1) states ‘[E]ach State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its 
criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by 
any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.’ Article 7(1) states 
‘[T]he State Party in territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have 
committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found, shall in the cases contemplated 
in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for 
the purpose of prosecution.’ Whilst this clearly sets out a duty to prosecute this crime, 
one just has to look at the plea negotiations that have taken place in the international 
criminal courts to see that the prosecutor’s discretion overrides any duty that they are 
bound by to prosecute. This normally occurs if it is in the interest of justice. Article 
18(1) of the ICTY Statute lays out the discretionary powers a prosecutor has, it states:  
[T]he Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex-officio or on the basis of 
information obtained from any source, particularly from Governments, United 
Nations organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. The 
Prosecutor shall assess the information received or obtained and decide 
whether there is sufficient basis to proceed. 
 
This indicates that the prosecutor enjoys wide discretion regarding who and what to 
prosecute, without being made subject to judicial scrutiny. Judge Wald, in the Jelisic 
Appeal said, ‘nowhere in the statute is any chamber of the ICTY given authority to 
dismiss an indictment or any count therein because it disagrees with the wisdom of 
the Prosecutor’s decision to bring a case.’ (Prosecutor v Goran Jelisic (IT-95-10 
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Judgment (Appeals Chamber) Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wald 5, July 2001 
Para. 4) This may also be back up by assertions made by Sir Geoffrey Nice QC 
regarding the Jelisic case, where the Judges had put pressure on the prosecution to 
drop the genocide charge, which was being contested by the defendant. Discussing the 
role that he and Louise Arbour had played Nice stated: 
She resisted internal pressures. Goran Jelisic, aka 'Serbian Adolf', pleaded 
guilty to various war crimes he committed but not to genocide, also on the 
indictment. The genocide trial was due to start when I took it over. It would 
have been the tribunal's first genocide trial to reach a conclusion. The trial 
judges pressed Louise in back corridors to accept the pleas of guilty, leaving 
genocide for a (publicity-attracting) "bigger fish". She declined to yield to the 
judges; the evidence against Jelesic would have allowed lawyers to know 
whether genocide was appropriate as a charge for someone low in the 
"management chain"; the trial continued. Louise left before the end of the trial. 
The trial judges acquitted in defiance of one, or more, basic rules of natural 
justice despite one of them privately revealing the "bigger fish" consideration 
that led to the acquittal. On appeal Louise's position was completely 
vindicated. (Nice 2010a) 
 
Nice also suggested that Carla Del Ponte had met with the Judges on her own despite 
being advised not to, as the Judges where trying to engage with a possible plea 
bargain in this case (Interview with Nice 2010). In light of the above, this would 
indicate that the Judge Wald is indeed correct in that there is very little that can 
regulate or control prosecutorial discretion. 
The ICC differs from the ICTY and ICTR, although the prosecutors there 
seemingly also have unconditional discretion, but it is met by a number of checks 
which are set out in Article 15 of the Rome Statute. The checks are mainly in place to 
curb concerns states may have regarding ‘a politically inspired prosecutor 
encroaching upon their sovereignty.’ (Dukic 2007: 711) The essence of Article 15 
with regards to the discretion a prosecutor may have when plea bargaining is similar 
to that of the ICTY and the ICTR’s.  The main source of this discretion comes from 
the ‘in the interest of justice’ clause. This clause in the remit of plea bargaining gives 
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the prosecutor the ability to bring a case against who he or she thinks is most 
criminally culpable. In turn, this of course means that a prosecutor also has the 
discretion as to who to use as an insider witness and who to initiate plea bargains 
with. In his experience at both the ICTR and SCSL, Chief Charles Taku explained 
that this wide discretionary practice was common practice in both tribunals. 
Suggesting this left the defendant at the mercy of the prosecutor’s discretion, which 
then extended to the Judges when determining sentence, who relied heavily on the 
prosecution’s evidence, regardless of whether it came from a reliable source or not 
(Interview with Taku 2010).  
In relation to this Dukic argues that this may indeed leave the prosecutor 
susceptible to political factors or pressure to influence any decisions as who to 
prosecute and who to use as a witness and protect from future prosecution. This is 
potentially dangerous, as an end result it may lead to politically motivated 
prosecutions, and in turn let judgments in through the back door of in the interest of 
justice curbing the attempts by the International Tribunals to limit prosecutorial 
discretion (Dukic 2007: 718). This would raise concern amongst liberal jurists as it 
would most certainly breach the rule of law.  
As the role of the international prosecutor has evolved Zappala has made the 
distinction that the role of the prosecutor at the ICC should that of an ‘organ of 
justice’ as opposed to a mere participant (Zappala 2003: 42). He argues that the 
prosecutor will be impartial with regards to political influence, explaining that, ‘The 
institutional profile of international prosecutors has moved from a very partial 
dimension, deeply grounded both in a victor’s justice paradigm and in the choice of an 
adversarial type of criminal procedure, to a more impartial character.’ (Zappala 2003: 
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40-41) Zappala also points out this was also discussed by the ICTY in the case of 
Prosecutor v Kupreskic (IT-95-16-PT) where is was held that:  
[T]he Prosecutor of the Tribunal is not, or not only, a party to adversarial 
proceedings, but is … an organ of international criminal justice whose object 
is not simply to secure a conviction but to present the case for the Prosecution, 
which includes not only inculpatory, but also exculpatory evidence, in order to 
assist the Chamber to discover the truth in a judicial setting. (Decision on 
Communication between the Parties and their Witnesses, 21 September 1998 
Para 3(ii))  
 
This is particularly significant in light of Chief Taku’s views regarding the wide and 
un- questioning discretion the prosecutor has, leaving the prosecutor’s version of 
events to be held as true. This is also reiterated by Slobodan Zecevic who, when 
taking about the factual document that is required says:  
This document which is drafted by the OTP, contains certain facts and 
constructions which are important for OTP’s theory of that particular case or 
some other future case. The accused are tempted to agree to such facts, even 
though some are obviously outside of their purview or knowledge, because 
they think naively that it can’t hurt them to confirm a thing or two they have 
no knowledge about. (Interview with Zecevic 2011) 
 
However, as David Crane explained, without insider witnesses or defendants giving 
evidence on their co-accused the SCSL would lack a coherent prosecution strategy. 
He argued that:  
[I]f you don’t have a strategy then you don’t know where individuals fit in and 
the importance of particular witnesses.’ With regards to the overall strategy 
and plea bargaining, Crane stated that plea bargaining was ‘clearly a 
possibility’ he went on to say that when thinking about negotiations one had to 
‘decide which ones (defendants) are bought to the plea bargaining process. As 
plea bargaining without association with the overall strategy in some cases 
could be dangerous as you don’t know what the ramifications are. (Interview 
with Crane 2009)  
 
The SCSL had less financial resources compared to other international criminal 
tribunals at the time. It was, therefore, important for the prosecutors to work out a 
strategy of who to prosecute and who to enter into negotiations with in order to obtain 
enough information and evidence that would allow for a successful prosecution of a 
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defendant. For this to happen effectively and efficiently, the prosecutor must be 
endowed with a large volume of discretionary powers. It is telling that Karim Khan, a 
very experienced lawyer in the field of international criminal law,
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 believes that 
discretion in the, ‘international jurisdiction is much more fettered than in the USA’, 
indicating that the prosecutors in international criminal tribunals do restrain their 
discretionary powers (Interview with Khan 2010).  
Concerning discretion, it may be that different trial professionals come to 
international criminal justice with many different backgrounds, which in turn leads to 
different approaches to how a trial should be conducted, or cases investigated and so 
on. This makes the theory and practice of discretion especially pertinent. It is 
important that the lawyers are afforded a broad amount of discretion as there will be 
differences in their approaches towards the law and the actual trial process itself 
depending on which legal culture they come from. This thinking is also extended to 
judges as well and the way that they conduct and oversee trial proceedings. In 
explaining this, HHJ Murphy stated that, ‘Judges from civil law countries are more 
proactive’ than those from common law countries. The last case that he was involved 
was a 16 month assignment to Prlic et al (IT-04-74), before he went to the Bench in 
the UK. This was ‘presided over by a French Judge and his two wing men were from 
Switzerland and Hungary.’ Murphy went on to say that this was a, ‘very interesting 
experience’ and it was clear to him the judging panel were doing, ‘their best to be 
fair.’ Although ‘they came from a different worlds they [the lawyers and the judges] 
were finding a common language from which to work with.’ Despite this, Murphy 
perceived that the French Judge was much more, ‘controlling and would take over 
cross examinations of the witnesses’ unlike a British judge who presided over a trial 
that Murphy was involved in was ‘hands off’ and had the attitude of ‘try the case for 
me, in the British tradition.’ (Interview with Murphy 2010) In an interview with the 
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IWPR, Judge Wolfgang Schomburg said, ‘The composition of the chamber has an 
effect on the outcome of the trial.’ (Rachel S 2005) 
 
4.2.12 Plea Bargaining and Legal Certainty  
 
As discussed previously, one of Hayek’s three principles of the rule of law is that the 
law should be certain.  In situations where plea bargaining takes place it is difficult to 
ensure certainty due to the discretionary nature of the process. For example in a 
domestic jurisdiction a defendant who is charged with mass murder may then enter 
into a plea bargain resulting in the original charge being dropped to manslaughter. In 
the area of international criminal law an example may be the removal of genocide 
charges in favour of a charge of a crime against humanity, like in the Plavsic case. 
This also may lead to them receiving a shorter prison term. Alongside this, another 
defendant who is also charged with a similar such murder and who may also enter into 
a plea agreement hoping to receive a short prison term and have the charges dropped 
may not receive equal treatment before the law although their crimes and conducts are 
identical. This provides no guarantee that the latter defendant will receive the same 
concessions as the previous one. Clearly such instances would violate both the 
certainty imperative valued by liberals as well as the ‘equal treatment’ values. There 
is also an issue that due to the lack of certainty in the plea bargaining process, it is 
unclear what it is that the prosecution must prove before obtaining a conviction, thus 
making this aspect of plea bargaining further incompatible with the rule of law 
doctrine as interpreted by liberalism.  
  From the Tribunals’ inception ICTY and ICTR judges have been pronouncing 
sentences for extraordinary crimes while lacking any detailed legislation or precedents 
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for guidance. To date the positive law has too been unable to offer any assistance with 
the issues surrounding sentencing. (Hola and Smeulers and Bijleveld 2011: 412) This 
issue of the lack of certainty is of course intensified when plea bargaining is 
introduced. This lack of certainty in plea bargaining is due to a lack of rule 
governance which encourages like cases to be dealt with in a like manner. In turn, 
such loose regulation raises a problem in international war crime tribunals as the 
tribunals do not have any form of sentence guidelines. Judges do not have to hand 
down sentences in accordance with the prosecution’s recommended sentences 
(Henham 2007; Cook 2005: 476).
98
  
This can result in defence counsel only being able to speculate on what the 
outcome of a proposed or actual plea bargaining is likely to be. The ICTY provides 
good examples of this in the case of Babic (IT-03-72-S). Here, the prosecution 
recommended a sentence of ‘below eleven years’, the prosecutor emphasized, ‘I stress 
here the word below.’ (Transcript, 24 April 2004 at 191) In fact he received thirteen 
years with the trial chamber stating that an eleven year sentence ‘would not do 
justice.’ (Babic Sentencing judgment, 29 June 2004 paragraph 101-02) Although the 
court gave him an even harsher sentence than the one the prosecution had suggested, 
the Trial Chamber did give him credit for voluntarily surrendering and pleading 
guilty. However, they took the fact that he had stayed in power during the Yugoslav 
conflict to be an aggravating factor, stating that:  
In conclusion, the Trial Chamber accepts that the following factors establish 
that a reduced sentence is appropriate: Babic’s admission of guilt and the 
promptness thereof; his voluntary contact with the Prosecution prior to 
confirmation of the indictment against him and his substantial cooperation 
with the Prosecution not only in his own case but also in other trials before 
this Tribunal; his voluntary appearance after confirmation of the indictment 
against him; his showing of remorse; and his family and personal situation.  
(para. 97) 
 
Babic appealed this sentence but lost the appeal in 2005 (IT-03-72-A).  
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 In a similar fashion, Dragan Nikolic (IT-02-60/1-A) received twenty three 
years instead of the recommended fifteen years, which was then reduced to twenty 
years in 2005 following an appeal. In contrast, Momir Nikolic was sentenced to 
twenty seven years, for his role in the genocide at Srebrenica. This was considerably 
higher than the fifteen to twenty years that had been recommended. The Jokic Case 
(IT-01-42/1-S) differs from the others in that the defendant received a lower sentence 
than the one that was recommended. He received seven years not the recommended 
ten years due to the promptness of his guilty plea and his voluntary surrender. The 
latter provides an interesting comparison to the Babic case. Here, the ICTY also took 
into account the substantial co-operation that was offered to the prosecution, stating 
that: 
In light of the above, the Trial Chamber finds that the following are relevant 
mitigating circumstances to which appropriate weight has been attached when 
determining the sentence: Voluntary surrender; Guilty plea; Remorse, also 
shown by the conduct concomitant and posterior to the committed crimes; 
Cooperation with the Prosecution; and Personal circumstances (paragraph 
103). 
 
Not forgetting the controversial case of Plavsic, which has already been discussed, 
where the defendant received only eleven years for her role in the mass violence that 
took place in the Former Yugoslavia, we can see that there is a lack of certainty in 
violation to the rule of law in the plea bargaining process in international war crime 
tribunals. Therefore, for liberal ideology, plea bargaining increases the problems a 
defendant may face due to the highly unpredictable nature of the decisions made by 
the tribunals. This can be illustrated by the diminished interest in guilty pleas at the 
ICTY after 2004. Such a change was at least partly due to the departure of Michael 
Johnson, who was the Chief of Prosecutions at the Tribunal. Johnson, an American 
lawyer, was a strong supporter of plea bargaining and had been involved in many of 
the plea negotiations that took place during 2003 (Combs 2006: 99).  Wayde Pittman 
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and Jonas Nilsson also suggested that this also may be due to the fact that, around this 
time, the ICTY had received a huge number of accused. Had other tribunals had also 
undergone such an influx in cases then they too may have seen an increase in plea 
bargaining (Interview with Pittman 2010; Interview with Nilsson 2010). HHJ Peter 
Murphy points out that the recent slowdown in the number of guilty pleas seen at the 
ICTY could be attributed to the fact that the Tribunal is coming to an end and hearing 
its last round of cases. The defendants who are at trial at the moment are too high 
ranking for the prosecution to enter into a negotiation with them. Murphy also 
suggested that if these defendants where to be convicted, then they ‘must go away for 
a very long time’. (Interview with Murphy 2010) 
It should also be noted that with regards to certainty and consistency of 
sentencing, the ad hoc tribunals prescribe in their statute the idea of handing down 
individual sentences, namely in Article 24 (1) of the ICTY Statute, and Article 23 (1) 
ICTR Statute. When considering these ‘individualised’ sentences, the Tribunal looks 
at mitigating and aggravating factors surrounding the circumstances of the case in 
question and then sentences the defendant accordingly
99
 (Zappala 2005: 204). This is 
to protect individual defendants from being punished for the general crimes that 
occurred during the time of conflict they are accused of taking part in but also to 
punish defendants for the specific crimes that they did in fact commit. Achieving this 
is not only a necessary component of international criminal law when it comes to 
sentencing in general but it also contributes towards the lack of predictability and rule 
governance at a sentencing stage. Factors such as remorse and the family life of the 
defendant, Plavsic (IT-00-39-40/1) Kambanda (ICTR-97-23-A) and Tadic (IT-94-1-
S) for example, have all been deemed to be pertinent factors when deciding the 
punishment a defendant should receive, potentially becoming a ‘bargaining chip’. 
However, if these considerations were carried out under a specific sentencing 
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framework, then it would allow for greater predictability and, therefore, make them 
more aligned with the liberal conception of the rule of law. Olusanya argued that one 
of the reasons for this lies within the distinctions between what constitutes a 
mitigating factor as opposed to an excuse for the criminal conduct. He states: 
[I]n the ICL context it is difficult to know where this boundary lies; owing to 
confusion and a lack of a clear picture of how a person’s criminal 
responsibility may be affected by contextual determinants, judges have 
vacillated between guilt and innocence, between exoneration and 
condemnation, and between heuristics and normative reasoning. As a result 
the boundary of international criminal responsibility is simultaneously 
expanding and contracting, and thereby exposing fissures in the edifice of 
international criminal law. Thus inconsistency and a lack of uniformity exist in 
the treatment of defendants vis-à-vis excuse and mitigating circumstances. 
Furthermore, in exercising their discretion judges have narrowly focused on 
volition and reason at the trial phase, thereby failing to take sufficient account 
of relevant contextual processes in attributing blame. (Olusanya 2010: 30-31) 
 
Although this aspect of international law applies to sentencing discretion in general 
rather than plea bargaining specifically, it is still important when regarding plea 
bargaining. This is because it contributes towards the problems faced by defendants 
when deciding to enter a guilty plea by adding to the uncertainty that a defendant 
faces when considering whether to plead guilty to lesser charges or contest the 
charges and go to trial. According to Pittman, one way to help ease this uncertainty is 
for the judges to get involved in that if they believe that the recommended sentence 
range is either too high or too low, then they should either send back the case to the 
two parties to ‘renegotiate’, or they should not allow the agreement to go ahead. As 
Pittman stated, ‘you can either plead guilty, but there would be no agreement or plead 
not guilty or renegotiate. But if the judges do accept the agreement then the trial 
chamber would be bound by it and must stay within the sentence recommendations 
when deciding on an appropriate sentence. This way you know what sentence you are 
getting.’ (Pittman 2007)  
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In his article Making a Case for Binding Plea Agreements at the ICTY (2007), 
Pitman suggests the case of United States v England, where the defendant was 
involved in the maltreatment of detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison facility in Iraq as 
an example as to how this might work. The judge presiding over this case rejected the 
guilty plea when the defendant contradicted herself through the testimony of a witness 
she called during the sentencing stage. Although the defendant had entered into a 
binding plea agreement, the judge sent the case back and the defendant had to 
revaluate whether to plead guilty, not guilty or to enter into a new plea agreement 
(Pittman 2007: 158).  
There are a lot of varying factors that are considered when negotiating a plea 
that can make the outcome uncertain and therefore confusing. It is important to note 
that some of these non-legal or extra-legal factors determine the outcome of 
negotiations which of course impacts on the sentence a defendant receives. The next 
section will look at the issues of sentencing and discretion when entering into 
negotiations.  
 
4.2.13 Sentencing Discretion and Plea Bargaining 
 
In the case of the International Criminal Court (ICC), similar to the two ad hoc 
tribunals, Article 78(1) of their statute emphasises the importance of individualisation 
of sentencing. It states that, ‘in determining the sentence, the court shall, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, take into account such factors 
as gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.’100 
Like the ICTY/R, this Article does not suggest any parameters to this, or how much 
weighting should be given to said ‘factors’. It therefore fails to give a framework 
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which can be used for guidance (Henham 2007: 770). To add to the confusion over 
the lack of certainty over what sentence an accused may receive, the ICC Statute 
positively encourages the use of discretion. This is provided for in Article 76(1) of the 
ICC statute which merely states that, ‘in the event of a conviction, the Trial Chamber 
shall consider the appropriate sentence to be imposed and shall take into account the 
evidence presented and submissions made during the trial that are relevant to the 
sentence.’ (Radosavlijevic 2007) 
 If liberalism is correct, determinate rules are required for a legal system to 
function effectively and fairly, then it would also be the case that the predictability 
and certainty of the law pertains to the proper method of legal interpretation. In other 
words, if the judges follow the exact language of the law then that secures 
predictability. This is known as the textualist approach (Easterbrook 1994: 17). 
Problems that may arise from this is that there are certain laws that sometimes need a 
broader interpretation to what the written rules give, in order to be more 
encompassing and fair. An example of this is may include the now more 
encompassing definition of rape and sexual violence as a war crime, and that acts of 
sexual violence can now be categorised as genocide (Allen 1996; Askin 1997).  
There are also a number of other factors that may make the outcome of the 
rules applied uncertain for defendants, one such factor is the language used in legal 
rules. There are many instances where the law is not framed in a clear and determinate 
language.
101
 This potentially leaves room for a vast amount of discretion, which in 
turn may lead to uncertainty. In particular, the rules that govern the use of plea 
bargaining in the world of international criminal law employ vague standards by using 
indeterminate terms such as ‘reasonable’, ‘significant’. One such standard that is 
important to plea bargaining is remorse. As discussed in detail in the previous chapter 
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a defendant’s expression of remorse when pleading guilty is considered a desirable 
effect of plea bargaining. Remorse however remains an ambiguous concept where a 
lot of discretion is given to judges to decide what is classed as ‘remorse’, if it is 
genuine, and whether to give it any mitigation, and how to apply such mitigation in a 
consistent and coherent manner (Ward 2006: 131). As Tieger observed, 
Remorse presents a particularly compelling demand for clarity because of its 
subjective nature... Remorse... resides within the perpetrator and can only be 
identified through circumstantial evidence or reliance on the declaration of the 
accused. This subjectivity further complicates a sentencing court’s effort to 
ensure that the basis for its decision is understood. (Tieger 2003: 777-778) 
 
 Showing remorse puts the court and its participants in a difficult situation as a 
defendant may appear to be contrite, and therefore possibly be on the way to being 
rehabilitated and reconciled. However, the implementation of factors such as remorse 
is not governed by any actual rules and so consistent application becomes difficult to 
ensure. Such factors are classed as legal standards, which are vague to say the least 
and therefore indeterminate which again may lead to uncertainty.  
Of course, the use of vague standards in law need not necessarily leave the 
legal system uncertain. There are instances where the certainty that is desired can be 
achieved through the use of vague and indeterminate legal standards. These standards 
of course have to be well crafted and have parameters placed upon the scope and level 
of discretion that can be applied to them. Still using remorse as an example of an 
indeterminate legal standard, legal systems have made factors such as remorse a legal 
norm that is expected of defendants. As well as expressing remorse by way of apology 
and/or trying to rectify the harm caused, remorse is also a mental state and is often 
lacking linguistic clarity and is governed by ambiguous rules if any.  
Raban suggests that we look at these factors as multi-dimensional situations 
(Raban 2010: 187). He argues that the phenomena they describe are informed by 
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various combinations and factors, each having different and varying importance. 
Therefore for international judges to determine remorse would resemble making a 
medical diagnosis (Raban 2010: 118).
102
 Where a diagnosis is made there are 
normally a number of factors to consider which are mutually exclusive to each other 
and do not impinge on other factors whether they are present or not. Say out of 100 
factors, there need only be 40 factors to diagnose an illness, if there are more factors 
then possibly there is a better chance of a correct diagnosis. Also the presence or 
absence of certain factors may point to the intensity of illness.  
Looking at the example of remorse in more depth the presence of a number of 
factors may help decrease the amount of uncertainty for a defendant when pleading 
guilty. For remorse to have any mitigation there usually are a number of things that 
are present, a statement of remorse, cooperation with the OTP, a psychiatric 
evaluation, a guilty plea, favourable post conflict conduct, family and personal 
circumstances to name a few. Although the evaluation of each of these is open to a 
certain amount of discretion and indeterminacy itself, each would carry weight and 
mitigation on its own merit, with certain factors carrying more merit than others, such 
as a guilty plea and cooperating with the OTP. The absence of any positive post 
conflict conduct or any other factor should not go towards undermining the mitigating 
circumstances already present.
103
 Therefore, by instilling multi-factor, multi-weight 
legal tests to evaluate vague legal standards may in fact increase the predictability and 
certainty desired in liberal legal systems
104
 (Raban 2010: 188). 
Despite Hayek’s arguments for rules to be fixed and announced beforehand 
and therefore unambiguous (Hayek 1944: 72) he came to realise that the use of vague 
legal standards may increase certainty and predictability over well-defined legal rules: 
This [last remark] throws important light on a much discussed issue, the 
supposed greater certainty of the law under a system in which all rules of law 
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have been laid down in written or codified form, and which the judge is 
restricted to applying in such rules as have become written law. In my own 
case even the experience of thirty odd years in the common law world was not 
enough to correct this deeply rooted prejudice, and only my return to a civil 
law atmosphere has led me to seriously question it. Although legislation can 
certainly increase the certainty of law on particular points, I am persuaded that 
this advantage is more than offset if its recognition leads to the requirement 
that only what has this been expressed in statutes should have the force of law. 
It seems to me that judicial decision may in fact be more predictable if the 
judge is also bound by generally held views of what is just, even when they 
are not supported by the letter of the law. (Hayek 1973: 117) 
 
The ICC aims to hear cases from all over the world and, from a liberal rule of law 
perspective, it is especially important to have predictability and certainty in 
sentencing policy in this particular court. It aims to try different defendants who were 
involved in different conflicts with some sense of equality. It will be interesting to 
ascertain how judges will maintain a certain and predicable sentencing policy when 
faced with markedly different defendants. By way of example, if one imagines that 
the cases of Plavsic and Kambanda (ICTR 97-23-S) were heard at the ICC, it would 
be interesting to see if there would have been such a difference in the respective 
sentences received. This disparity in sentence, with Plavsic receiving eleven years and 
Kambanda receiving life imprisonment after both pleaded guilty, could also lend itself 
toward the argument that the use of plea bargaining in war crime tribunals violates the 
equal treatment and predictability standards that are required by the classical liberal 
rule of law. It is evident that there are many factors that are considered when issuing a 
sentence, the factors considered often overlap with each other and are rarely mutually 
exclusive to one another. This is also true of the rights that a defendant loses when 
deciding to plead guilty, for example the loss of the right to equality impacts on the 
due process rights of the defendant.   
 
4.3 Conclusion 
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In this section I have discussed the implications of plea bargaining in international 
war crime tribunals from a liberal perspective, emphasising the importance of the 
ideological principle of the rule of law in relation to prosecution practice in these 
contexts. This is not to say that this is the only interpretative model that one may 
follow in analysing plea bargaining. There has been much debate about the decline of 
liberal rule of law, and how its ideologies are incompatible with modern legal 
systems. In recent years, there has been a revival of the arguments put forward by Carl 
Schmitt in his criticisms against liberalism and the rule of law in general.
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As already noted, legal systems based on liberalism are rights based and 
individualistic. This holds that the main aspects of plea bargaining are incompatible 
with the liberal rule of law. These areas are mainly based around the discretionary 
nature and the unequal treatment the defendants receive and the lack of transparency 
that arises when plea deals are negotiated. This, of course, contributes greatly to the 
lack of certainty a defendant will have when deciding whether to enter into 
negotiations or to go to trial. Although the very nature of plea bargaining means that 
this will always be the case. These issues highlighted in this section are of great 
importance, especially as international tribunals do their utmost to enshrine these 
rights in their laws and rules. The stark reality is that full and complete adherence to 
the rule of law when employing judicial mechanisms such as plea bargaining is 
unrealistic. The liberal rule of law sets high standards that in reality cannot be met 
when entering into to a plea bargain as evidenced by the interviews above. As far as 
notion of judicial certainty involves strict rule following to generate predictable 
outcomes, this in itself is impossible. Although there needs to be some degree of rule 
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following otherwise this would lead to random outcomes, which would be 
unacceptable. 
When it comes to defendants’ claimed rights to ‘equality before the law’, it 
seems that there is a division in whether people regard this to be breached or not. 
Generally, from the interviews it is defence counsel that believes that they and their 
clients are treated unequally, and often gave examples to illustrate their point. Chief 
Taku offered his first hand knowledge of the inequality and unfairness in plea 
bargaining when he discussed his experience in the cases of Bisengimana, Semanza 
and Runambarara
106
 (Interview with Taku 2010). Related to equal treatment, His 
Honour Judge Peter Murphy talked about the lack of the equality of arms when it 
came to plea bargaining, at one point stating that it had been rumoured that at the 
ICTY the OTP had ‘over three million documents stashed away in the basement’, of 
which ‘only a handful made their way to the defence’, Murphy went on to say that 
many of these documents were not even translated (Interview with Murphy 2010).  
 Whereas other trial professionals believe that the tribunals do their utmost to 
ensure the equal treatment rights. This may be because the defence like most criminal 
courts international tribunals are often in a less advantageous position than the 
prosecution, who have amassed evidence and information through the investigations 
that have already taken place. It would seem prudent that in this situation the only 
realistic measure that can be taken is that defendants are treated individually even 
when a particular defendant’s case is part of a JCE  that they are given equal 
opportunity to plead guilty and that the procedure governing the bargaining process 
are applied equally to all defendants. This should also be extended to defence counsel 
who may not be as familiar with the plea bargaining process as the prosecution. As 
O’Sullivan and Zecevic point out:  
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[T]here is a lack of uniformity in plea bargaining as a result of the fact that the 
opportunity to enter into such an agreement has been only recently introduced 
in the legal system and it inevitably will take time to create and develop 
certain standards for this process in the domestic criminal practice. It may be 
understandable that counsel from the inquisitorial system lack the experience 
and sufficient knowledge of the plea bargaining process. (O’Sullivan and 
Zecevic 2011: 150) 
 
The other area of concern highlighted in this section is the lack of transparency that 
occurs when entering into negotiations. Although this most certainly breaches the 
right to a public trial, it would be inconceivable to hold negotiations involving war 
crimes in open court, this therefore would most definitely infringe upon a defendant’s 
presumption of innocence.  
As far as plea bargaining is concerned, it is clear to see that the theory of the 
rule of law and the use of plea bargaining however reformed are incompatible. It may 
be as shown above through the use of interviews that certain aspects of plea 
bargaining, such as the loss of a defendant’s right to the presumption of innocence, 
may not always be an issue in reality and that the trial professionals have full 
confidence in the tribunals to protect this right.
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 This does not mean that it may not 
become an issue later on, possibly in another tribunal. (Interview with Pittman 2010) 
The rule of law in itself is also an incomplete theory one of the main down 
falls of this particular approach in the context of plea bargaining in relation to such 
large scale crimes is that it fails to consider the rights of the victims unlike 
utilitarianism.
108
 From the interviews I undertook with practitioners who have 
experience of working at the tribunals, it is apparent that both of these theories fail to 
provide adequate frameworks for the use of plea bargaining ‘on the ground’ in 
international criminal law. This is particularly apparent when the very concept of plea 
bargaining is alien to the persons the international justice imperative is aimed at. With 
this important factor in mind, the next chapter deals with the differing theories of legal 
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imperialism and neo-colonialism exploring these issues from a non-liberal perspective 
using the idea of legal imperialism as a way of further developing a critique of the 
liberal rule of law. Once again I will substantiate my position by illustrating the 
arguments with empirical evidence derived from the experiences of practitioners who 
have worked on cases that have involved the use of plea bargaining in war crime 
tribunals. These interviews allow me to reflect on abstract legal theories and consider 
how far ‘hard and fast’ theoretical positions are actually workable in the reality of the 
contemporary international legal systems. 
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5. Plea Bargaining at International Tribunals and the Concept of Legal 
Imperialism 
 
This chapter will explore the issues that surround the use of plea bargaining in war 
crime tribunals through the lens of the interpretative framework of legal imperialism. 
This notion is complex and, therefore, in order to fully explore the issues it raises 
here, this section will be broken down into three parts. The first will discuss the 
theories that inform the idea of legal imperialism, such as post-colonialism and 
cultural imperialism, and relate them to the thesis’ central research question; the 
justification of prosecutors deploying various forms of plea bargaining in international 
criminal law cases involving war crimes charges. The second will look at the subject 
of plea bargaining as a form of legal transplant, considering the reasons how and why 
it was transplanted into the international system. This section will be using Prosecutor 
v Sesay, Kallon,Gbabo (SCSL-04-15-A) as a case study. The third section will 
examine the implications of plea bargaining using subaltern theories, highlighting the 
long term problems that may occur when negotiating guilty pleas.  
Unlike the previous two chapters, this section does not aim to represent the use 
of plea bargaining merely as something of a hindrance to the realisation of liberal 
ideals, or as an instrument of justice as defined by utilitarian criteria. Instead, it offers 
a more nuanced analysis that incorporates some of the more viable lessons provided 
by the earlier perspectives and examples of institutional practice but also vitally 
acknowledges the roles of previously imperialist powers in constructing a continuing 
legacy of international law and transplanting aspects of their particular systems into 
the international context, often as false over-generalisations as if any particular system 
can be taken to represent universal criminal justice as such. 
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In light of this, and unlike the previous two chapters, this section does not take 
as its starting point an analysis of the role of plea bargaining in international tribunals 
in relation to already established legal theories. Rather, it engages more directly with 
the issues that arose from the interviews I conducted with legal practitioners drawn 
from both western and non-westerns legal systems. Although I have already discussed 
some of these issues discussed here, it is worth revisiting them but this time through 
the prism of writing about imperialism and post-colonialism in ways that could not be 
fully addressed by the frameworks offered by utilitarian or liberal approaches. 
 
5.1 Legal Imperialism and Post Colonialism 
 
Recently, the idea of an imperial ordering of the world has returned with the terms 
‘imperialism’ and ‘empire’ denoting geopolitical issues (Hurrell 2007: 107). This 
contrasts with the twentieth century where a more ambiguous and theoretical meaning 
was used under the influence of Marxist theory (Zolo 2009: 107). Indeed, recently 
substantial quantities of sovereign states have transferred some of their autonomy to 
international establishments, such as the European Union, NATO, the World Bank, 
the G8, The Arab League and the International Criminal Court and of course ICTY 
and ICTR.  
However, whilst there may have been some moves to such 
internationalisation, the post-war period also saw the development of a hegemony 
driven by Western powers led by the USA. This is exemplified by the role that the 
USA took in the liberalising agenda of trade negotiations and the expansion of the 
World Trade Organisation’s scope (Hurrell 2007: 108). Hurrell notes that at the core 
of this was a specific form of legal practice. He states that there was an, 
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‘extraterritorial application of US law’, arguing that, ‘the externalizing of US 
domestic law and domestic regulatory practices’ was part of a wider strategy leading 
to what he termed ‘global regulation’ (Hurrell 2007: 108). It is this form of 
imperialism that is particularly relevant to this thesis, specifically the use of plea 
bargaining in war crime tribunals via the implementation of a ‘legal transplant’ that is 
not indigenous to the legal tradition into which it is introduced. 
There has been much written about imperialism and international law (Anghie 
2004; Mievelle 2005, 2008; Schmitt 2005), in particular the areas of humanitarian law 
(Bricmont 2006), and environmental law (Crosby 2004; Gonzales 2001). Some of 
these authors also question the role of international criminal justice and its place and 
function in the world today, whilst some refer to the imperialistic nature of the 
institutions that define it. In doing so they use terms such as ‘new’ and ‘liberal’ or 
neo-liberal imperialism (Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks 2006; Weinstein and Van 
de Merwe 2007) and ‘lawfare’109 (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Kelsall 2009: 8). 
However, for all this, there is still insufficient analysis of which aspects of 
international criminal law may be usefully regarded as a form of imperialism and why 
such a characterisation can helpfully supplement the more familiar insights I have 
discussed and that are derived from the perspectives of liberalism and utilitarianism. 
Generally, it is taken for granted by such writers that aspects of the international legal 
system can indeed be viewed as being imperialistic without sufficient discussion, 
elaboration or firm evidence.  
Returning to its origins, the classical notion of international law was also the 
product of a European legal culture which, ‘is an incontestable fact that no-one 
questions.’ (Jouannet 2007: 380) This is evident in international criminal law where 
debate about legal imperialism is often confined to questions of whether the 
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international legal system should be based on the inquisitorial or adversarial systems 
and which one of these has become more dominant. In fact, the tribunals are supposed 
to be a hybrid of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems which leaves very little 
room for anything else, least of all non-European modes of trial and conceptions of 
justice. In the context of the discussions contained in this thesis, it is of interest to see 
how plea bargaining might be interpreted in other tribunals, especially those that are 
not funded by and therefore potentially influenced by, the USA. As Judge Peter 
Murphy said when interviewed for this thesis, ‘the ICC, due to the absence of an 
American influence, has moved over to the civil law…There is not much adversarial 
about that (tribunal)’. He went on to say, ‘regrettably the UK doesn’t have as much 
influence as the USA does.’ (Interview with Murphy 2010)  
There has been little discussion regarding whether the basis of the 
international legal system could take on another, non-European, form. However, a 
considerable amount of consideration has been given to the idea that certain elements 
of other systems, such as Traditional Informal Justice Mechanisms and other non-
judicial forms of accountability such as Truth Commissions, may be incorporated in 
certain circumstances
110
 (Drumbl 2007; Kelsall 2009). Jouannet argues that this is a 
form of modern day imperialism and represents a type of neo-colonialism as the 
Eurocentric international legal and cultural ideals are not considered to be compatible 
with non-European legal cultures (Jouannet 2007: 383). Here, the aspect of 
international criminal law in question is plea bargaining and in this chapter the 
introduction and use of plea bargaining is examined as a possible form of imperialism 
originating from the adversarial legal system, and in particular the USA. 
In discussing the issue of legal imperialism and plea bargaining it is useful to 
first consider what is be meant by the term ‘imperialism’. The study of imperialism 
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has a long history, one that traditionally directs attention to discussions concerned 
with the development of international capital. Here, imperialism is most widely 
understood as the expansion of a state’s power over other states in a manner that 
usually creates an imbalance in territorial, economic and cultural fields. In the past, 
this type of activity has been synonymous with notions of empire and much of the 
legal scholarship surrounding imperialism is based in notions of capital which can be 
characterised by perpetual motion and continual expansion (Marks 2008: 13). 
  Imperialism may also be defined as ‘a policy of extending a country’s power 
and influence through colonization, use of military force, or other means.’ (Marks 
2008: 13) Hence, it should therefore not be confused with colonialism, which Edward 
Said suggested was best understood as, ‘the practice, the theory and the attitudes of a 
dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory.’ (Said 1993: 8) In a legal 
context this resonates with the idea of plea bargaining as this was initially introduced 
into the Tribunal’s debate by the US advisors and which has taken on an adversarial 
mode which is more in keeping with its interpretation within the US legal system.   
It can be argued that the use of plea bargaining in international tribunals is a 
form of American imperialism for two reasons, it is a form of cultural imperialism and 
it is also that the way in which plea negotiations are conducted ‘looks after’ American 
interests. When looking at the justifications of plea bargaining I noted that one of the 
major reasons for its use was economic efficiency. Much of the money for these 
tribunals is donated by nation states and in the case of the ICTY a quarter of their 
funds come from the USA (Scharf 2004: 1077). Hence, any money that is saved in 
this context ultimately serves the economic interests of the USA and therefore the 
material interests of United States citizens as it is their tax money that is funding 
international justice. Going even further, Mieville (2005; 2008) states that, 
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‘imperialism and international law are part of the same system. Modern capitalism is 
an imperialistic system, and a juridical one. International law’s constituent forms are 
constituent forms of global capitalism and therefore imperialism’. (Mieville 2008: 
120) This assertion is illustrated by comments the former prosecutor of the ICTY and 
ICTR, Carla Del Ponte, made at a speech she gave in 2005 at the London branch of 
Goldman Sachs entitled, The Dividends of International Criminal Justice. Del Ponte 
emphasized that international criminal tribunals facilitate profit making for others by 
bringing about stability in the effected regions via prosecutions. She stated that, ‘this 
is where the long-term profit of the UN’s work resides. We are trying to create stable 
conditions so that safe investments to take place.’ (Del Ponte 2005) Presumably the 
‘safe investments’ can be taken out by private companies, individuals and 
governments alike. 
 As discussed in the utilitarian chapter, the more guilty pleas there are, the 
more criminal convictions there are. In turn, this helps restore some of the wrong 
doing that had occurred and works towards the re-stabilising of a region
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 (Combs 
2007). This, of course, would also create an environment for safer economic 
investments. In addition plea bargaining conserves funds donated by States’ 
governments and by extension the need for further funding. Hence, if one adopts a 
materialistic stance, these governments can potentially be viewed as having a vested 
interest in effected regions. Historically, this may have been due to their being, for 
example, former colonies or having close geographic regions. Today not all major 
donors, such as the USA, have former colonies in Africa or Eastern European for 
example. However, many states do have an economic interest in helping to bring 
justice to the regions in question in order to stimulate conditions for safer investment. 
Put simply, the leaders of western countries are seeking to pacify and civilise ‘third 
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world’ and war torn regions using high level prosecutions and rule of law strategy 
programs (Alkon 2010; Kelsall 2009: 8). This can be viewed as form of ‘lawfare’. 
Donor countries such as the USA, where there are many big businesses with 
international investments, may see the increased number of convictions through plea 
bargaining as proof of the stabilisation process and a way to maintain their financial 
position in the global economy. As already noted, this would lead to greater 
confidence in the investment in post conflict countries and Plea bargaining in 
international war crime tribunals can this be viewed as an economic trade off.  
Another issue that Del Ponte raised was that at times Tribunals have found 
themselves lacking in vital funds, as was the case with the SCSL, which found itself 
‘terribly under resourced the international community was suffering from donor 
fatigue at the time.’ (Interview with De Silva 2010) In such cases there may be the 
possibility that private companies are invited to fund criminal prosecutions which may 
in turn also lead to more plea bargains as private companies would desire efficiency. 
Such concerns reflect an ideological position that demands results that puts economic 
concerns ahead of abstract notions of justice.  
 
5.1.1 Schmitt, Imperialism and the Law 
 
It is worth discussing the notions of imperialism that are pertinent to this thesis 
through the theories advanced by Carl Schmitt as, although very controversial, they 
can help explain plea bargaining as a legal mechanism put forward by the US that 
many of the persons involved in international criminal law have no or very little 
knowledge of. Schmitt’s theory of international law is set out in a number of his 
texts
112
 where he lays out his philosophy of empire through a criticism of the USA’s 
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Monroe Doctrine.
113
 He offers the idea of an American grossraum (geo-political 
space), which refers to the strategies used to spread US policy to other states such as 
those of the Caribbean and South America in order to create an ideological consensus 
(Zolo 2009: 118). According to Schmitt, another example would be the construction 
of the League of Nations which highlights the US’s most radical form of imperialism, 
as through it they were able to influence other nation states. Schmitt observed in Der 
Nomos Erde that the world: 
[h]as reached a clear dilemma between universalism and pluralism, between 
monopoly and polypoly. The question was whether the planet was mature 
enough for a global monopoly of a single power or whether a pluralism of 
coexisting grossbraume, spheres of influence, and cultural spheres would 
determine the new international law of the earth. (Schmitt 2003: 243-244) 
 
Zolo points out that the USA has also managed to reign supreme not only because it 
has managed a global monopoly through its economy but also because it has imposed 
its own lexicon  and theoretical vocabulary, as Schmitt notes, ‘Caesar dominus et 
supra grammaticam’ (Caesar also reigns over the grammar)114 (Schmitt 2003).  
Following these observations, one might argue that the USA has also been 
able to maintain a global empire by not only contributing substantial funds to the 
criminal courts but also by drafting the laws and procedures that are in place in these 
institutions. Their influence also advanced by the fact that there has been at least one 
lawyer from either the USA or the UK involved in a plea bargaining case; a fact that 
assists in the assertion that the legal system that is most dominant is able to enforce 
their interpretation of the laws on an institution applying them. This gives rise to a 
new form of imperialism where the imperial power dominates without actually ruling, 
creating a kind of legal globalism. Reflecting this, the future Under-Secretary for 
Disarmament Affairs of the Bush Administration John Bolton, asked, ‘should we take 
global governance seriously?’ answering, ‘Sadly…yes’. For him, globalism, 
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‘represent[ed] a kind of worldwide cartelization of governments and interest groups’, 
something the US needed to combat with all its energy. He stated that, ‘It is well past 
the point when the uncritical acceptance of globalist slogans…can be allowed to 
proceed. The costs to the United States…are far too great, and the current 
understanding of these costs far too limited to be acceptable.’ (Bolton 2000: 221 in 
Koskenniemi 2004: 1) For this thesis this idea may be illustrated by pointing out the 
provisions in the ICC statute that allow for guilty pleas to be accepted although the 
USA has not yet signed the Rome Statute. The inclusion of this provision is no doubt 
due to the ICTY and ICTR accepting guilty pleas and entering into plea bargains 
under the sway of US law makers.
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It can then be argued that the use of plea bargaining in international tribunals 
represents a form of legal imperialism, and needs to be expressly recognised and 
characterised as such, as it is an invention of the Anglo-American criminal system, 
and until recently few other jurisdictions had such a mechanism in place. When it 
comes to the domestic use of plea bargaining, there have been a considerable number 
of jurisdictions that have introduced this practice through the process of legal 
transplantation. Many jurisdictions that have been involved in war crime tribunals, 
such as Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Alkon 2010) have subsequently 
introduced plea bargaining into their own war crime tribunals due to its use at the 
ICTY, which in turn has led to it being introduced into their domestic jurisdiction. 
Although its origins are in the common law system, it is also not unheard of in the 
civil law jurisdiction in some form. For example, in Italy they have the 
Patteggiamento Sulla Pen and a number of post-colonial countries have legal systems 
that are based on the common law model such as India and areas of Nigeria which 
have also introduced variations of the American styled of plea bargaining. These 
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countries have encountered problems with the notion of plea bargaining not because 
the criminal system is alien to the common law base that plea bargaining comes from 
but rather because of the cultural practices plea bargaining is rooted in. In particular, 
Eurocentric versions of Judeo-Christian dogma where the idea of confession, 
admitting ones sins and showing remorse is encouraged and met by redemption 
(Vogel 2007: 221).  
In relation to plea bargaining, the introduction of its use into international 
criminal practice may be perceived as imperialistic in one regard as it is the 
expression of US legal culture and its continued use can been viewed as preserving a 
legal culture conducive to US interests. From its introduction into the international 
arena, the use of plea bargaining has also been transplanted into the legal systems of 
the states that are involved in these tribunals. In another regard, plea bargaining’s 
introduction into a forum where the defendants that are being tried are not from 
jurisdictions that traditionally have provisions for this in their legal systems may also 
been seen as imperialistic. This is because the use of such a European and, in 
particular, adversarial legal mechanism may be perceived as a way to exclude or 
marginalise a state’s indigenous legal ideologies and culture, therefore excluding them 
from the hegemonic ordering of the international institution. If this is the case, then it 
would maintain the position of the ‘leading’ legal systems and their States as the pre-
eminent bearers of their own distinctive models of justice and legality.  
 
5.1.2 Plea Bargaining and Cultural Imperialism 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the use of plea bargaining is an integral part of the 
US criminal system, with approximately 90% of cases being settled by way of such 
218 
 
negotiations. I therefore argue that the use of plea bargaining in international criminal 
law can be construed and discussed as a form of cultural imperialism in a similar way 
to how this practice is seen as an example of both classic liberalism and utilitarianism. 
Unlike the general concept of imperialism, the specific theory of cultural imperialism 
does not have a long history and is still an emerging area of study but offers insights 
that can be useful in the context of this thesis (Tomlinson 1991: 2). 
The concept of Cultural Imperialism started to evolve in the 1960s and has 
since become part of the general discourses around imperialism in the second half of 
the twentieth century (Tomlinson 1991: 2). However, arriving at a working definition 
of cultural imperialism is not easy, as Mattelart notes, ‘It is always with a certain 
apprehension that the problem of imperialism is approached and especially what is 
known as cultural imperialism. This generic concept has too often been used with ill-
defined meaning.’ (1979: 57) However, when related to the concept of plea 
bargaining and the idea of legal transplants, many of the discussions that arise can be 
usefully evoked, in particular the alleged need for a ‘common’ culture. Yet the term 
‘culture’ embraces a disparate and indefinite range of phenomena. According to 
Taylor, culture can be defined as, ‘that complex whole which includes knowledge, 
belief, art, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society.’ (Taylor 1871: 56) This definition includes law as an integral part 
of a wider notion of what constitutes culture. Merry asserts that legal systems ‘are 
often embedded in very different ways of thinking about the fact/law dichotomy, the 
nature of evidence, and the meaning of Judging.’ (Merry 1988: 871)  
 Whilst there has been no substantial analysis regarding plea bargaining as a 
form of cultural imperialism, there has been discussions about the general difficulties 
that may arise when western legal traditions are superimposed on non-western 
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cultures in international criminal law. Judith Shklar noted, when talking about the 
Tokyo trials: 
When… the America prosecutor at the Tokyo trials appealed to the law of 
nature as a basis for condemning the accused, he was only applying a foreign 
ideology, serving his nation’s interests, to a group of people who neither knew 
nor cared about this doctrine. The assumption of universal agreement served 
here merely to impose dogmatically an ethnocentric vision of international 
order. It was the claim that these universal rules were ‘there’- the assumption 
of general agreement, which was so contrary to the culture and realities of the 
situation. (Shklar 1964, 1986: 128) 
 
 
The tribunal went ahead, with the prosecution validating thier position but asserting 
the Christian-Judaic ethics. Shklar asks, ‘what on earth could the Christian-Judaic 
ethic mean to the Japanese?’ (Shklar 1986: 186) Shklar’s response to her own 
question was that the trial was ‘a complete dud’ (Shklar 1986: 124). This can be also 
seen in the ECCC case of Duch (Kaing Guek Eav Case 001), where the defendant 
pleaded guilty to the crimes he was accused of but the court did not accept this or his 
counsel’s arguments that this could be an expedited way to gain a conviction. This 
may have happened because the tribunal staff was made up of both international 
lawyers and Cambodian lawyers. In this instance, there would not have been a 
majority of lawyers from western legal backgrounds or who had been experienced in 
conducting plea bargains. Alongside this, there were enough people at the tribunal 
from the region not to allow legal mechanisms that were so far removed from their 
own legal ideology. This would have enabled the putting of the legal process into a 
cultural perspective that victims and the wider Cambodian community could have 
related to. Former prosecutor David Crane gave a speech questioning what the justice 
the SCSL sought to pose was, and hoping it was not just ‘white man’s justice’ (Crane 
2006: 1685-6). He argued: 
Our perspectives are off-kilter. We simply don’t think about or factor in the 
justice victims seek … We approach the intersection of international justice 
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paternalistically. I would even say with self-righteous attitude that borders on 
the ethnocentric … We consider our justice as the only justice … We don’t 
contemplate why the tribunal is being set up, and for whom it was established 
… After set up, we don’t create mechanisms by which we can consider the 
cultural and customary approaches to justice within the region. (Crane 2006: 
1685-6) 
 
He also said there are, ‘many alternatives to justice rather than the international 
model.’ He went on to argue we, ‘must be respectful before making a decision to set 
up an international tribunal, as they are costly and politically problematic.’ He also 
pointed out that if using an ‘alternative to international criminal justice, you must 
ensure some justice is done rather than no justice.’ (Interview with Crane 2009) This 
indicates that Crane was very conscious of what the SCSL was set up to do, and that 
was to try those who bore the greatest responsibility. This is interesting as, although 
Crane does consider local justice methods or traditional informal justice mechanisms 
to be important and is on the whole culturally sensitive towards the participants of the 
trials, he took a very adversarial approach towards the attempted plea negotiations that 
took place at this court. This does not mean that Crane behaved inappropriately. It 
merely means that he acted in complete accordance with his own legal culture, which 
the defendants themselves did not trust or comprehend at the time (Jordash 2010; 
Taku 2010). These arguments are developed throughout the rest of this section of the 
thesis. 
Despite the many different facets the notion of imperialism has, it seems as 
with the utilitarian arguments, the most dominant factors concerning the use of plea 
bargaining are centralised around finance and the financial preservation of the courts 
in question. Having laid down a basic framework for why the use of plea bargaining 
may be considered a form of legal and cultural imperialism it is important to now turn 
to how it was introduced into the international jurisdiction and how it has be adapted 
by through an analysis of legal transplant. 
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5.2 Legal Transplant and Plea Bargaining   
 
The purpose of this section is to look at the transplant of plea bargaining in the 
international system and the extent to which it has taken root and why. There have 
been many legal transplants over time. In fact it said that there is no contemporary 
legal system that has not had a legal rule or procedure transplanted into their system 
(Watson 1974). The most common example of legal transplantations occurred during 
the expansion of the Roman Empire were Roman laws and procedures which were 
based in notions of Roman morality, a form of natural law, were applied over the 
colonised populations, over cultural beliefs and practices held by the indigenous 
people (Goodman 1995; Gillespie 2006: 3). Generally, Western European states have 
been influenced by Roman law, which was a form of natural law which legitimatised 
European colonisation over non-Christian peoples (Gillespie 2006: 3). Natural law 
doctrine like the more contemporary right based laws held that all human beings had a 
right to salvation, and colonial laws were not allowed to revoke this ideal and 
therefore not allowed to dismiss indigenous laws. Yet they did so (Gillespie 2006: 3). 
Gillespie uses the example of the French colonial rule over Vietnam, where French 
legal transplantation ignored this sentiment and set out to regulate and prohibit local 
practices (Gillespie 2006: 4). Many legal transplants can easily be seen in countries 
that have been colonised for example Cambodia’s legal system still follows the 
French legal code (Ratner and Abrams 2001:284). Similarly it is considered common 
knowledge that India’s judicial system has been influenced by the British legal system 
that was implemented during the colonial rule as was the case in Sierra Leone (Kelsall 
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2009: 25). It is interesting that these countries have been able to maintain many 
cultural practices as well follow the formal legal systems. 
Legal transplants feature in all areas of law from economic policy to contract 
and property law. A legal transplant is in its most basic form is the moving of one 
rule, legal system or legal concept from one country or legal system to another 
(Watson 1974). The term legal transplant was coined by legal scholar Alan Watson in 
the 1970s but he was more concerned with private law than with public law, such as 
the transfer of criminal rules, or criminal procedures from one jurisdiction to another. 
In modern times it would seem that legal principles are still being transplanted into a 
State’s legal systems from another State. There are a number of wide ranging benefits 
for this an example may be, a change in commercial law facilitates interstate 
commerce due to the harmonisation of the laws between the trading states, or a 
change in intellectual property laws helps prevent the quality control of the protected 
product, for example medical drugs. It can therefore be argued that introducing 
aspects of Anglo-American system equates to a form of cultural and legal 
imperialism. This is because in doing so it imposes a legal culture on a system as 
discussed above. There are a number of varying reasons why transplants take place. 
At one end of the spectrum, legal transplants can be viewed as a form of 
imperialism, when it is forced on a population without consultation or consent and at 
the expense of pre-existing arrangements. For example, this occurred in the European 
colonisation of Australia and North America, where not only were the indigenous 
people displaced but there was also a change in institutions, religious administrations 
as well as various social relations such as marriage (Merry 2000). This allowed for the 
transfer of European legal systems. On the other hand, wholesale transplants of legal 
systems, or even the transfer of some legal principles can be useful when there is 
223 
 
nothing else available in the native legal system. Examples would be the case of 
Central and Eastern European countries after the Cold War in 1989, when these 
countries needed to borrow legal and political rules and institutions following decades 
of Soviet domination. This was also the case after the reunification of East and West 
Germany, when it was not only the laws that were transferred, but also legal personnel 
from Western Germany were seconded to the East to administer the transplanted 
system (Norbert-Horn 1991; Gillespie 2006: 4). 
 The introduction of plea bargaining into a number of domestic jurisdictions  
has generally been to act as a solution to unmanageable court backlogs and the 
financial strains that this then causes (Turner 2009: 139).
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  A number of new legal 
systems that have been established contain provisions for plea bargaining, as the 
system that has been transferred incorporates jury trials and, therefore, the inclusion 
of plea bargaining into the system safeguards the cost effectiveness of the courts.  It is 
said that ‘growth of law is principally to be explained by the transplantation of legal 
rules between legal systems, or by the elaboration of existing legal ides within 
systems so as to apply them with an analogy to new circumstances.’ (Cotterall 2006: 
110) 
There are a number of benefits to transplants. Some of the advantages include 
the laws have already been tried and tested in their original legal system, and therefore 
in theory any lessons that need to be learnt would have been learnt in the home 
jurisdiction avoiding any potential problems, and if any did occur the judiciary would 
have already preempted any possible defences. Some of the drawbacks of legal 
transplants primarily are that the transplant may not ‘take root’. Other problems that 
may be encountered as a result of this is that it may challenge local customs that are 
already in place, or even require rule change in other aspects of the law in order for a 
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particular transplant to be accepted. The latter may, in turn, lead to a change in culture 
and potentially then stifle local development or upset local traditions. Although laws 
that are transplanted may benefit from the experience of the transferring state, in 
respect to that law the borrowing system rarely seems to benefit from any 
amendments that the donor system may make to them in their own jurisdiction after 
the transplant, potentially leaving the transplant outdated and ineffective (Merry 2000: 
49). Watson’s theory was that laws in the most part have a life of their own, they are 
autonomous. According to Watson law and legal systems develop due to the existence 
and practice of legal transplants. He believes that such rules would not occur naturally 
due to an inevitable consequence of the social structure of the borrowing society, and 
would have emerged even without a model to copy. What is of interest to this thesis is 
that in Watson’s notion particular legal transplants occur because the foreign rule or 
law is known to the those who have control over law making and because they have 
observed the apparent merits that it may yield. In this thesis, plea bargaining was 
borrowed from the adversarial legal system after the United States had already 
suggested that it be included in the ICTY’s jurisprudence, as it would aid the 
functionality of the tribunal and no doubt the rules regulating the use of plea 
bargaining were implemented under the advice of those who had knowledge and first 
hand experience of how it works (Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemovic IT-96-22-A, AC, 
Judgement, Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 7 
October 1997 Para 6-9; Morris and Scharf 1995: 531-532). 
Kahn-Freund, was also working in the area of comparative law in the 1970s, 
his notions of legal transplants, differed from Watson’s. Under Watson’s notion, there 
is no relationship between a state’s law and the state’s society. Kahn-Freund asserts 
that the laws transplanted must not be separated from their purposes or the 
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circumstances in which they were made. He argues, ‘we cannot take for granted that 
rules or institutions are transplantable’ and that there are ‘there are degrees of 
transferability.’ (Kahn-Freund 1974: 6-27) For example, plea bargaining was 
introduced into war crime tribunals to facilitate the judicial process of the tribunals 
effectively and efficiently, but as the rate of guilty pleas via negotiation increased the 
tribunals started to assert other factors for entering into negotiations and awarding 
sentence reductions, such as reconciliation (Plavsic), protecting victims and witnesses 
from the added trauma of cross examination (Zelenovic). Kahn-Freund theory was 
summarised by Ewald as, ‘legal institutions may be more-or-less embedded in a 
nation's life, and therefore more-or-less readily transplantable from one legal system 
to another; but nevertheless at one end of the spectrum law is so deeply embedded that 
transplantation is in effect impossible.’ (Ewald 1996: 495) Unlike Watson, Kahn-
Freund offers a process to determine the feasibility of a potential transplant. This is a 
two-step procedure, the first step is to determine the relationship between the legal 
rule, concept, institution to be transplanted and the socio-political structure of the 
donor state. The second step then requires comparative analysis of the socio-political 
environment of both the donor and the recipient state (Kahn-Freund 1974: 11-18). 
International criminal law is relatively new, in some aspects still operating in 
uncharted territories,
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 it seems practical that other aspects of other established legal 
systems are donated to the emerging international system to ensure smooth running or 
at the very least some sort of theoretical functionality. An example of this the 
introduction of plea bargaining in Russia to help combat the backlog of cases that 
have arisen due to the introduction of jury trials (Pomorski 2006). 
 Whether the transplant is accepted or takes root in that particular system may 
still cause problems or tensions.  Transplants generally take some time to be taken up 
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and assimilated into a new legal system. An example of this is the case of Erdemovic, 
which is discussed elsewhere. It may seem that it has taken root at the ICTY, but if 
you scratch the surface you will find that such transplanted practices do not resonate 
very well in the post-conflict communities, especially in relation to the sentence 
reductions defendants received (Clark 2007; 2009; 2011). This sentiment is also 
reinforced by Chief Taku who said, ‘[F]or the Tribunal for Rwanda, the plea bargains 
have absolutely no impact in Rwanda because for a majority of Rwandans, the entire 
judicial process is taking place is unfair to the extent that it is victor’s justice.   
Besides, the trial process is perceived by many as a vindictive politically motivated 
exercise that neither benefits the victims nor the rule of law.’ (Interview with Taku 
2010) Mr Zecevic has also expressed this by saying, ‘I am pretty sure that the victims 
perceive the plea bargains as a way out for perpetrators and they are very unhappy 
about it. There is still a fierce opposition for plea bargains in the region. On top plea 
bargains do not help reconciliation in the post conflict societies.’ (Interview with 
Zecevic 2011) 
This is a good point to move on to the specific technicalities of legal transfers. 
Over the years there has not been a great amount of understanding of the definitions 
and methods of modern day transfers and transplants. This is particularly true of legal 
concepts that have been transferred up, from domestic jurisdictions to supranational 
ones, such as the international criminal tribunals and courts. It is just as important to 
look at the recipient of the transfer as it is the donor analysing the legal and political 
culture of the institution, as well as the impact of the legal transfer. 
Gardener has identified six types of legal transfer: 
Direct- Transfer of specific legal institutions and instruments (e.g. constitution, code, 
statute, court). 
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Indirect- Transfer of legal concepts and models (e.g. legal values or ideas, 
jurisprudential or professional models). 
Invited- Where the initiative and encouragement for the legal transfer process comes 
principally from the recipient legal culture (e.g. the requested importation of specific 
legal instruments or legal models). 
Imposed/Uninvited – Where the initiative and encouragement of the legal transfer 
process comes principally from exporting legal cultures (e.g. the largely imposed 
transfer of the legal models that has often accompanied geopolitical conquest and 
colonization). 
Infused- Which is neither invited nor imposed in the usual sense of these words, but in 
which premeditated initiative and encouragement come principally from the exporting 
legal culture often with selective participation on the part of the recipient culture. 
Interactional – Less premeditated or time specific, more ad hoc and on-going, legal 
transfer process, frequently related to on-going cultural and intellectual interchange 
generally (Gardener 1980: 33). 
It is obvious that some transplants fit better into some systems than others. 
There may be a number of reasons for this. An important one is if both the donating 
system and the receiving system have a common or overlapping culture. In certain 
situations, the legal cultures are too divergent to harmonize together for a successful 
transplant to take place (Legrand 1996: 61-62). Take, for example, the introduction of 
plea bargaining in Russia under US supervision was met with suspicion even though 
it made judicial sense as it would free up the backlog of cases. Unfortunately the 
notion of plea bargaining did not resonate well in the general population, ‘many 
Russians felt that confessions before trial in plea bargaining smacked too much of the 
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forced confessions of Stalin’s show trials.’ (Spence 2006: 232) Much of the modern 
day legal transplantation that occurs in domestic jurisdictions are legal concepts of 
American legal origin, and their successful import often serves at least indirectly to 
reiterate or protect American interests. Examples of such interests and transplants 
include the marketization of former communist economies was accompanied by 
‘wholesale transplants’ of US securities, banking and capital markets law.’ (Drumbl 
2007:125) International criminal law has also seen a number of transplants from both 
the adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems, plea bargaining is the most prominent 
transplant in international criminal law, as it has been alien to most legal systems 
apart from the Anglo-American criminal systems. Although transplants are necessary 
for international legal systems, the fact that transplants occur does not mean that this 
should be over looked and escape critical examination, as it has done so in the past. 
As Drumbl, one of the few scholars in the field of international law who recognises 
this need for analysis, points out, ‘[A]lthough transplants are a fact of life where 
power meets rules in frameworks of supranational regulation, this does not dissipate 
the need to think critically about them.’ (Drumbl 2007, 125)    
There has been much written about legal transplants between domestic 
jurisdictions, and transplants from international systems down to domestic 
jurisdictions, but there has not been much written about transplants from domestic 
jurisdictions to international systems. Maximo Langer (2004) discusses the 
Americanisation and globalisation of law with the export of plea bargaining to other 
nation states. However, again there is very little discussion about the transfer of plea 
bargaining from national legal systems up to the international criminal systems. Legal 
transplants have been pioneered mostly in an inter-state or transnational context. As 
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one author put it in the area of international environmental law, one of the few strands 
of international law where this issue has been given attention: 
 
One might look for answers to these questions in the rich literature on legal 
borrowing. A great deal of work has been done to document and explain the 
pervasive use of legal transplants from other legal systems. But that line of 
scholarship offers surprisingly little guidance on the [question of international 
law borrowing from national law] because the extant literature focuses almost 
entirely on borrowing across national legal systems. (Wiener 2001: 1297) 
 
Although this is a relatively new area of study, a positive matter of empirical legal 
evolution, comparativists tend to see national law as borrowing from other national 
law, and internationalists tend to see international treaty law as borrowing from other 
international treaty law; with neither of them meeting in the middle ground as it were 
(Wiener 2001: 1297; Megret 2003). Wiener quite rightly goes on to state that, ‘one is 
hard pressed to find the comparative law concept of legal borrowing being applied to 
the sister subject of international law.’ (Wiener 2001: 1302; Megret 2003) 
When the British colonised other nation states one of their perceived greatest 
achievements was the transplant of the legal system, and British style constitution and 
the rule of law as understood by the British Empire. As Hoeber-Rudolph state ‘for 
most Englishmen, having established the ‘rule of law’ on the Indian subcontinent was 
probably the proudest achievement of the British.’ (1967: 253) When discussing a 
contemporary British perspective to legal transplant, Kenneth Robert-Wray noted that 
he did not understand the urge to have a new constitution produced in such a way that 
it can claim to be an entirely local product (Gardener 1980: 30). He continued:  
It is not as if independence constitutions enacted in the United Kingdom are 
imposed upon the country. They are always the outcomes of full consultation 
and discussions and in the majority of cases independence constitutions have 
been preceded by one or more full-scale conferences. It can justly be claimed 
that the constitution gives the people what they asked for. (Robert-Wray 1963: 
43) 
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He went on to discuss the British colonial office as a ‘constitution factory’ exporting 
in the Westminster model ‘a nicely adjusted piece of legal machinery’, which ‘works 
overtime giving substance and political designs.’ (Robert-Wray 1963: 60-61) 
Although the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the legal system have been exported to 
nuances, changes, advancements made by the colonising/exporting state generally 
have not been adopted by the colonised state after they achieved independence. 
Recently due to the increase in globalisation many aspects of law, as mentioned have 
been transplanted to aid harmonisation of the laws between states and to facilitate 
economic benefits. But transplants have not stopped there. As this thesis addresses 
plea bargaining, it is only proper to point out that there has been a recent surge in plea 
bargaining transplantation over recent years, such as India in 2006 (Ghosh 2006), 
Nigeria in 2006 (Yekini 2008), Russia in 2001 (Pomorski 2006; Reynolds and 
Semukhina: 2009). Anecdotally the increase in the transfer of the plea bargaining 
phenomenon may possibly be due to the transfer of rules of evidence and procedure in 
to criminal systems, therefore becoming more complex and the transfer of plea 
bargaining help cut down the amount of money and time spent trying these cases. 
The use of plea bargaining in war crime tribunals in so far as the ICTY and 
ICTR have taken the form of a direct and invited transfer from the Anglo-American 
criminal systems. The notion of pleading guilty and plea negotiations had been subject 
to much discussion before it was introduced into the system. These two tribunals, the 
ICTY in particular have adopted the use of plea bargaining with relative ease, and 
through discussions I had with defence lawyers it became apparent that the tribunal 
would have engaged in many more plea negotiations had the defendant been willing 
(Interview with Muphy 2010). In other tribunals, such as the SCSL, the transplant of 
plea bargaining would be more akin to an imposed or an uninvited transfer. As there 
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have been no successful plea agreements in this particular tribunals even though there 
have been substantial negotiations in at least two of the three defendants in the RUF 
case. It can, therefore, be inferred that this particular transfer did not ‘take root’ and 
flourish in this particular environment. 
The ECCC and the Special Panels again pose a different type transplant. At 
the Special Panels many defendants admitted to some culpability but they were not 
strictly plea bargains and at the ECCC there is no mechanism to enter into 
negotiations. Hence defendants must undergo a full criminal trial even if they plead 
guilty, as seen in the Duch case. Therefore, there has not really been a transfer here. 
Although not a war crime tribunal, but still an international criminal tribunal, the STL 
has held a training session for Lebanese defence lawyers on plea bargains, the 
seminars were conducted by ICTY and ICTR defence counsel who were experienced 
in plea bargaining in international tribunals (Press Release March 4, 2010). This could 
therefore be classified as an invited transfer. The ICC is again a different scenario as 
far as plea bargaining is concerned. This is because the court intends to hear cases 
from all over the world, and as the other tribunals have shown there are a number of 
differing cultural factors that have influenced the type of transfer or transplant of the 
same mechanism. Therefore the use of plea bargaining would have to develop over 
time as David Crane stated that the, ‘ICC has the benefit of time and the evolution of 
the jurisprudence.’ (Interview with Crane 2009) Crane is right. This particular tribunal 
does indeed benefit from having time to consider what is appropriate and how to enter 
into negotiations. It will also need to consider the role of victims in the plea 
bargaining process due to the introduction of victim participation in this court, which 
may indeed make the guilty plea and the negotiations, ‘will change the landscape.’ 
(Interview with Muphy 2010) 
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From all of the above, it is apparent that the concept of legal transplant is a 
unilateral migration from one legal system to another. In international criminal law, 
the practice of plea bargaining is not transplanted or transferred in the way that other 
existing criminal systems with their own traditions have ‘grafted’ (Megret 2003:9) 
this procedure. As there were in effect no procedures or rules in the international 
system to speak of when the ICTY was formed many of the laws were constructed to 
fits its specific purpose. The migration of some of the laws and procedures from other 
more established legal systems helps form a system, in turn helping form a legal 
culture and tradition were one did not previously exist.  
When looking particularly at whether and if so to what extent plea bargaining 
has ‘taken root’ and become part of the workings of a particular tribunal, it is not just 
whether there is a common theory that underpins the foundation of the tribunal’s 
jurisprudence. The backgrounds and the traditions of the people involved in these 
tribunals are also an influencing factor in the overall acceptance and integration of a 
transplant. As one of the downfalls of the theoretical analysis of plea bargaining is 
that it fails to take into account human agency (Maynard 1984: 166). I will first 
discuss the role judges play in this. Although I was not able to obtain any interviews 
from any judges who work or have worked in international criminal law it is still 
worth discussing the role judges have played with regards to plea bargaining.  
 
5.2.1 Judges and the Evolution, Acceptance and Nature of Plea Bargaining 
 
Judges play an important part in determining the future orientation of the tribunal in 
question as it is their interpretation of the tribunal’s founding documents that set the 
course which the tribunal will take. Kennedy states that ‘[J]udges are supposed to 
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submit to something “bigger” and “higher” than “themselves.”’ (Kennedy 1997: 3) 
Koskenniemi points out this is usually the case when the substance of the laws and 
rules that are being applied, and not the actual application of them (Koskenniemi 
2011: 285). This is particularly clear when looking at the ad hoc tribunals, where the 
judges are given the power to amend their own rules of evidence and procedure. The 
inclusion of the provision of guilty pleas and negotiations took this path.
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 As already 
discussed initially the ICTY did not provide for the guilty pleas and plea bargaining as 
fashioned in adversarial, common law jurisdictions. In its initial policy, as outlined in 
the First Annual Report 1994 the ICTY had clearly ruled out the use of plea 
bargaining. (1
st
 Annual Report Para. 74) The rules initially were left open to 
interpretation by the judges in either the common or civil law tradition. The 
ambiguous Article 20(3) states, ‘[T]he trial chamber shall…instruct the accused to 
enter a plea. The trial chamber shall then set a date for trial.’ The wording in this 
particular incarnation of the Article allows for civil law interpretation insofar that if a 
guilty plea is entered it does not explain what happens then, it merely states that after 
a plea is entered the chamber will set a date regardless of what the plea may be, as 
seen in the ECCC in the Duch case. The original Article can also be read in the 
common law style to allow for guilty pleas due to the open ended terminology used 
(Prosecutor v Erdemovic AC, Judgement, joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald 
and Judge Vohrah, 7 October 1997, Para 6; Schoun 2010: 200). This can also be seen 
in the wording of the original Rule 62, as it failed to clearly set out the procedure the 
chamber should follow.
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 Rule 62(A)(iv) of the initial Rule 62 (now Rule 62(A)(v)) 
stated that the chamber would ‘instruct the registrar to set a date for trial’ but did not 
specify that this will only be the case if there is a plea of not guilty. In the face of 
Erdemovic’s guilty plea, the judges of the tribunal made amendments to these Rules 
in January 1995 inserted the phrase in Rule 62(iv) ‘in case of a plea of not guilty’ 
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before a trial date is set. The new Rule 62 (v) sets out that after a guilty plea a date for 
a sentencing hearing will be set, (Schuon 2010: 200) therefore clearing up any 
ambiguity and taking the tribunal along a common law path, not only in the language 
it was using, but also in that set out to establish an Anglo-American style procedure 
for guilty pleas. This is relevant for the purposes of legal transplants, as it shows that 
amongst the ICTY judges at that time there was an acceptance that guilty pleas were 
legitimate. It also shows the sequential and systematic migration of the plea bargain 
procedure from the original Rule 62 to the Rule 62 bis, which is the rule that has been 
in existence since 1997 at the ICTY setting out the requirements for a guilty plea that 
where presented in the Erdemonvic case. In order to justify their decision, the judges 
referred to the origins of Rule 62, whose provenance can be traced back to ‘Rule 15 of 
the Suggestions Made by the Government of the United States of America, Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Former Yugoslavia.’ It stated: 
 
[U]nder many common law systems, the prosecutor enjoys broad powers to 
offer immunity to, and enter into plea-bargain agreements with, accused who 
provide meaningful and substantial cooperation in the investigation or 
prosecution of other cases … Without such mechanisms, the International 
Tribunal may be unable to successfully prosecute a significant number of 
high-level figures. (Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemovic IT-96-22-A, AC, 
Judgement, Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge 
Vohrah, 7 October 1997 Para 6-9; Morris and Scharf 1995: 531-532) 
 
Again the guilty plea and plea agreements underwent another transformation in 
December 2001 with the introduction of Rule 62 ter which explicitly included 
provisions for plea bargaining in its most adversarial form. This was only included 
after a number of plea bargains and guilty pleas, as well as attempted plea 
negotiations (Prosecutor v Stevan Todorovic (IT-95-9/1) July 2001; Prosecutor v 
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Goran Jelisic (IT-95-10) December 1999; Prosecutor v Milan Kovacevic (IT-97-24) 
Dies August 1998; Prosecutor  v Drazen Eredemovic (IT-96-22) March 1998; Sikirica 
et al. (IT-95-8) November 2001). This in turn set a precedent for the other tribunals to 
follow suite. Accordingly, the initial tenor of international criminal tribunals has 
always been negotiated politically, and inevitably reflects power structure in the 
international community. The combination of the ascendancy of the common law in 
the last 50 years, and of the US as a world power from 1917 onwards, means that the 
influence of the common law has been particularly visible for the ad hoc tribunals 
(Megret 2003). 
When it comes to the ICC, its rules of evidence and procedure differ from the 
previous rules of other international criminal tribunals in that they are dictated by the 
Rome Statute, a treaty, which will not allow for the amount of discretion in 
interpretation that the ad hoc tribunals enjoyed. Yet the ICC and its rules have 
benefitted from the advances made by the ad hoc tribunals. We have yet to see how 
the notion of pleading guilty and plea negotiations play out in the ICC’s system, 
which leans far more towards the inquisitorial, civil law jurisdictions, as the US 
forfeited a leadership role early on. As Judge Murphy put it the tribunals are ‘meant to 
be hybrid… in a way that has never been achieved. The ICC due to the absence of 
American influence has moved over to civil law.’ (Interview with Muphy 2010) 
This analysis would not be complete without pointing out that at the ICTY 
saw an increase in the number of defendants before the tribunal, and this potentially 
may be a reason for the increase in the rate of guilty pleas seen here during 2001-
2004. This may also be the reason why other tribunals have not engaged in as much 
plea bargaining as they have not seen a sudden spike in the increase of accused before 
the tribunal as the ICTY did. As noted by Wayde Pittman, ‘there are still a lot of 
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fugitives in Rwanda. If they were to all come in maybe there would be an increase in 
guilty pleas at the ICTR.’ (Interview with Pittman 2010) It should be observed that the 
increase in plea bargaining at the ICTY can be attributed to the change in stance of the 
tribunal’s political and financial backers and the pressure exerted by the UN Security 
Council and the US administration (Simons 2003; Schoun 2010: 202). At the time, the 
increase in plea bargaining might well have been attributed to the 2003 completion 
strategy, which has now been revised, and will no doubt be revised again after the 
recent arrest of General Mladic. However, the decrease seen in the number of plea 
bargains in the international tribunals does not mean that the tribunal has reverted to 
civil law style adjudication or that transplant has been rejected. 
 
5.2.2 Differences in Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR 
 
This is a good point to discuss the differences between the sentencing practices of the 
ICTY and the ICTR to show the disparity in the outcomes of plea bargaining and how 
this particular practice has evolved. These two tribunals offer a good example as they 
are the only two tribunals that are purely UN tribunals, and they are also they only 
two tribunals that have openly engaged with plea bargaining under the Anglo-
American model. Both of these tribunals, as well as the ICC, lack an express 
sentencing framework, unlike many national jurisdictions. At first sight, the average 
sentences handed down by the ICTR are shorter than the ones handed down by the 
ICTY being 11 years and 12.5 years respectively.
120
 This seems peculiar as the overall 
average sentence for the ICTR is 45 years and the ICTY is 15 years, and at first blush 
would seem to indicate a potential issue with sentencing. These ‘discrepancies’ are 
easily explained. There have been a higher number of people that have pleaded guilty 
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at the ICTY. In fact, 20 defendants more than the ICTR - where there have been 9 
defendants who have admitted their guilt. There have also been considerably fewer 
defendants at the ICTR than the ICTY on the whole. Alongside with these very 
practical explanations, there are other factors that should be considered when looking 
at the differences between these two tribunals. 
 Although both these two tribunals prosecute the same classification of crimes 
such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, there are some very stark 
differences that effect the way the transfer of plea bargaining and its usage has taken 
root. The first being the actual crimes themselves, the reasons for the two conflicts 
behind the two conflicts are very differ widely from each other. They were committed 
in very different circumstances and in different ways with the people committing the 
crimes and their victims coming are from very different backgrounds. When 
considering the ICTY and ICTR the international community tried to overcome this 
by harmonising the prosecutorial strategy by having the same prosecutor for both the 
tribunals. This is evidenced by David Schaffer who when discussing a conversation 
with then Prosecutor Richard Goldstone said:  
 
Goldstone visited me in New York on October 19 to discuss strategy. He was 
strongly opposed to a separate prosecutor for the Rwanda tribunal. We both 
agreed that it was critical to approach atrocity crimes in the Balkans and 
Rwanda with the same prosecutorial perspective so that cases would be 
litigated consistently with international criminal law as it existed then and 
would be developed in the years to come. Goldstone conceded that it would 
make sense to set up a deputy prosecutor’s office in Kigali, which was 
accomplished in 1995. Ultimately, we successfully negotiated dual prosecutor 
responsibilities for Goldstone. (Scheffer 2011: 79) 
 
Despite this there is still a wide difference in the sentence ranges and the number of 
guilty pleas received by the tribunals. Considering this how would plea bargaining 
work at the ICC, where there would be many different atrocities and crime bases, but 
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the same category of crime? How would, say hypothetically two defendants of the 
same ranking and culpability of the same crimes, but one is from Libya and the other 
from The Democratic Republic of Congo, be treated with regards to plea bargaining? 
Still, like the ICTR and ICTY the backgrounds of the conflict and the political climate 
that the crimes took place will affect the use of plea bargaining and in turn sentencing. 
We know that admitting guilt and offering information to the Office of The Prosecutor 
offers mitigation in sentencing, but whether this mitigation is applied is unknown due 
to the almost indefinite amount of discretion bestowed on the judges and the lack of 
transparency when it comes to sentence decision making. Would the family 
circumstances or the good behaviour in detention of one defendant be taken into to 
consideration more than another? When sentencing would the notoriety of one 
defendant act against him or her than another less well known defendant? Also, will 
the political pressure asserted onto the court and their staffs from outside donor 
countries and institutions influence the decisions the judges make as well? Again it is 
difficult to speculate what the ICC may or may not do when it comes to plea 
bargaining, but one thing is for sure, and that is, that it may well be difficult for the 
ICC to adhere to classic liberal forms of rule of law standards requiring like cases to 
be judged in a like manner. No doubt the role of legal transplants is not to transplant 
one legal concept into a legal system as a wholesale transfer, but rather to mould and 
adapt to the culture and the needs of the system it has been transplanted into. More so 
than other national jurisdictions, in international law culture changes with the 
differing conflicts and the differing staff members that make up prosecuting and 
defending counsel, and more recently counsel representing victim groups. As Justice 
Jackson said ‘International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there 
is no continuously sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions in 
international law are brought about by the action of governments, designed to meet a 
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change in circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached 
from time to time in adapting settled principles to new situations.’ (Report to the 
President by Mr. Justice Jackson, 6 June 1945: 51-52) This would be a good place to 
discuss the legal transplantation of plea bargaining at the SCSL. 
 
5.2.3 Plea Bargaining as a Legal Transplant at the SCSL 
 
In this section I will discuss the failed attempts to enter into plea negotiations at the 
SCSL and the reasons why the use of this practice was not taken up more successfully 
in other tribunals. I will concentrate on the RUF trial to illustrate this, focusing on the 
defendants Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay.
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 Although there are other issues that arise 
in the SCSL that potentially effected the legal transfer of plea bargaining, I think they 
are best discussed in other parts of this thesis - namely in the sections addressing legal 
and cultural imperialism above and it is these two cases where most of my knowledge, 
through the use of interviews lies. I also think that these two cases illustrate generally 
the reasons why plea bargaining has not taken root in the SCSL, rather than very 
specific and unique examples, such as the use of witch doctors. It quite clear from my 
interviews with the two prosecutors at the SCSL that there was a definite will to 
engage with plea bargaining, and to obtain insider witnesses. In fact, David Crane 
even alluded to this in his opening address to the court by stating the prosecution were 
going to ‘dance with the devil’. During my interview with him, Crane also explained 
that the prosecution at the SCSL had a very clear prosecution strategy. He stated that 
they knew who to try, who to negotiate with as insider witnesses, and where ‘plea 
bargaining is clearly a possibility.’ (Interview with Crane 2009) For Crane, the 
prosecution at the time had decided which defendants to bring to trial and which ones 
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to enter into the plea bargaining process (Interview with Crane 2009). Professor Crane 
had also told prosecution staff that if they were approached with ‘a professionally 
offered plea,’ they should ‘listen and consider it.’ (Interview with Crane 2009) 
From my research I believe that the main factors contributing to plea 
negotiations collapsing are the cultural differences between the parties involved. The 
senior prosecutorial staff, who at that time, came mainly from common law 
backgrounds, took an aggressive adversarial approach, which the defendants 
themselves where completely unprepared for, and which was alien to the type of legal 
system they were used to. This turned out to one of the main causes of the breakdown 
in the negotiations. It should be stressed that the approach taken by the prosecution 
and their staff was not improper under international criminal law and in particular the 
laws of the SCSL, law as it stands. They were acting in a way that would wholly 
acceptable and expected in the US where David Crane, the then Chief Prosecutor, was 
from. due to the insufficient financial and strict time constraints
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 and the colossal 
task the SCSL had in bringing the persons who bore the greatest responsibility to 
trial, they did not behave in a way that would have been unthinkable, especially when 
it comes to the plea bargaining. It was just the wrong place to carry this out, or at best 
they needed much more time, so they could afford to be more culturally sensitive and 
refine the jurisprudence of the court (Interview with Crane 2009). This shows that 
both legal and wider culture plays a very important role in the uptake and success of 
legal transplant. 
The RUF case had three defendants, Sesay, Kallon and Gbao. Sesay and 
Kallon had entered into initial negotiations with the SCSL prosecution,
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 but Gbao to 
my knowledge had not. My correspondence with Scott Martin, Gbao’s co-counsel, 
indicates ‘Note that the Gbao case did not involve plea bargaining.’ (email 
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correspondence with Martin 2010) To fully explain the situation, it is important to 
start with Sesay and his arrest and not the actual plea negotiations that took place later 
on. Put briefly, Sesay was initially contacted by the tribunal and bought in for 
questioning as a witness for the prosecution. But when this did not work out, he 
became an indictee. During this time Sesay, had been aggressively interviewed at 
some length by investigators. These interviews had taken place in the absence of any 
defence counsel present, or being offered and without being informed of his rights 
(Van Tuyl 2008). He was also allegedly given off the record assurances from Dr Alan 
White, a senior investigator to the effect of, ‘Issa, there is no hope left for you. This is 
the only way forward. You talk to us. This is the only way out.’ (Prosecutor v Sesay 
et al Trial Transcript 19 June 2007: P 46 lines, 11-13) Coupled with the allegations 
that Mr Morissette had also ‘plied pressure’ on Sesay (P 83, lines 20-26) and  in effect 
told him that he was wasting any opportunity he may have to cooperate as an insider 
witness for the prosecution (P 51, lines 3-12, 5-24). Sesay recalled ‘[H]e would come 
and say, “Issa, we are just trying to help you. But what we have been hearing, if you 
don't confirm these things, how will we be able to help you?” He said, “So you have 
to confirm the things that we have heard. That's the only way we'd be able to help 
you, so that you will be out of this problem.”’(P 47, lines 28-29-  P 48, lines 1-4) The 
actual way he was interviewed and the ethics and validity of any plea that was based 
on these interviews, is discussed elsewhere in this thesis.
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It was information deduced from these interviews with Sesay that the 
prosecutors used to try and negotiate a deal with the defendant Kallon. When 
discussing  how the prosecution went about trying to negotiate with Kallon Chief 
Taku, Kallon’s defence counsel, stated: 
He obtained several hundreds of pages of evidence which he keep in 
transcripts and video and photographic form. After that he approached Mr 
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Kallon with the information in an attempt to pressurize him to co-operate, cut 
a bargain and plead guilty to one count of enlistment of child combatants in 
exchange for a 12 year conviction and a relocation of his family to Canada.  
Because Kallon was also expected to testify against Foday Sankoh and other 
RUF commanders, he turned down the request. The evidence obtained from 
Sesay was not tendered at trial and so would be deemed to have had no 
probative value against Mr Kallon. (Interview with Taku 2010)  
 
Chief Taku also went on to say that the prosecutor had, ‘showed him evidence he had 
obtained from Sesay to entice him to enter into a plea bargain with him. Kallon 
showed me a piece of paper on which the Prosecutor made suggestive notes on this 
matter and at trial, the court did not want Kallon to adduce evidence on this subject.’ 
(Interview with Taku 2010) 
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 This shows a very determined effort to enter into a 
deal with the defendant. This is also a strongly adversarial approach the prosecution 
chose to take. It is more than likely that people who do not come from jurisdictions 
where this is common practice will also believe this to be coercive and improper 
practice. On discussing the reasoning why the negotiation may have fallen apart, 
Chief Taku listed four reasons: 
1. The court processes were perceived as a rush to convict than to do justice. 
The accused saw a process in which witnesses were given incentives to testify 
as unjust and unreliable and so did not trust that the Prosecutor could be 
trusted in a process of plea bargain. 
 
2. The manner in which the accused were arrested, interrogated and kept 
without counsel and the pre-trial violations they suffered in the hands of the 
Prosecutor made the accused suspicious of the Prosecutor. 
 
3. Finally, the high handed manner in which the Prosecutor conducted the plea 
negotiations, like the case of Sesay and Kallon resembled more an entrapment 
than a genuine will to negotiate a plea bargain. 
 
4. The Prosecutor displayed such lack of patience, insensitivity and cultural 
and psychological indifference towards the accused and the process. 
(Interview with Taku 2010) 
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From Kallon’s perspective, it is easy to see why he felt he could not or should not 
enter into a plea bargain. The whole process was too alien for him to be able to 
engage with, even with the wisdom and experience of his counsel. The approach was 
far too adversarial, showing Kallon Sesay’s statements126 not only felt like a betrayal 
to Kallon, but understandably felt like ‘entrapment’ (Interview with Taku 2010). 
Again, as already mentioned prosecutorial tactics such as these are not unheard of in 
the USA and are quite common. In fact, most crime/police based TV dramas in the 
USA exhibit this type of procedure, indicating that the approach taken here in the 
Kallon case is very much part of the cultural fabric of the US criminal system. Again 
this would be very difficult for somebody who is not aware of this to understand the 
process, and would quite rightly not wish to negotiate under such circumstances as 
their plea would not be unequivocal. Realistically when entering into a plea bargain 
where the crimes concerned are of great complexity and gravity, such as the ones tried 
in war crime tribunals, it is rare that a defendant will be pleading guilty to what they 
actually did. Pleading guilty as part of a plea bargain requires a great deal of 
pragmatism, persons who are not familiar with this way of thinking or understanding 
within the legal context will undoubtedly find this very complex and possibly 
encounter difficulties within the legal system. This is particularly the case if there is a 
TRC in place alongside the tribunal encouraging people to come forward and tell the 
whole truth and accept culpability in their own words and as they see it. 
Moving back to the defendant Kallon, there are a number of other factors that 
contributed to Mr Kallon specifically not wishing to enter into negotiations. Primarily, 
he had helped, along with Issa Sesay to broker the Lome Peace Accords and both 
were granted amnesty (Interview with Taku 2010). It was after negotiations with 
Kallon had failed and the RUF trial had begun in late 2004 that actual plea 
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negotiations had started with regards to Issa Sesay. Both defence and prosecuting 
counsel knew each other, as they had worked together on a case in the UK (Interview 
with Jordash 2010).  
After spending a considerable amount of time defining and refining the 
statement of facts and the plea agreement, both the defence and senior prosecuting 
counsel met to discuss the indictment. The prosecuting counsel had then taken the 
indictment back to the Chief Prosecutor who disagreed with aspects of the plea 
agreement. At this stage the original agreement had been conveyed back to the 
defendant, and defence counsel had to go back to his client to tell him that the 
prosecution no longer agreed to this deal, and would have to renegotiate (Interview 
with Jordash 2010). Given the experiences that Issa Sesay had had with the SCSL 
from when he was bought in as an insider witness to becoming an inditee to the 
negotiations, one cannot be surprised that he lost confidence in the Tribunal and 
decided not to renegotiate. Jordash points out because the SCSL has no history of plea 
bargaining so he was unable to reassure his client as to how the trial chamber would 
decide when it comes to sentencing, as he had been able to with his clients at the 
ICTR (Interview with Jordash 2010). Also bearing in mind the trial chamber is not 
bound by sentence recommendations, possibly this also added to the anxiety felt by 
the defendant when he decided to end negotiations. An issue that occurs in this 
particular tribunal more than others is that defence counsel consider that there was ‘no 
process’ in place on how to negotiate between the prosecutorial staff and themselves. 
Hence, defence counsel does not know what to expect. With regards to Sesay, he 
found it very difficult to enter a guilty to plea to things he felt he was not guilty of, 
which when plea bargaining is one of the fundamental aspects of plea deals, counsel 
on both sides negotiate what the crimes are and what the potential sentence range 
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should be. To put it crudely both parties have something to gain and they both have 
something to lose. Sesay was not able to understand this and judged that he should be 
able to admit his guilt in his way much like in a truth and reconciliation commission, 
which he was willing to testify in front of in 2003 along with Augustine Gbao 
(Interview with Jordash 2010; Kerr and Mobekk 2007: 93). 
 The fact that the defendants were not only alien to the adversarial practice of 
plea bargaining they were also alien to the notion of the SCSL and the rules and 
procedures that go with any sort of rule based criminal tribunal. As Jordash put it, 
‘[O]ne of the problems with the SCSL from the outset is that they are taking men who 
have been running around the bush with AK47s and then putting them in a fancy 
western model of justice and expect them to follow exactly what’s going on. They 
didn’t, none of them fully understood what was going on.’ (Interview with Jordash 
2010) From this it is easy to see why the transfer of plea bargaining was not 
successful at the SCSL. If the people that had been put on trial at the SCSL had not 
even been engaged or familiar with the laws of Sierra Leone, then it is unlikely they 
would be able to comprehend and participate with the sophisticated rules and 
procedures of an international tribunal. Jordash explained, ‘Sierra Leone does not 
have a functioning criminal system, at best it has a haphazard system in Freetown. In 
the provinces it has customary law, “town square” adjudication’, he went on to say 
that Issa Sesay was not even part of that ad hoc system, that he was in the bush and 
exercised a sort of military law, which seemed to revolve around whatever they 
thought was appropriate at the time. When Sesay found himself at the SCSL it was 
clear to Jordash that he found this, ‘very surreal’, as did all of the defendants who six 
months to a year ago had been in the bush fighting. Jordash pointed out, ‘They now 
found themselves sitting in an international court’ whilst they eventually adapted to 
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the process, ‘for the first year didn’t know what the hell was going on.’ (Interview 
with Jordash 2010) It would therefore be impossible for the prosecution to enter into 
meaningful negotiations with the defendants in this context. If negotiations under 
similar circumstances take place there would always be serious doubts about whether 
the defendant’s plea was unequivocal.  
When asked about the Tribunal staff understanding the nuances of plea 
bargaining, David Crane, then the Chief Prosecutor, stated that to his knowledge there 
were no specific members of staff being confused by the process and practice of plea 
bargaining as it never really moved beyond the initial stages. Although the 
‘admissions of guilt are done routinely’ in traditional forms of justice ‘but the concept 
of plea bargaining can be confusing to both the court personnel’ and it would be a 
‘challenge to have judges understand what’s going on.’ (Interview with Crane 2009)  
If the tribunal had had the time and resources to develop understanding and 
procedures, I believe that the defendants themselves would have had much more 
confidence in the system, as there would have been a way for them to see what was 
going on. Much more time and sensitivity needed to be spent in this tribunal to 
nurture the transplant for it to take root in this environment. Although the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone was well received with the people of 
Sierra Leone, it is hard to see how they would have felt about plea bargaining. If 
introduced into the SCSL, the tribunal would have to make sure that the population of 
Sierra Leone was aware of it  and how it works, especially in the RUF case were 
many of the population do not believe Sesay or Kallon should have been tried or 
received such lengthy sentences
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 (Interview with Taku 2010). I do not think that 
plea bargaining would have translated into the post conflict community of Sierra 
Leone especially when there is a successful Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
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that grants immunity from prosecution at the SCSL to anything that is disclosed at the 
Commission.   
  A good example by way of comparison is the STL, where there has been a 
defence seminar regarding how to plea bargain (STL Press Release March 4, 2010), 
therefore, embedding into defence teams the notion of guilty pleas that what to expect 
from negotiations. This also may give the impression that the STL may be gearing up 
to obtain convictions from negotiated pleas, as the nature of the crimes that will be 
tried are highly political and very sensitive. These trials also have the potential to 
embarrass nation states depending on the tactics the defence take. It may be the case 
that the STL is taking its lead from other national terrorism cases where there have 
been guilty pleas, notably the on-going negotiations with American prosecutors and 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the ‘Underwear Bomber’, hence opening the gate for 
negotiations in terrorism cases to go ahead. 
  Unlike the SCSL, the STL has set out a process on how to proceed with plea 
bargains, in particular the defence counsel have been informed on what to do and 
when to do it through training sessions. The ADC-ICTY have also published a manual 
that informs the readers on the basics of what to do when plea bargaining (STL Press 
Release 4 March 2010). Therefore they are in  much better prepared to advise and 
defend their clients in light of any plea negotiations that may occur. If this sort of 
planning had taken place, then there may well have been a place for plea bargaining at 
the SCSL. From the above it is evident that there is a likelihood that the use of plea 
bargaining may not ‘catch on’, yet prosecutors or defence counsel may push for its 
use in situations where it would be inappropriate. The potential, very ideologically 
problematic issues that can arise are discussed below using a framework drawn from 
subaltern studies.  
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5.3 Plea Bargaining Through Subaltern Studies 
 
In light of some of the responses in the interviews I conducted and the research 
carried out by Professor Nancy Combs for her book Fact Finding without Facts 
(2010), which highlights the cultural differences between the defendants and the 
tribunals, this chapter on post-colonialism and legal imperialism would be incomplete 
without an analysis of plea bargaining that is informed by the field of subaltern 
studies. This is needed because there is currently little analysis of international 
criminal law from this perspective, which is one that assists an understanding of what 
problems may occur when legal mechanisms are transplanted to an arena where trial 
participants come from different legal cultures.   
 
5.3.1 Subaltern Studies a Definition 
 
The area of Subaltern Studies has arisen from the field of post-colonial theory and 
came to prominence in the 1980s when scholars, such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(1988), began to discuss issues relating to post-colonial and post-imperial societies in 
South Asia. Whilst there is some discussion surrounding the notion of the subaltern in 
international legal studies this usually focuses on the role of international law and its 
dominance over persons of a state (Singh 2010; Rajagopal 2003; de Sousa Santos 
2003). However, there is no substantial analysis of the notion that persons can be 
classed as subaltern in actual international institutions, such as the tribunals, through 
the implementation of legal practices that are alien to participants. It is therefore 
important to discuss the impact of a mechanism such as plea bargaining has on the 
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trial participants in this context. The previous section of this chapter has discussed 
how plea bargaining is transplanted into the international system and that it does not 
always ‘fit’ well with the legal backgrounds of the staff and accused alike, making it 
difficult if not impossible for the uninitiated to enter into negotiations with full 
understanding of the potential implications of the process.  
At its most basic, ‘subaltern’ refers to marginalised groups who are rendered 
without agency by their social status (Young 2003). From this there follows a number 
of other, more nuanced, meanings of the term subaltern. Homi Bhabha, for example, 
emphasises the importance of social power relations, and according to him subaltern 
groups are: 
Oppressed, minority groups whose presence was crucial to the self-definition 
of the majority groups: subaltern social groups were also in a position to 
subvert the authority of those who had hegemonic power. (Bhabha 1996: 210) 
 
Spivak in turn resists defining the subaltern, as for her it is often, ‘employed far too 
vaguely to denote “oppression” or “otherness”’ (Didur and Heffernan 2003: 2). 
Rather, she offers only a description, which is of interest here as it reinforces the idea 
that the subaltern can be situated only in the context of the imperial power (Maggio 
2007). In an interview with Leon De Kock she stated that:  
subaltern is not just a classy word for oppressed, for Other, for somebody 
who's not getting a piece of the pie....In postcolonial terms, everything that has 
limited or no access to the cultural imperialism is subaltern-—a space of 
difference. Now who would say that's just the oppressed? The working class is 
oppressed. It's not subaltern....Many people want to claim subalternity. They 
are the least interesting and the most dangerous. I mean, just by being a 
discriminated-against minority on the university campus, they don't need the 
word 'subaltern'...They should see what the mechanics of the discrimination 
are. They're within the hegemonic discourse wanting a piece of the pie and not 
being allowed, so let them speak, use the hegemonic discourse. They should 
not call themselves subaltern. (De Kock 1992: np) 
Following on from this and considering the study of international law generally de 
Sousa Santos (2002) uses the term Subaltern in the context of counter hegemonic 
practices, struggles and resistances against neo-globalisation. In essence, for de Sousa 
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Santos the subaltern are those struggling against hegemonic globalisation (de Sousa 
Santos 2002: 180). In relation to international law he states that, ‘[T]he common 
heritage of humankind in particular, which originated in public international law, has 
been under sustained attack by hegemonic especially the US.’ (de Sousa Santos 2002: 
181) Drawing on this work, I use the term subaltern to refer to a person or persons 
who, through the practice of plea bargaining, are marginalised or left out of the 
hegemonic order of the international tribunal in question.  
  There are a number of ways those whose cultural; religious beliefs; philosophy 
are incompatible, or outside that of the tribunals ‘understanding’ are marginalised 
within the context of the tribunals. An example of this can be found in the SCSL case, 
Prosecutor v Brima et al. (Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT). The following exchange 
highlights the difficulties the tribunal staff may experience when receiving evidence 
from a witness who is not from the same cultural, philosophical, or educational 
background as themselves: 
Question: Do you know whether it was in the year 1999 or the year 2000? 
1999 or 2000? 
 
Answer: These things, Pa, I do not understand these things. When you tell me 
1990 I don’t understand. I don’t even say months, I only understand 
[inaudible] numbers. I really don’t understand anything. (Transcript April 8, 
2005 at 20)  
Witnesses such as this may be seen as obstructive by counsel and the judges and the 
trial chamber may well deem the witness to be unreliable when the responses given do 
not fit into the tribunal’s understanding of concepts such as time, distance or weight. 
This idea can be taken further and might be seen to have greater ramifications when 
there are also significantly differing notions of more abstract concepts such as truth.
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When it comes to truth telling it is worth reiterating Jordash’s earlier point 
regarding truth telling and plea bargaining. He stated that, ‘there is truth and there’s 
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something a bit less than truth’, arguing that this concept can be difficult for an, 
‘accused who does not have such a pragmatic head on them, it seems a little odd to 
them’ He went on to talk specifically about the defendant Sesay, who, ‘was a bit like 
that, because he was the sort of guy who didn’t understand what the court required of 
him.’ (Interview with Jordash 2010) Combs also argues, after conducting numerous 
interviews with trial staff, that, ‘Rwandans and Sierra Leoneans viewed truth and 
deception differently from Westerners.’ (Combs 2010: 131) The cultural differences 
in truth telling are also highlighted by Kelsall, who states that, in Sierra Leone: 
Krio saying Tok Af Lef Af encapsulates the idea that only the foolish, 
untrustworthy or downright reprehensible person will divulge everything they 
know in a first encounter, meaning that many people will withhold some 
portion of the truth, taking half, leaving half not least because the person they 
are dealing with might constitute a threat. (Kelsall 2009: 214-15) 
 
When it comes to issues such as these, there is clearly the potential for witnesses to be 
seen as obstructive by the judging panel and counsel alike which in turn may leave a 
witness without any role or voice in the proceedings. It might be argued then that in 
order for witnesses, defendants, and trial personnel to fully participate in criminal 
proceedings in any meaningful way they must embrace the hegemonic order and in so 
doing adopt western notions of thought, reasoning, language and so forth. This 
argument may equally be extended to the populations of post-conflict societies who 
must also adopt such a world view in order to operate in an informed way when it 
comes to the Tribunals’ methods and philosophies. This process is often facilitated by 
the tribunals outreach programs and will pose an issue in the newer tribunals such as 
the ICC and the STL (Clark 2009: 436). One of the major areas where this acceptance 
of a particular set of values and perspectives has a potential impact is that of plea 
bargaining, which as I have argued has become a central area of the work of the 
international war crime tribunals. For this reason I now return to the idea that 
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members of the trial system can be classed as subaltern when alien legal mechanisms, 
such as plea bargaining are implemented into the jurisprudence. 
 
5.3.2 Examples of Plea Bargaining and the Notion of the Subaltern 
 
It is worth highlighting once more that the legal system international tribunals have 
adopted is based either on the Continental legal model or the Anglo-Saxon one - both 
European forms of justice. Because of this it is possible to argue that persons who do 
not hail from places that use such European legal models may feel that they have had 
been subjected to an alien legal system and are at a disadvantage. This is due to the 
fact that different cultures have different notions of justice often focussing on things 
such as retribution, truth telling, or reconciliation (Drumbl 2007; Cavadino and 
Dignan 2006; Mani 2002). However, despite the local culture, when it comes to the 
issue of human rights violations it seems the norm to bring about justice to the 
affected community through criminal proceedings. Reflecting this, when interviewed 
for this thesis, Professor Crane reiterated that: 
[T]here are many alternatives to justice rather than the international model. 
They must be respected before making a decision to set up an international 
tribunal. As they (international tribunals) are costly and politically 
problematic…when using an alternative to justice one must ensure that some 
justice is done rather than none. (Interview with Crane 2009)  
 
The predominance of western systems at the tribunals may also be explained by the 
wider world which is outraged at the atrocities committed want to see justice done and 
also have a culturally specific notion of what this means.
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Plea bargaining as a predominantly Anglo-American concept has become 
central to this process. However, to date, none of the defendants who have engaged in 
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plea negotiations in international tribunals have been from either of these two 
jurisdictions. Alongside this, many of the negotiations that have taken place have 
done so in a manner that is akin the Anglo-American model of negotiating a plea 
rather than the newer, alternative, models that have been developed in continental 
Europe.
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 Whilst on the surface the negotiations at the ICTY seem to have been 
conducted relatively smoothly we must not forget the case of Erdemovic. Here the 
guilty plea was not negotiated but it did put the wheels in motion for procedures to 
allow plea bargaining and guilty pleas into the system. However, there were problems 
with his guilty plea as the trial chamber rejected his initial plea and asked him to re-
enter his plea. This was in part due to the defendant and his counsel not fully 
understanding the concept and implications of pleading guilty in the way the tribunal 
staff from a common law background did.
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 Fortunately, the Trial Chamber acted on 
this and Rule 62 bis was added to the statute, which states, If an accused wishes to 
plead guilty then the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that: (i) the guilty plea has been 
made voluntarily; (ii) the guilty plea is informed; (iii) the guilty plea is not equivocal; 
and (iv) there is a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the accused’s participation 
in it, either on the basis of independent indicia or on lack of any material 
disagreement between the parties about the facts of the case. Ironically, Erdemovic 
was the first ever judgement to be handed down by the ICTY. 
Due to the nature of international criminal law, those who are not able to 
participate, due to issues such as education, cultural and religious backgrounds may 
be classed as subaltern. That is because they do not fit within the hegemonic order of 
international criminal law and they are unable to communicate to the tribunal in a way 
that is recognized, or more importantly is willing to be recognised (Prosecutor v Joa 
Fernandes Case No. 200/15).
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 It can also be argued that the tribunal does not 
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communicate with participants in a way that would allow them to enter into the 
hegemony of the courts. In the cases of Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon there were a 
number of factors that occurred that resulted in negotiations breaking down which 
have been discussed above.  
One factor that needs to be drawn out here is the fact that plea bargaining is 
fundamentally an informal negotiation that takes place between the prosecution and 
the defence. There are a number of ways in which this may take place depending on 
the legal and cultural background of the persons involved, for example in the UK the 
Bar is congenial (Interview with Muphy 2010) and therefore negotiations may not be 
as adversarial as they are in the US. This means that there are unsaid and informal 
procedures in which one may carry out a negotiation. In other words there is a 
‘dramaturgy’ to negotiations. This dramaturgy is not taught or laid out in the 
tribunals’ rules but generally learnt through experience. If counsel or defendants are 
not privy to this knowledge and are therefore unaware of what is required of them 
then they are very much at a disadvantage and are possibly unable to negotiate in any 
meaningful way (Maynard 1984: 165-209).   
Also, although obvious, it should be noted that tribunal personnel come from a 
variety of different legal backgrounds, therefore it is possible that the differences 
between them culturally may also cause problems in regards to the actual negotiating 
process despite in depth knowledge of what plea bargaining is and theoretically 
understanding how to proceed. As Slobodan Zecevic, Former President of the ADC at 
the ICTY counsel in the cases of Milan Simić (IT-95-9/2)133 and Miroslav Deronjić 
(IT-02-61), both of which are plea bargain cases, said, ‘Of course I was aware of the 
possibility of plea agreements and in general was aware of it and how it works’,  
stating that: 
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There is no doubt that defence counsel and their clients coming from 
inquisitorial background are seriously disadvantaged in the plea bargaining 
process. In my case except from general knowledge and Jurisprudence I was 
completely unaware of the actual process in technical terms meaning what 
needs to be done, when, how and alike. For these reasons in both my plea 
agreements I had an experience defence counsel from adversarial system who 
was actually running the show from the defence side. (Interview with Zecevic 
2011)
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He went on to argue that: 
After the two pleas I did, I am quite sure that if we were not assisted by 
Ms.Baen it would have been virtually impossible for us to finalize the plea 
agreements. Starting from Proffer agreements to actual negotiation there has 
been so many situations where we were in doubt what needs to be done or how 
we should approach that issue. Therefore, I am sure the outcome and overall 
experience would have been different had we been on our own, without Ms. 
Baen. (Interview with Zecevic 2011) 
Zecevic’s statements illustrate that even the most experienced international criminal 
lawyers may find themselves unable to work within the Tribunal’s laws and 
procedures when they come from different legal and cultural backgrounds. Such 
cultural differences should not be underestimated and the fact that these stark 
differences potentially disadvantage some of those that come into the orbit of the 
tribunals and therefore marginalised. 
 
5.3.3 The Case of the Special Panels 
 
In relation to these debates, one of the most interesting factors of international law 
arose at the Special Panels for Serious Crimes of the District Court of Dili. Here, 
almost every accused person who appeared before it admitted to being involved in 
some aspect of the crime they have been charged with (Linton and Reiger 2002: 2). 
They also usually informed the courts that they did so under duress or because they 
were ordered to do so. Such as in the case Public Prosecutor v Sarmento (Special 
Panel for Serious Crimes, Court Record June 30, 2003) where the defendant Benjamin 
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Sarmento indicated that he was willing to plead guilty to the charges against him, but 
asserted that he had done so under duress stating that, ‘People send us to kill. That’s 
why we did it. That’s why we accept our guilty’ going on to say that, ‘[t]his charge, I 
accept, because they told me to do it. That’s why I accept. But the problem is that for 
me to think about doing it, I wouldn’t have done it. That is because I was told to do 
it.’ (Public Prosecutor v Sarmento at 10 in Combs 2010: 43) Despite the obvious 
defence that Sarmento had, the trial chamber still accepted the guilty plea. This 
occurred again in the same case when the co-accused Romerio Tilman, pleading 
guilty, explained his involvement in the crime charged but also had a valid defence of 
duress. Guilty pleas and claims of duress arose over and over again, so much so that 
the frequency of these claims indicates that there was a pattern of coercive behavior in 
the pro-Jakarta forces.  
However, there was also a desire on the part of many of the accused to 
acknowledge their involvement in crimes and be reconciled with their communities as 
is the local custom (Linton and Reiger 2002:2; Combs 2007: 169-70). It should be 
pointed out that even though there was a high number of guilty pleas there was no 
indication of  improper conduct in procuring admission but there has been a lack of 
representation during police questioning of suspects due to lack of a defence counsel 
(Linton and Rieger 2002: 2). Although it is clear that the defendants did not fully 
understand the consequences of pleading guilty and that they should have had entered 
a plea of not guilty and raised the defence of duress. The Special Panels continued to 
accept uninformed and equivocal pleas that where not based on a sufficient factual 
basis as the defendants could have raised a valid defence and potentially be found not 
to be guilty. 
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Linton and Rieger argue that the Special Panels only once took a cautious 
approach when accepting a guilty plea; that was in their first case, Prosecutor v Joa 
Fernades, where the guilty plea was rejected. There were other cases in which 
admissions of guilt were also rejected and Linton and Rieger refer to these as partial 
admissions as the admissions or confessions by the defendants did not entirely match 
the allegations against them (Julio Fernades; Yoseph Leki; Manuel Lete Bere; Jose 
Valente; Agustinho da Costa; Gaspa Leite; Lospalos). Since these cases it would 
seem that the Special Panels have taken a more lenient stance. This can be compared 
with a multi-party trial where the lead defendant pleaded guilty, the trial chamber 
waited until the end of the trial to accept the guilty plea, after hearing all evidence and 
submissions presented to the court (Linton and Rieger 2002: 13; Public Prosecutor v 
Joni Marques & Ors case No.9/2000 ‘Lospalos Case’  Decision 4 December 2001). In 
this situation The Special Panels have generally been unable to decide whether there 
was duress or people followed superior orders and so have erred on the side of caution 
and have not accepted guilty pleas and have gone to a full trial.  
This approach was favored by Judge Stephens in Erdemovic; in this particular 
case the Appeals Chamber rejected the plea of duress from the defendant because of 
the lack of evidence and proceeded to sentencing. Judge Stephens said that the onus of 
proof should be placed on the defendant (Erdemovic Appeal Decision, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Stephen; Paragraph 22). This would mean that defendants would 
have to call their own witnesses in order to prove they were forced into committing 
criminal acts. It could also be possible that this could raise further confusion regarding 
the distinction between what constitutes a defence and what constitutes a mitigating 
circumstance.  
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It would also appear to be the case that defendants who pleaded guilty did not 
understand that they may not in fact be guilty as they may have been able to raise a 
successful defence of duress. This would seem to further alienate defendants from the 
western notion of justice. Evidence of this can be seen in the aforementioned case of 
Joa Fernandes. Here, the fact that the defendant claimed he acted under duress and in 
accordance with superior’s orders was indeed viewed as mitigation in his defence. On 
appeal, the Appeal Chamber used the Erdemovic case to reject the defence that 
Fernandes was forced to kill acting under superior’s orders. The Special Panels 
viewed Fernandes as having acted under superior orders and only accepted the matter 
of duress as a mitigating factor. They sentenced the defendant to twelve years 
accordingly (Trial Judgement; Paragraph 6). 
Significantly, when this case went to appeal the defence counsel were 
confused by the distinction between superior orders and duress even though the 
differences between the elements of what constitutes duress and superior orders are 
set out in UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 (Linton and Rieger 2002: 15). It is possible 
that there was a genuine misunderstanding between the Bench and defence due to 
inadequate translations. English and Portuguese were the official languages of this 
tribunal even though many of the defendants and witnesses only spoke one of the East 
Timorese languages.
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 In the case of Fernandes this led to some crucial issues not 
being addressed by the Appeals Chamber as the Tribunal did not understand what he 
was trying to tell them (Linton and Rieger 2002: 15-19).  
It seems that there are a number of factors that need to be considered here. 
Although the defendant accepts that they have committed the acts they are accused of 
they also claim that they were forced to commit those acts therefore lacking any 
specific intent. It is clearly the case that the defendant did not understand the nuances 
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between the defence strategies that may have been available to them or that pleading 
guilty may take away these defences. This in turn would raises the possibility that 
defence counsel where unable to determine the nuances themselves as if they entered 
into a plea bargain they may have been able to negotiate with the prosecutors to 
modify the charges. The defendant would then be pleading guilty to a more accurate 
account of their actual involvement and culpability. As it stands, if these defendants 
are to be believed it might be thought they have been held fully liable for crimes 
where there may be a partial defence, such as duress. This of course is a highly 
relevant mitigating factor when it comes to sentencing. In these circumstances 
defendants have unfortunately fallen foul of a system that cannot accommodate their 
desire to confess to the acts that they have committed in a manner that they can 
express themselves properly. 
 Judge Egonda-Ntende has also engaged with this issue. He argued that in 
order to make sure that the chamber understood the defendant it should have 
investigated: firstly whether he or his counsel knew the difference between duress and 
superior orders; secondly, whether he and his counsel knew the difference between 
mitigating factors under East Timor’s New Laws or the consequences of pleading 
guilty when the defendants operating under superior orders may have been used as a 
mitigating factor; and thirdly if they knew what a claim of duress meant, i.e. acquittal 
not a lighter sentence (Joa Fernandes Appeal, Judge EgondaNtende Separate Opinion 
29 June 2001 p 30). This highlights the dangers of using mechanisms such as plea 
bargaining in a forum where the participants do not hail from the same cultural and 
philosophical sphere as those where plea bargaining is a helpful and important judicial 
instrument. 
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This case study indicates the issues that may arise when foreign legal 
instruments are transplanted into a system where the participants are not aware of the 
nuances within this particular system and how they work. It also highlights how 
persons may be left outside this system when there is only a vague and/or improper 
understanding of how the system works. Another way in which a person or a group of 
persons may be left out of the hegemonic order of international criminal justice is 
when the there is a clash of cultures between the supranational institution and the 
region the tribunal is working with. The following example of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone highlights this. 
 
5.3.4 The Case of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
One aspect of Sierra Leonean culture the SCSL and its staff had to deal with that other 
international tribunals have not had to contemplate was the issue of witchcraft.
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 The 
CDF (Civil Defence Forces) trials heard a great amount of evidence that was based on 
witness accounts of the role and use of witchcraft during the conflict in Sierra Leone. 
This included evidence involving issues such as initiation rights and the belief that if 
people follow certain rituals they may become immune to bullets. (Prosecutor v 
Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa (SCSL-04-14-T)) The 
evidence adduced in these trials shows how seriously people in Sierra Leone believed 
in the rites and rituals associated with mystical powers
137
 and this in turn raises the 
question once again of how far defendants fully grasped the judicial system they were 
tried within.  
When issues of mystical nature arose the bench tried to understand the part it 
played in Sierra Leonean culture and the violence that tore through the country. In this 
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respect Judge Thompson, who is Sierra Leonean, in the Hinga Norman case stated 
that, ‘the witness believes that we are familiar with the culture. We’re not. That’s why 
I sought clarification.’ (Transcript 22nd February 2006, P32-33) On another occasion 
he admitted that the court’s culture was alien to that of some of the trial’s participants, 
and said that there was a sense of oppositional positions in their understanding of 
what was going on, ‘in other words, this traditional thing as against the western 
position.’ (Transcript 15th February 2006, p15-16) The SCSL is the first international 
court to deal with witchcraft, however, it is not the first Western style court to deal 
with the issue. As Kelsall points out, there have been instances in some post-colonial 
African countries where issues of witchcraft have been integral parts of criminal 
proceedings (Kelsall 2009: 113-117). Although the SCSL was prepared to try and 
understand the issues of witchcraft, it was not integrated into the proceedings as either 
a legitimate defence or some form of mitigating factor. This suggests that even when 
working with the best of intentions, international criminal law may be considered a 
form of imperial justice as it is ultimately unable to, or chooses not to, accommodate 
beliefs that its participants and the wider population itself may believe in. Although 
not public knowledge as the negotiations in this particular scenario collapsed, the 
issue of witchcraft even affected the potential for the court to accept guilty pleas. This 
raised the question of how to bring justice to defendants whose belief systems are 
outside of the Tribunal’s philosophical and cultural beliefs.138  
When interviewed for this thesis, SCSL prosecutors David Crane and Sir 
Desmond de Silva QC stated that there was another instance when a plea deal had 
been negotiated where the defendant would enter a guilty plea and give evidence on 
behalf of the prosecution (Interview with De Silva 2010).
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 The agreement was ready 
to sign on Friday morning and defence counsel was scheduled to leave in the evening 
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that day. When defence counsel went to meet with the defendant, they were informed 
that he wished to consult with a witch doctor before signing the document (Crane 
2009; De Silva 2010). After consulting with the witch doctor the defendant decided 
not to sign the plea agreement under their advisement. Regardless of the defendant’s 
decision, Sir Desmond and Professor Crane had decided that they would not be able to 
rely on this defendant as a credible witness. Sir Desmond acknowledged that, ‘this 
was an unusual situation’ and that he ‘could foresee endless problems.’ (Interview 
with De Silva 2010) The ‘endless problems’ the prosecution could have envisaged 
would likely include the fact that the credibility of the witness may be a risk, as ‘if he 
goes in to the witness box, and says I pleaded guilty but consulted with my witch 
doctor first’ (Interview with De Silva 2010), the Bench may not give any weight to 
any of the evidence elicited at trial. The second issue that the prosecutors may have 
considered is that if the defendant had pleaded guilty after discussions with the witch 
doctor, his plea may not be voluntary or unequivocal and therefore it would be very 
wrong for the OTP to accept a plea under such circumstances.  
This particular negotiation at the SCSL raises a number of questions with 
regards to subaltern studies. Firstly, it highlights the difference of opinions within the 
tribunal; when discussing the use of witchdoctors Chief Charles Taku stated that: 
Throughout the entire proceedings an allegation was made about the RUF 
consulting a witch doctor during the so-called “fata fati” campaign which they 
alleged Kallon sabotaged by staying away and discouraging others to do so. 
The campaign failed with the RUF having heavy casualties and Kallon was 
suspended, recalled and punished…Entry into the detention centre and access 
to Kallon and others was always rigid and I will be surprised if witch doctor 
gained ingress into the centre and interfered with the Judicial process in the 
manner alleged. (Interview with Taku 2011) 
 
Chief Taku went on to suggest that there may indeed be some confusion and that the 
defendant in question had not wished to see a witch doctor for magical purposes but 
had wanted to speak to a spiritual leader for guidance. Taku went on to say that he 
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believed that in general there was a distinct clash of religious philosophies between 
the participants of the trial proceedings. He gave the specific example of the 
differences seen between the defendants who were Muslim and the bench in the RUF 
case stating that the Bench when passing judgment quoted the Bible to the defendants:  
This allegation comes to emphasize a religious twist that was evident in the 
trial and which was stated so eloquently by Judge Galega King in his joint 
dissenting opinion with Judge Kamanda when they cited the Holy Bible ( The 
Plsamist) about “ We’the good and them the bad”.  The reliance on their (the 
Judges) religious believes to support their finding in a case in which two of the 
convicts were Moslem was and remain troubling indeed. (Interview with Taku 
2010) (Appeals Judgment, Prosecutor Vs Isa Sesay, Morris Kallon and 
Augustine Gbao (SCSL-04-15-A) 26 Oct. 2009, p491. Joint dissenting opinion 
of Justice Galega King and Justice Kamanda). 
Therefore, it may be the case that anything that was not grounded in Western legal 
tradition or Christian ideology was not welcomed into the court and that any faith in 
metaphysical beliefs was deemed incomprehensible. Persons with such beliefs are 
marginalised and left outside the tribunals workings. As such they are unable to 
interact and engage at a level where all parties are able to work together in order to 
establish the truth of whether the defendant is legally culpable of the crimes charged 
or not. 
Although the details of this particular negotiation are vague, it shows that 
international criminal justice at times cannot incorporate the beliefs of the people it 
serves. This particular scenario also highlights that in this situation the defendant was 
unaware that seeking advice about pleading guilty or not from a witch doctor would 
not only be inappropriate, as conceptually guilty pleas should only be entered if one is 
factually and legally guilty rather than accepting or denying guilt on metaphysical 
advice. But again, this situation may also have been misconstrued as Chief Taku 
suggests. This also helps show how fraught negotiations of this nature can be and that 
neither the prosecution nor defence are able to ‘rest on their laurels’ as they must be 
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ready to go to trial in case negotiations fail, as in the Plavsic case. For the most part, 
this particular, highly unusual scenario, points to the difference in cultures and that 
international law as it stands is unable to integrate beliefs that Western notions of 
justice would find illogical. It is therefore fair to say that justice mechanisms such as 
plea bargaining implemented into legal systems where it does not resonate within the 
wider populations of the post conflict society and the trial participants it is indeed then 
an inappropriate transplant. It is therefore essential that the international community 
when deciding the tribunals mandate must factor in these differences and envisage the 
problems that may occur. Therefore an appropriate and realistic tribunal budget and 
completion strategy needs to be instated.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter of the thesis has taken on a distinctly different format from the previous 
two chapters as, in order to fully analyse the issues that arise from plea bargaining, 
one has to consider that it may constitute a form of legal imperialism. It is difficult to 
ignore the obvious financial constraints international tribunals find themselves placed 
under and the impact this has on the increased application of plea bargaining in 
international courts. However, whilst utilitarian approaches explain the financial drive 
behind the introduction of plea bargaining in the international tribunals, one that fully 
acknowledges the imperialistic urge to stabilise trouble torn regions to enable the 
financial investment of international capital offers a more nuanced and one might 
argue, realistic, rationale for their usage.  
If legal transplants are to be appropriate then not only do the courts need to be 
adequately funded they also need adequate time for defence counsel to explain to 
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defendants the way in which plea bargains work. An analysis of the process of plea 
bargaining that acknowledges the potentially imperialistic drive of transplant without 
explanation and its potential to create a subaltern layer of populations in conflict 
zones opens up the process of plea bargaining to a wider set of concerns that move 
beyond the more classical approaches utilised in my earlier chapters. This approach 
reveals that the courts must carry out their work with respect to the cultural and 
spiritual beliefs of the post conflict society in order for there to be any real and lasting 
impact in the region. This may be achieved with more effective outreach programs but 
these in turn must acknowledge the need to be seen as developing and adapting the 
legal transplant to the point of destination instead of simply forcing it upon it (Clark 
2009). The outreach will not only act as a method of disseminating information about 
judgments and sentences handed out but must also play an integral role in the 
dissemination of information regarding the courts rules and procedures by discussing 
and explaining how and why plea bargaining is used in these courts. Again, to allow a 
tribunal the ability to do this there needs to be adequate funds available and time in 
which this work can be carried out, after which the transplantation of alien legal tools 
may have a better chance of being successful. As already discussed above, it is of 
great interest to see how the use of plea negotiations and guilty pleas will progress at 
the ICC. 
 To date there have been a number of practical reasons why plea bargaining has 
been implemented into the international system, namely over-burdened court dockets 
and the lack of resources. But international courts must ensure that their prosecutorial 
strategy is not influenced by the funders or the dominant legislators who, as it have 
been argued above may be viewed as imperial states that have subjected defendants to 
alien legal mechanisms. This may also raise potential questions as to whether this has 
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had any impact in deciding who should enter into negotiations and who should go to 
trial. If there is even a slight perception of this in the regions where the tribunals 
work, there will no doubt be claims of victor’s justice. 
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Conclusion 
 
What has become evident throughout the interviews I have undertaken for this project 
is that, whilst there is a generally accepted understanding of what might constitute a 
plea bargain in the context of the international tribunals, there is no universal 
acknowledgement of how to either conduct one or more precisely how to proceed in 
the negotiations leading up to the establishing of one.
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 O’Sullivan and Zecevic go 
some way to alleviating this through their work on plea bargaining in the ADC ICTY 
Manual (2011). However, even their contribution has not provided a set dramaturgical 
model that may be followed during plea negotiations in the manner available for trial 
proceedings. Here, there remain a number of central questions that exist during the 
process. In particular, how does a trial participant interact with another participant 
within the spaces of the court room? This is particularly pertinent as any resultant plea 
bargain delivers a criminal conviction without a trial. This means that there must be 
aspects of the negotiations that take a formal and legalistic approach within what is 
generally considered an informal method of evaluating the facts and deciding the guilt 
of a defendant. Whilst there may be economic and even theoretical justifications for 
plea bargaining, without an understanding of how such deals may be entered into, and 
which types of ‘actions’ are permissible in the exchange between the parties, there can 
be no broadly acceptable practice of how to proceed with or what to expect from plea 
negotiations. Furthermore, if there is no common understanding of what constitutes a 
plea bargain in international law, then the somewhat ad hoc process employed will be 
open to charges of cultural imperialism. Such accusations can often be driven by a 
perceived imperialistic superimposition of contextually inappropriate assumptions and 
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practices and unequal treatment regardless of any institutional benefit that may be 
achieved from employing plea bargaining. 
As international criminal law continues to evolve and with the emergence of 
new conflicts, often resulting in new indictments being issued and new prosecutions 
taking place, it is evident that there will continue to be a place for negotiated justice. 
This has proved to be the case with provisions within the rules of the ICC and STL to 
accept guilty pleas. Presently, justifications drawn from utilitarian approaches are 
once again being evoked as, if persistent rumours are to be believed, the ICC has 
proposed financial cuts which will impact on the fees defence attorneys receive 
(Walker 2012: np). If this is indeed the case, then it will be of interest to see if plea 
bargaining materialises into the actual practice of the ICC, particularly in light of 
counter-utilitarian assertions such as fiat justitia ne pereat mundus (let justice be done 
though the world should perish) (Kant 1795), that are all too readily made in 
discussions by liberals about international justice. What is for sure is that debates 
around the use of plea bargaining in the context of international tribunals will 
continue.  
This thesis has examined the use of plea bargaining in war crime tribunals 
from three distinct interpretive viewpoints: classical utilitarianism; the classical liberal 
concept of the rule of law; and legal imperialism. The three theoretical models serve 
the purpose of testing and evaluating the different ways in which plea bargaining 
impacts on international criminal law. In formulating my arguments I have utilised 
responses drawn from the extensive interviews that I have conducted with 
international criminal trial professionals. These perspectives have helped supplement, 
nuance and either reinforce or challenge the assumptions often present in more 
theoretical arguments about plea bargaining in war crime tribunals. 
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The first two analytical models I utilise, utilitarianism and the rule of law, 
provide a good theoretical background to the study of plea bargaining as they are 
diametrically opposite, and therefore allow the limitations of each to stand out 
emphatically when seen from the perspective of the other. They also explain the 
issues and nuances surrounding the use of plea bargaining that would not be initially 
apparent. The development of my third approach was, however, necessary due not 
only to the limitations of the first two but also because of the responses that arose 
from a number of the interviews.
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 As my research progressed, it became apparent 
that there were aspects of the interview material I was gathering that did not fit into 
the interpretative framework of either of the two models and upon reflection it became 
increasingly apparent that they could be better assimilated and made sense of when 
viewed through the lens of legal imperialism. Therefore, without these theoretical 
frameworks I would not have been able to fully evaluate the responses that I received 
from the interviews. Within this research a number of aspects relating to the use of 
plea bargaining have arisen that have added to the explanation of how plea 
negotiations are conducted in the various international tribunals. Examples include the 
way in which the attempted negotiations took place in the RUF trials, (Interview with 
Taku 2010; Interview with Jordash 2010) and the lack of transparency in the Plavsic 
trial (Interview with Murphy 2010). 
The international tribunals have been championed by liberal democratic 
societies such as the UK, USA, Germany and France (Bass 2000). These States hold 
individual rights to be paramount to the functioning of their societies and the 
influence of their Western legalism is clearly visible in the tribunals. It is arguably 
wrong for tribunals to employ plea bargaining as it disregards the rights that they vow 
to uphold in their bid to be seen as fair and just and avoid claims that they are meting 
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out a form of ‘victors justice’ (Zolo 2009). Utilitarianism as a theory, and as an 
institutional practice within the tribunals, is understood as the principle or imperative 
of the greatest happiness for the great number. As such, it is unable to adhere with the 
tribunals’ generally liberal principles and ideology because, as a theory, utilitarianism 
disregards the sanctity of individual’s rights in favour of a collectivist policy concern 
for optimising the interests of the greatest number. In practice, this means that under a 
legal system that champions a utilitarian form of justice, rights such as the 
presumption of innocence, or the right to a fair trial may be forfeited wherever this 
serves the greatest happiness for the greatest number principle. Therefore, when 
thinking about plea bargaining the responses from the interviews help emphasise the 
contradiction between its use and the principles of liberalism on which the tribunals 
have been established. 
 Another important issue that has the potential to undercut the utilitarian 
justifications when entering into plea agreements in war crime tribunals, is that the 
nature of the crimes being investigated are of great complexity and involve large 
number of people. War crimes generally are not committed in just one single political 
context. There are normally a number of political and sociological reasons for armed 
conflicts, and the crimes committed within them. There are often many differing 
opinions regarding, and understandings of, what constitutes and what does not 
constitute not a war crime. This often extends to questions relating to who is a war 
criminal when in some contexts perpetrators may be considered a war hero. With this 
in mind, under utilitarian thinking it is not possible to determine what a cost is and 
what is a benefit for everybody in general, in every post conflict situation that exists 
or may exist in the future. Utilitarian justifications, such as the promotion of 
reconciliation, may be more suitable to certain regions of the world than to others; not 
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least because one person’s peaceful reconciliation efforts are another’s attempts at 
ethnic or cultural assimilation. People from different post conflict societies may see 
the presence of plea negotiations as a corrupt practice in the international legal 
system, and also linked to wider tendencies to ‘peace without justice’ that they 
oppose. Conversely, others may believe that this promotes reconciliation within the 
affected region,
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 which by definition is in everyone’s interest because war is 
everyone’s enemy. The very nature of utilitarianism is that it is pragmatic. Therefore, 
in order for plea bargaining to deliver the greatest happiness to the greatest number it 
does not have to be applied equally across the range of defendants. 
In summary, the theory of utilitarianism treats defendants as a means to an end 
rather than individuals. The ‘ends’ for the purposes of this thesis is a criminal 
conviction. Utilitarianism disregards the ‘quality’ of convictions in favour of the 
quantity of convictions.
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 By doing so it sacrifices aspects such as, the rights that are 
bestowed on to a defendant in international criminal tribunals to contributing towards 
a full and truthful historical record in exchange for a number of convictions that have 
been efficiently obtained.  
  I then turned to a consideration of the use of plea bargaining from a liberal 
perspective in order to give a fuller analysis of this area of international criminal law 
practice. From this chapter, it is clear that the use of plea bargaining is at odds with 
the rights based liberalism that informs the tribunals’ procedural laws. The interview 
responses have offered additional insight to these theoretical issues,
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 allowing for 
nuanced evaluation determining how much the theoretical objections concern the real 
consequence of the actual practice of plea bargaining. It has also become apparent 
from the interview responses that the strict rule following normativisms and doctrinal 
certainty requirements of liberalism are impossible to maintain, especially in relation 
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to plea bargaining, which in itself is necessarily subject to much additional discretion. 
This was highlighted by wayde Pittman who pointed out the judges had not followed 
to a number of sentence recommendations and had sentenced defendants to longer 
prison terms (Interview with Pittman 2010). One of the problems with classical liberal 
theory, unlike utilitarianism, is that its individualistic focus on the rights of defendants 
does not concern itself with the plight of the victims of war crimes. With the 
introduction of victim representation in the form of civil party groups, this has the 
potential to disrupt the liberal theory underpinning plea bargaining. The theory itself 
is limited with in the area of international criminal justice in general. With regards to 
equality, there will never be true equality as at the beginning of criminal proceedings, 
be that at an arrest or at the beginning of negotiations. The prosecution on the whole 
are in a more dominant position due to the lengthy investigations that they have 
carried out before the defendant is even arrested. This leads to an imbalance in the 
information and resources available to the defendant. Still on the subject of equality, 
within a legal system it is impossible to treat defendants equally. The best a criminal 
system can hope for is that the defendants are given equal access to legal measures in 
place. The use of plea bargaining in it is subject to a vast amount of discretion that 
impacts on the defendant’s right to equality.145 It also increases the level of 
uncertainty for defendants. Under liberalism it is the law that decides cases not the 
people who are involved in them. Making it impossible for legal systems, in particular 
international legal systems to deliver the strict and utopian demands of the rule of law, 
as the success of plea bargains often rests on the lawyer’s negotiation skills and the 
human agency involved in conducting a plea negotiation. Therefore, like 
utilitarianism, the classical liberal approach is also limited in its ability to offer a 
complete understanding of plea bargaining’s place within the context of international 
tribunals. 
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 Both the classical utilitarian and classical liberal frameworks go some way in 
advancing an understanding of plea bargaining and offer useful approaches to the 
issues surrounding plea bargaining, but in light of the interviews conducted this is an 
incomplete and, for present purposes, arguably insufficient one. In the context of 
international law both these theories reveal significant problems and naiveties when 
scrutinised under the theories of legal imperialism. Chapter 5 offered a general 
framework for legal imperialism in order to best address the troubling interview 
responses regarding the use of plea bargaining in war crime tribunals, and to explore 
possible alternatives to liberal and utilitarian orientations. Again, as a framework in 
which to think about plea bargaining this too is inadequate, at least insofar as it 
operates in isolation from liberalism and utilitarianism and remains unreceptive to 
their admittedly limited positive features. Not all transplantation can be understood as 
imperialistic. The high cost and the time it takes for a full trial to take place, tribunals 
such as the ICTY would not have been able to bring to trial all the suspects they had 
set out to bring to the Hague and face prosecution, had there not been provisions for 
plea bargaining. It is therefore evident that in new legal systems there needs to be a 
certain amount of legal transplantation, in order to have a functioning tribunal. Plea 
bargaining is a highly adversarial mechanism that comes from adversarial 
jurisprudence. Therefore, it is predictable that persons from different legal 
backgrounds are not comfortable with the notion of plea bargaining, this in itself does 
not constitute legal imperialism. Arguments of imperialism arise when plea 
bargaining is employed or possibly imposed in a culturally insensitive manner, as seen 
in the RUF trials (Interview with Taku 2010), or if there is an inadequate level of 
understanding of what is involved to the extent qualified and experienced defence 
counsel are unable to proceed.
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 This may arise when cultural differences appear 
between the defence and the prosecution, therefore making the actual exchange during 
274 
 
negotiations the source of the problem. In turn, this potentially leaves the defence and 
the defendant in a vulnerable position, and permits a form of cultural imperialism to 
arise. This may further link into issues of equality before the law, and equality of arms 
as the defence are in general disadvantaged by their lack of experience or 
understanding in this area of legal practice.  
 All three of the theories I have used to evaluate the use of plea bargaining do 
not offer a satisfactory understanding into the research area when taken in isolation 
from each other. That is not to say that there are no aspects to these theories that offer 
insights into plea bargaining which merit inclusion in an emerging alternative 
position. Together, particularly if their more viable elements can be integrated, they 
offer a nuanced and holistic approach to considering plea bargaining and its future in 
international criminal law. Therefore, this research has analysed plea bargaining in the 
international context in a number of ways which has added to the explanation of what 
plea bargaining is the different forms it may take, as well as the evaluation of this 
particular legal phenomenon which offers an interdisciplinary approach to the use of 
plea bargaining in the international context.   
  With this in mind, I will now distil the main aspects from evaluation of the 
three models that seem the most pertinent to plea bargaining from which I aim to 
deliver a more nuanced way of considering plea bargaining in the future. As the use of 
plea bargaining in international criminal law is continually evolving within the diverse 
political and cultural contexts in which the international tribunals work. It is also 
apparent from the establishment of more recent tribunals, such as the ICC and the 
STL, that plea bargaining as both a legal concept and institutional practice will remain 
within the international criminal jurisprudence.   
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From the chapter relating to the utilitarian justifications of plea bargaining, it 
is very clear that the overarching benefit of plea bargaining is that it improves the 
efficiency of international justice, by way of cutting cost drastically and speeding up 
the judicial process, as evidenced by the interviews with Chief Taku (2010), Sir 
Desmond (2010) and Professor Crane (2009). Although there are other by products of 
plea bargaining that may be considered desirable
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 it still remains that the potential to 
increase international productivity is the only concrete and undisputable rationale for 
its entry into the international criminal justice system. 
From the chapter that dealt with the objections to the use of plea bargaining 
under the theory of the classical liberal rule of law, it is apparent that there is a high 
level of discretion from the judges and prosecutors throughout the entire process of 
plea bargaining. This then leads to the high level of uncertainty as to what the final 
outcome of a plea bargain may be (Interview with Taku 2010; Interview with Pittman 
2010; interview with Jordash 2010). The second prevailing issue in relation to 
liberalism’s objections to plea bargaining that was informed by the interviews 
surrounds the area of equality and equal treatment, where certain defendants are given 
more favourable plea deals than others on grounds that cannot be justified in terms of 
liberal principles, such as having more valuable information that the OTP can utilize 
than another defendant (interview with De Silva 2010). Upholding a strict adherence 
to every aspect and implication of the rule of law, as defined by liberal ideology, is 
unrealistic. However, this does not mean that there must not be a structure in place 
which instils at least a general concern for equal treatment for defendants such that 
inequalities require a measure of justification, and all the participants of the trial and 
allows an optimal amount of certainty. 
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From the chapter focussing on imperialism it can be inferred that the use of 
plea bargaining will not be successful if the defendants and the populations of the post 
conflict society do not understand the nuances that are involved in plea bargaining.
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This will lead to a contextually inappropriate transplant of plea bargaining. This in 
turn very much has the potential to create confusion and mistrust in the international 
courts, for example, at the SCSL Issa Sesay felt he could not trust the prosecutors or 
the legal system regarding plea bargaining during his actual negotiations (Interview 
with Jordash 2010). Another aspect that arose from this chapter is that international 
tribunals rely on donor countries to fund them. Hence, it is of utmost importance that 
tribunals remain free from political influence when deciding who and what to 
investigate, charge and ultimately enter into negotiations. 
Finally, drawing on these conclusions I argue that in order to make the use of 
plea bargaining more uniform and fairer to all, a number of practical initiatives should 
be employed by the international criminal tribunals. The first main recommendation 
derives from the evaluation conducted in this research regarding legal imperialism and 
the rule of law objections in particular the use of discretion, and is, that there needs to 
be an understanding between the three offices of the tribunals, namely, the defence 
associations, the office of the prosecutor, and the judges, as to what parameters should 
be employed during the negotiation process. These parameters may encompass a 
number of things. For example, to date there are no guidelines as to how to initiate the 
plea bargaining process. This will avoid situations that Morris Kallon found himself in 
at the SCSL (Interview with Taku 2010) and Dragan Obrenovic at the ICTY 
(Karganovic, no date). More importantly it will go some way to stop allegations of 
coercion from the prosecution. There may also be parameters established that indicate 
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the amount of discretion a prosecutor may have when deciding what charges shall be 
dropped.  
In this regard, I would argue that that the Indian model of plea bargaining may 
be a useful guide because here there are a number of important caveats. For example, 
in India under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 Chapter-XX1A Section 265-L 
parties are unable to enter into negotiations if the crime is committed against women 
of children below the age of 14 (Gosh 2006). A version of this may be adopted to fit 
and then implemented in international law in a bid to limit the practice of 
overcharging defendants and, at the same time, post conflict communities are not let 
down when the most serious and grave charges are dropped as part of a deal. For 
instance, a rule may be imposed, similar to the Indian model that prohibits plea 
negotiations in charges of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, for example.
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Currently, there are no sentencing guidelines in international tribunals therefore at 
present it is impossible to make suggestions such as there should be a prohibition on 
entering into agreements where the alleged crime is punishable by twenty five years 
or more. The implementation of this new model may also help curb feeling of betrayal 
from the wider population by the tribunals when they engage in charge bargaining, as 
the most serious charges a defendant may be charged with will not be subject to 
charge bargaining regardless of the amount of information the defendant is able to 
give to the OTP. The proposed parameters should help inform the parties as to how 
judges come to their decisions when sentencing, for example how much weight to 
apportion to the different mitigating and aggravating factors. These proposed 
parameters are not aimed to restrict discretion that is involved when engaging in plea 
bargaining. However, they are aimed at enabling defendants make informed decisions 
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and to understand the decision making processes that are involved, hopefully taking 
some of the uncertainty out of the whole process. 
The second main recommendation is to promote legal training for counsel in 
which legal mechanisms such as plea bargaining are discussed in detail and the 
dilemmas they raise are confronted openly and from diverse standpoints.
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 This 
means that counsel will be aware of what plea bargaining is and the nuances and how 
to proceed in plea bargaining. Defence counsel will then be better able to advise their 
clients. There has been some head way with this, defence counsel at the STL have 
already received training (STL Press Release Mach 4 2010). The ICTY Association of 
Defence Counsel have also recently issued a defence manual, in which there is a 
chapter discussing the basics of plea bargaining (O’Sullivan and Zecevic 2011). 
The third recommendation has arisen from the analysis of plea bargaining and 
legal transplant, and that is to increase the dissemination of information regarding plea 
bargaining from the tribunals back to the post conflict communities. This can be done 
through outreach programs.
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 Not only will this inform the communities about the 
outcomes, they should also be informed about the procedures of plea bargaining and 
the role it plays in international justice. If there is to be a successful legal 
transplantation of plea bargaining and therefore any lasting positive effect of the plea 
bargains that take place then there must be some sort community engagement. If there 
is not then plea bargaining will remain a foreign legal practice offering little benefit 
within the post conflict society it aims to help.  
In the early stages of this thesis I laid down a brief explanation of the 
trajectory and history of plea bargaining in the UK. With this in mind and in 
conjunction with the conclusions I have drawn, it would be suitable at this point to 
have some discussion as to whether the use of overt sentence bargaining involving 
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judges would be an appropriate development in international law, as in the UK case of 
Goodyear. To recap, in R v Goodyear [2005] ECA 888, CA it was set out that 
following a request from a defendant a judge may give an indication as to the 
maximum sentence to be imposed after a guilty plea is entered. The judge may also 
remind counsel that the defendant is entitled to this in open court. In light of the 
findings of this thesis I will now briefly discuss if overt sentence bargaining in 
international criminal law would be appropriate.  
Overt sentence bargaining of this kind would of course limit the uncertainty 
and the lack of transparency elements of that the use of plea bargaining raises, as a 
defendant would be able to learn what sentence s/he could expect after entering a 
guilty plea. This on its face would also open up the guilty plea process to the wider 
public, as they would be able to see how the process of sentence reduction takes place, 
why the defendant is receiving such a sentence and seemingly there has not been a 
clandestine meeting between the defence and prosecution to negotiate a sentence. 
Therefore as a result of what I have argued in this thesis overt sentence bargaining 
similar to that put forward by the Goodyear principles seems appropriate.  
Unfortunately, like many areas of international criminal law, things are rarely 
clear cut and what seems sensible and efficient has the potential to give rise to a 
number of other issues if not adapted to fit the arena and purpose they serve. I noted 
in the thesis that at times the crux of the negotiation does not always rest on the 
sentence a defendant may receive. Factors such as family relocation (Kallon; 
Kambanda) are very important to defendants, where they may serve their prison 
sentence (Plavsic) or even negotiations as to whether or not they give evidence in 
other trials (Deronjic; Plavsic) are very important and are at times given more 
emphasis in the negotiation process than sentence length (Interview with Jordash 
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2010). Often these factors are what the negotiation rests on, but they are not within the 
judge’s control and therefore cannot be communicated by them to the defendant. Put 
simply, it is not their decision to make. Another aspect of the Goodyear principles that 
may be problematic is that when a defendant asks what sentence s/he might receive 
upon entering a guilty plea, this has the potential to violate the right to the 
presumption of innocence, especially if the defendant then opts to go to trial. As, in 
theory the defendant would have alerted the judges that they are not guilt free when it 
comes to the charges that they are willing to plead guilty to but are now contesting. 
This issue was discussed in the section relating to the presumption of innocence in the 
rule of law chapter and the case of Kunarac was used as an example. Another serious 
issue that might be arise is if after asking for a sentence indication a defendant choses 
to plead not guilty, this is problematic as one can imagine the effect that this may have 
on post conflict societies. Victims may feel aggrieved that the defendant is now 
reneging on the acknowledgement of the crime they perpetrated on them and their 
communities this may also lead to mistrust in the institution. 
The issues that are dealt with international criminal tribunals vary in degrees 
of sensitivity, the most sensitive issues being dealt with in private session. When it 
comes to plea bargaining the Plavsic case illustrates this, I refer to the fact that the 
prosecution felt that the information in the case was so sensitive that a ‘wall’ had to be 
put up between members of the defence team (Interview with Murphy 2010). It 
possibly would not be appropriate to have overt sentence bargaining when the actual 
plea bargain would also be subject to rigorous and secret negotiations by the defence 
and prosecution, of which the judges are unaware of when issuing the expected 
sentence. Therefore, although the Goodyear principles can help solve some of the 
issues and controversies that arise in this research it brings with it another set of issues 
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and controversies which would make this a difficult development to implement. If it 
was to be implemented, as I have argued in the section relating to legal transplants it 
would need to be adapted in a way to best fit the international system and its many 
facets. 
Of course, the findings, reflections and proposed recommendations of this 
thesis are not aimed to act as a panacea to the issue of plea bargaining in international 
criminal law. They only aim to add to the study already done and, through the 
interview responses, aim to give a more nuanced idea of what plea bargaining can 
actually offer the international community. With the increased globalization of 
international criminal justice and the changing landscapes and political contexts  in 
that international trials occur it is clear that there is still much more study to be done 
in this area in order to provide a definitive evaluation of plea bargaining. Further 
study in this field that I have identified includes the role of civil party groups
152
 in 
negotiating guilty pleas. Although touched upon in this thesis, an in depth study of 
plea bargaining and legal indeterminacy in the international context would also help 
create a more sound understanding of the wider subject matter. 
 Plea bargaining in war crime tribunals will of course always remain 
controversial, at least insofar as liberal and anti-imperialist sensibilities remain active 
in this field. With many commentators believing that it is inappropriate, especially in 
relation to the crimes that have been committed and the sheer number of victims that 
persons who commit such acts leave in their wake. But the practical benefits plea 
bargaining brings has enabled it to act as salve to help with the continuing concerns 
regarding the finances and resources of the tribunals. In turn, this has meant that it 
will also be a viable option in which a pragmatic form of justice is done or at least 
optimised in contexts where, given inevitable resources limitations, there can be no 
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ideal solutions. But to quote Weinstein and Stover ‘[J]ustice, like beauty, is in the eye 
of the beholder and can be interpreted in a variety of ways.’ (Weinstein and Stover 
2004:4) What this thesis has achieved is showing how three different interpretative 
perspectives can each, in their own way, highlight relations between justice, 
international legality and plea-bargaining in the context of war criminality in ways 
that remain charged with continuing and still partly unfulfilled relevance to on-going 
debates that show no sign of being exhausted in the near future. 
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03-66); Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor(SCSL-03-1-T); Prosecutor v Alex 
Tamba Brima (SCSL-04-16-ES); Prosecutor v Bruno Stojic (IT-04-74); Prosecutor v 
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Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09); Prosecutor v Abdullah Banda and Saleh Jerbo (ICC-CPI-
20110308-PR635). 
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(STL-11-01). 
 
4 HHJ Peter Murphy’s cases included: Prosecutor v Esad Landzo (IT-96-21); 
Prosecutor v Plavsic (IT-00-39/40); Prosecutor v Bruno Stojic (IT-04-74); Prosecutor 
v Blagoje Simic (IT-95-9); Prosecutor v Haradin Bala (IT-03-66). 
 
 5 Chief Charles Taku’s cases include: Prosecutor v  Laurent Semanza (ICTR-97-20); 
Prosecutor v Francois-Xavier Nzuwonemeye (ICTR-00-56-T ); Prosecutor v Morris 
Kallon (SCSL-04-15-A). 
 
6 Sir Geoffrey Nice QC’s cases include: Prosecutor v Kordic (IT-95-14/2); 
Prosecutor v Jelisic (IT-94-10); Prosecutor v Milosevic (IT-02-54). 
 
7 Mr Slobodan Zecevic’s cases incude: Prosecutor v Milan Simić (IT-95-9/2); 
Prosecutor v Momir Talić (IT-99-36/1); Prosecutor v Miroslav Deronjić (IT-02-61); 
Prosecutor v  Milan Milutinović (IT-0-87); Prosecutor v Mićo Stanišić (IT-08-91). 
 
 
Methodology 
 
8 Consider for example Roger Cotterrell’s claim that: 
 
All the centuries of purely doctrinal writing on law has produced less valuable 
knowledge about what law is, as a social phenomena, and what it does than the 
relatively few decades of work in sophisticated modern empirical socio-legal 
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studies… Socio-legal scholarship in the broadest sense is the most important 
scholarship presently being undertaken in the legal world. Its importance is not 
only in what it has achieved, which is considerable, but also in what it 
promises. (Cotterrell 1995: 296, 314) 
 
9 When talking about evaluation it is noted by way of reference that there is a 
scholarship related to evaluation known as, Evaluation Studies. The very basic aim of 
this particular discipline is to assess information and provide feedback (Leeuw 2011). 
This particular area of study has been described by Scriven as a ‘transdiscipline’. He 
used this term to indicate that theories, research designs and methods from disciplines 
like psychology, economics, sociology, public administration, and statistics and, to 
some extent, law, have merged into a field, called evaluation studies (2008: 65-66). 
Although this thesis employs a number of different methodologies to evaluate plea 
bargaining it does not it is here were the similarity ends.  
  
10 This is particularly evident in the chapter dealing with legal imperialism. 
 
11 Henham and Findlay (2007) discuss this in relation to analysis of the trail process 
in more detail. 
  
12 Again this is most evident in chapter which discusses plea bargaining in relation to 
legal imperialism. Here much of the chapter is devoted to the explanation of the 
development of plea bargaining in the various international criminal tribunals in order 
to explore the issues relating to plea bargaining and legal imperialism. 
 
13 Recently Rauxloh (2012) has conducted qualitative regarding plea bargaining, but 
her focus was on the Former GDR.  
 
14 I stress that I complied with the university research ethics at all times. I respected 
the confidentiality of the interviewees. 
 
15 Examples of such reasons are, they were still involved in aspects of cases that may 
be bought up during the interview, the office that they worked for did not allow them 
to be interviewed, they had their own personal reasons why they felt it would be 
‘unethical’ to be interviewed. 
 
16 Civil Parties are victim groups that are participating in the trial proceedings, they 
are usually represented by counsel. 
  
17 By this I mean that the interviewees came from a different range of professional 
legal backgrounds. For example defence counsel, the OTP, legal officers.  
 
18 This also ensured that there was little to no issues surrounding snowballing. That is 
Interviewees give the names of other potential interviews with the same viewpoints as 
them (Dobinson and Johns 2007: 56).  
  
19 For an example of this see Turner (2010). 
 
20 For an illustration of semi-structured interviewing in a sociolegal project see 
Sawyer (2000). 
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21 On occasion this did not happen as it was the interviewee who initiated the 
interview process and I had to find a way to ask questions in a way that would still 
allow them to discuss the issues they wanted to tell me about on their own terms as 
well gain the information required for this thesis. 
 
22 Lindlof and Taylor (2002) assert that the specific topic or topics that the 
interviewer wants to explore during the interview should be thought about in advance. 
It is generally beneficial for interviewers to have an interview guide prepared, which 
is an informal grouping of topics and questions that the interviewer can ask in 
different ways for different participants depending on their background and 
experiences.  
 
23 The clearest example of this is the issue of plea bargaining and legal imperialism. 
A number of the interviewees gave responses that indicated that there is the potential 
for a form of legal imperialism. 
 
24 Examining plea bargaining in international tribunals through the rule of law and 
utilitarianism and examining the finding of each analysis through the lens of the other 
one. 
 
Chapter 1 
 
25 See also Prosecutor v Rutaganda ICTR-96-3 Judgement and Sentence, 6 December 
1999) and Prosecutor v Serushago (ICTR-98-39-S Sentence 2 Febuary 1999 para 20). 
 
26 These distinctions of the different forms of plea bargaining are discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter. It should be pointed out that in general plea bargains contain 
aspects of all three of nuanced versions of the phenomenon. Usually it is very difficult 
to distinguish what exact form of negotiation has taken place due to the secretive 
nature of plea bargaining. 
 
27 This case was specifically dealt with by sentence and charge bargaining. 
 
28 This case featured aggressive charge, sentence and fact bargaining. 
 
29 Although ensuring the safety of a defendant’s family does not come under the 
three headings of the different types of plea bargaining it has proved to be a popular 
method used by the prosecution to entice defendants to plead guilty. This is discussed 
later on in the thesis. 
 
30 It is unclear whether this particular charge was dropped due to charge bargaining, 
or if there was a lack of evidence. 
 
31 This case was not dealt with by way of a plea bargain, although the defendant 
pleaded guilty it was by way of confession. 
 
32 Jhoni Franca pleaded guilty to four counts of imprisonment and one count of 
torture as a crime against humanity. The prosecution withdrew one count of 
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persecution and two counts of inhumane acts, as these charges were covered by the 
one that he had pleaded guilty to. 
 
33 Sabino Leite pleaded guilty to torture, three counts of imprisonment and other 
inhumane acts. Again, as in the case of Jhoni Franca the persecution charges were 
withdrawn and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. 
 
Chapter 2 
 
34 These three distinctions are discussed in greater detail below. 
 
35 It is noted that truth telling and retribution are some of the aspirations of 
international criminal tribunals. 
 
36 For more on command responsibility see Mundis (2003). 
 
37 Note that both of these defendants did not enter into plea negotiations even though 
they entered guilty pleas. 
 
38 This particular case was dealt by sentence bargaining and charge bargaining. The 
initial rape charge were the defendant was accused of raping a teenaged girl nearly 
every night for two months was replaced with a more general charge of rape where 
the defendant facilitated the rapes of other women and girls (Prosecutor v Dragan 
Nikolic IT-94-2-PT Second Amended Indictment, para. 21-22 January 7 2002). 
 
39 This case involved all three types of plea bargain. Four of the initial counts that the 
defendant was charged with were removed and he pleaded guilty to one count of 
persecution. It was also agreed that the OTP should recommend a sentence of eleven 
years imprisonment (Plea Agreement para 4 January 22 2004). The factual statement 
that was present to the court not only contained information that implicated the 
defendant in the charge he pleaded guilty to it also contained assertions that 
minimised his involved in the commission of the crime (Factual Statement para 4 
January 22 2004). 
 
40 The accused admitted his guilt on all twelve counts contained in the third amended 
indictment and agreed to testify in other proceedings before the Tribunal. A written 
factual basis describing the crimes and Ranko Češić’s participation in them was 
annexed to the plea agreement (October 28 2003). It would seem that this defendant 
benefited greatly from a sentence discount as his co accused, Goran Jelisic received 
forty years imprisonment.  
 
 
Chapter 3 
41 Fecundity to Bentham meant the chance the same kind of pleasure or pain may be 
repeated. Purity meant the chance the act in question not being followed by the 
opposite sensation, and by extent he meant the number of people who would 
experience the pleasure or pain. (Mcleod 2005: 165) 
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42 In a telephone interview with the former Chief Prosecutor of SCSL Professor 
David Crane stated that, although the SCSL had not actually disposed of a case 
through plea bargaining he believed that the use of plea bargaining in war crime 
tribunals aids the efficient running of the tribunal, speeding up the process (Interview 
with Crane 2009). 
 
43 This is also true for international criminal tribunals, as it is the money from the tax 
payers from the donor countries that is donated to these tribunals. 
 
44 Jorgensen also highlights the practical benefits of plea bargaining, saying, ‘it may 
be stated tentatively that the guilty plea has come of age, which represents a triumph 
for pragmatism.’ (Jorgensen 2002: 407) 
 
45 This may raise concerns that the prosecution may start to use coercive methods to 
pressurise defendants to plead guilty and entering into negotiations. This is discussed 
in more depth further on in the thesis. 
46 Damir Dosen and his two co-defendants, Dusko Sikirica and Drazen Kolundzija, 
all pleaded guilty to persecution as a crime against humanity each admitting to 
varying degrees of culpability and methods. It is clear that the plea agreements limited 
the responsibilities of the defendants, which would be in line with a fact bargain. The 
plea agreements also set out a maximum sentence recommendation by the prosecution 
pursuant to a sentence bargain (Admitted Facts Relevant to the Plea Agreement of 
Drazen Kolundzija, September 4 2001: Paragraph 3; Admitted Facts Relevant to the 
Plea Agreement of Damir Dosen, September 6 2001: Paragraphs 8-10; Joint 
Submission of the Prosecution and the Accused Dusko Sikirica Concerning the Plea 
Agreement and Relevant Facts, September 6 2001: Paragraph 8-10).     
  
47 Although an economic analysis of plea bargaining is important, it does not feature 
in this thesis. For more general study of the economic analysis of plea bargaining see 
Oren Bar-Gill and Oren Gazal-Ayal (2006); Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar 
(2007); Limor Riza and Oren Gaal-Ayal (2009). 
 
48 It is noted that the construction of a truthful historical record is one of the aims of 
the international tribunals, as discussed earlier in this thesis. 
 
49 For example, receiving mitigation in the way of a sentence reduction for 
expressing remorse does not fit into the just desert theory put forward by Von Hirsch, 
who argues that punishment should be assessed objectively and must be based on the 
degree of harm and offender blameworthiness, with remorse only becoming relevant, 
(if at all) the post sentencing stage (Von Hirsch,1993: 72; Henham, 2005:105).  
 
50 In Plavsic’s sentencing judgement it was said ‘indeed, it may be argued that by her 
guilty plea Mrs Plavsic has already demonstrated remorse.’ (IT-00-39 & 40/1-S: Para. 
73) 
 
51 The mitigation a defendant may receive does not necessarily have to take the form 
of a sentence reduction. It could be an agreement on where the defendant serves their 
sentence, and protection and relocation for the defendant’s family (Interview with 
Khan 2010; Prosecutor v Kambanda; Prosecutor v Bagaragaza). 
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52 The facts of the RUF case and the attempted plea bargains in this case are 
discussed in the chapter about legal imperialism. 
 
53 Judge Cassese has said that he would think that it would be ‘very good if it was 
allowed for a judge to go and talk to an accused before sentencing. A two-hour talk 
between human beings, off the record, about what he felt at that time. I would want to 
know whether somebody is genuine, and maybe thought twice about what he did.’ 
(Stuart and Simons, 1999: 88) 
 
54 There may be some scope for this if there is a conceptualisation of criminal system 
that is based more on restorative principles. This is important and requires much more 
analysis, unfortunately this is outside the remit of this particular research. 
 
55 This case involved an aggressive form of charge bargaining, as well as a sentence 
bargain that resulted in a dramatic sentence reduction. For his part of the agreement he 
cooperated openly with the prosecution and it was agreed that he would not be 
charged with any crimes relating to Srebrenica. 
56 Former Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY and ICTR Carla Del Ponte reiterates 
Blewitt’s assertions in an address to the NATO parliamentary Assembly stating that, 
‘the Tribunal was established as a measure to restore and maintain peace and promote 
reconciliation.’ (Del Ponte 2007) 
 
57 Sir Desmond De Silva recounted a potential problem with the TRC, ‘one defendant 
wanted to give evidence before the TRC after being indicted’ De Silva had to step in 
and advise the defense counsel not to allow their defendant to do that as, ‘it would be 
inevitable that the prosecutor would have the right to that material.’ (Interview with 
De Silva 2010) This is despite assurances that any evidence given in the TRC would 
not be used to prosecute a person (Interview with Crane 2009; Interview with De 
Silva 2010). 
 
58 The idea of equality before the law is discussed in detail in the Rule of Law section 
of this thesis 
 
59 For more on this argument also see Bohlander (2001) and Waspi (2000).  
 
60 This of course is more in keeping with the restorative aims of international 
criminal law. 
 
61 Victim participation has been part of the ECCC’s and will be part of the STL’s 
trial proceedings. 
 
62 The ICC as stated above may ask that victims/witnesses testify. This does not 
mean that they are able to participate in the actual negotiations, and this only states 
what the court may do, it is not under obligation to call victims/witnesses to testify. 
This was also the case in Medlin v State (208 S.E. 2d 648 (S.C. 1981)). 
 
63 This is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this thesis. 
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64 Although this would increase the requirements of transparency that is required 
under contemporary legal systems, it I widely accepted that in war crime tribunals that 
there will be an element of evidence/information given by defendants that must be 
kept confidential. 
 
65 This kind of thinking seems to have fallen out of favour with the prosecutors at the 
ICTY. This can be evidenced by their refusal to drop charges in Karadzic’s case, as 
Marko Hoare put it, ‘With Biljana Plavsic barely punished [and] given early release, it 
would be very wrong to yet again compromise and take the easy option and let off one 
of the few key perpetrators who hasn’t been brought to justice [and] actually trim his 
indictment further. How many more times are the victims going to be let down?’ 
(Jennings, 2009: np) 
 
Chapter 4 
 
66 For a critical response from the left to E. P. Thompson’s work, see (Horwitz 1977). 
 
67 According to John Stuart Mill, ‘men are born and always continue free and equal 
in respect to their rights’ (1989: np). It is only when each person is given equal respect 
and treatment under the law that any notion of justice can be obtained. 
 
68 The centrality and importance of the above concept of the rule of law can be found 
in John Locke’s Second Treaties of Government. Locke’s notion of liberalism was 
inherently legalistic and he observed that ‘where-ever law ends, tyranny begins’ 
(1980: 103). distinguishing the rule of law as the, ‘Freedom of men under government 
is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to everyone of that society, and made 
by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, 
where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, 
unknown, arbitrary will of another man.’ (1980: 17)  
 
69 This can be traced back to  Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta which states, 
No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised of his Freehold, or 
Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise 
destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful 
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. (Tamanaha, 2004: 26) 
Thus requiring the Monarchy to obey the law and also limiting the extent to which the 
Monarchy could change the law. 
70 Ex post facto or retroactive law is one that punishes certain conduct or individuals 
retrospectively. With the possibility of criminalising an action that was legal when 
conducted. 
 
71 Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither 
of them consist with ends of society and government, which men would not quit the 
freedom of the state of nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve 
their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure 
their peace and quiet ... [F]or all the power the government has, being only for the 
good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at both the people may now 
their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept 
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within their bounds...’ (Locke 1980: 72) Here Locke gives a concise blueprint for 
legal liberty as well as for constitutional governance, one where the attainment of 
certainty and predictability advances the idea of equality before the law in the rule of 
law ideology. 
 
72 This is discussed more generally in Rauxloh (2011: 5). 
 
73 Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) is a legal doctrine in international law to prosecute 
war crimes. The JCE doctrine considers each member of an organized group 
individually responsible for crimes committed by group within the common plan or 
purpose. 
 
74 This may be due to negotiations that took place concerning the sentence 
recommendation, which would result in a sentence bargain. 
 
75 It is alleged by one of Jelisic’s lawyers that the defendant pled guilty over his 
lawyers’ objections on the mistaken belief that his guilty plea would be considered as 
substantial cooperation with the prosecution (Combs, 2007: 62).  
 
76 It may be the case that lower ranking perpetrators commit the majority of the most 
serious offences such as murder and rape during times of conflict, as lower ranking 
perpetrators are unable to provide as much incriminating information. Therefore the 
policy criteria for the tribunals is that most of the attention and the priority need to be 
redistributed to senior officials, with the useful information, but this should be done to 
a justifiable scale. 
 
77 See also Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolic (IT-94-2-S), 18 December 2003, Para 46. 
 
78 It could be argued that a justice system based on retribution will perceive this as 
acceptable, as some punishment is being meted out. 
 
79 Plavsic was granted early release in October 2009. 
 
80 Wayne Jordash, who was lead defence counsel for Issa Hassan Sesay at the SCSL 
(Case No. SCSL-04-15-T), alleged in an interview with Dutch radio that the 
prosecution witnesses were paid to give evidence at his client’s trial 
(http://www.rnw.nl/int-justice/article/trial-legal-principle). 
81 This does not mean that defence counsel will be able to represent the clients 
effectively, as they may also be influenced by outside personal and professional 
pressures. An example of this is where the defence counsel in the Sierra Leone plea 
bargaining case had to leave Freetown on the same date the plea agreement was 
agreed to be signed. This case was discussed in the Introduction and Historical 
Background section (Interview with Crane 2009). 
 
82 For more general discussion of the presumption of innocence at the ICTY see Guy-
Smith (2011: 9-21). 
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83 For a more general discussion of the issues regarding the presumption of innocence 
when plea bargaining or guilty pleas are involves see Ashworth (1998: 288-292) and 
Ashworth (2006). 
 
84 Rule 98(B) of the ICTY RPE provides that the Trial Chamber may take judicial 
notice of facts or documentary evidence from other proceeding which relate to matters 
in the current proceedings. 
 
85 This issue was raised in the case of Prosecutor v Milosevic (IT-02-54). 
 
86 See Ashworth (1998: 286-292) for discussions regarding due process issues in the 
context of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
87 This would also be counterproductive for the international courts to fulfil their 
truth telling aims. 
 
88 It should be noted that Strugar was sentenced to seven and half years for the crimes 
he was found guilty of. 
 
89 For more information on this matter D’amato (2000) goes into detail about his own 
experiences with plea negotiations at the ICTY and this may shed some more light on 
this matter. 
 
90 Details of this case can be found in the Introduction and Historical Background 
section. 
 
91 An example of this can be found in the case of Turner, which has already been 
discussed, which deals with the issue of undue pressure to plead guilty. 
92 These arguments also form the basis for the ‘equality of arms’ arguments, 
discussed above. 
 
93 For more general information on this matter see Ashworth (1987) and Jodoin 
(2010) for more information on decision making in international criminal law. 
 
94 For more analysis of decision making see Ewald (2010). 
 
95 There is much discretion involved in criminal proceedings. Starting firstly with the 
prosecutor who has a vast amount of discretion, as it is s/he that decides what charges 
to being against an accused and up to a point the facts that are relevant to the 
commission of the alleged crime. They also decide whether to enter into plea 
negotiations with the defendant or not.  After a certain point in the criminal 
proceeding the prosecution lose their discretionary powers, as they are transferred to 
the judges presiding over the case. The main crux of a judge’s discretion surrounds 
the enviable judgment that has to be given. Unlike the prosecutor who had many 
choices, judges only have two choices, is the defendant guilty of the charges brought 
against him/her or not? They come to this decision from a vast range of opinions and 
competing interpretations concerning the facts of the case and the laws and rules that 
govern these facts as well as the procedure in which the trial is conducted. The main 
aspect of the judge’s discretion surrounds the sentencing stage of the proceedings. 
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They are able to decide on what sentence best fits the crimes the defendant have been 
found guilty of, in the case of plea bargaining they do not have to follow the sentence 
recommendations given to them by the prosecution.  
The study of the discretion in international criminal tribunals is an interesting and 
important one. Unfortunately much of the issues that pertain to this area of study falls 
outside of the scope of this research, which is only able to deal with issues of 
discretion and plea bargaining. 
 
96 For more on this concept see Dukic (2007). 
 
97 Khan was worked for both the Prosecution and Defence in international war crime 
tribunals, such as the ICTY, ICTR, ECCC, SCSL, the Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes of the District Court of Dili, and the ICC. 
 
98 Although Sir Desmond De Silva QC stated that when it came to recommending a 
sentence he would be willing to recommend a reduction off a third, in exchange for a 
guilty plea and cooperation with the prosecution (De Silva, 2010). 
 
99 Langbein  points out that earlier versions of the adverserialial trial process objected 
to the use of guilty pleas as it was thought that this would result to loss of any 
mitigating evidence that would otherwise to available to the court (2003: 20). 
 
100 As M. Cherif Bassiouni states, ‘The idea that penalties should fit the offender and 
not the offence was not new, and it had its roots in canon criminal law, which 
expressly permitted analogy in the imposition of penalties.’ (Bassiouni, 1996: 132) 
 
101This broadly comes under the subject heading of Legal Indeterminacy. The law 
itself doesn’t produce a single right answer, there is often more than one right answer 
giving contradictory outcomes. Leading to the assumption that decisions made by 
legal professionals, such as, judges and lawyers are influenced by external extra legal 
factors other than these legal rules, thus making the law indeterminate. Legal 
Indeterminacy is a very wide and interesting and much needed area of study 
especially in the examination of plea bargaining. However it is outside the remit of 
this particular thesis and the general issues described above are there merely to 
illustrate a point rather than offer an in depth analysis.  
 
102 It should be noted that the tribunals do actually employ medical professionals to 
determine the mental state of defendants and to determine the genuiness of their 
contrition. 
103 Although the presence of negative aggravating factors may negate any mitigation 
given, but the whole idea would be that defendants and their counsel would 
understand more clearly how much weight and consideration is given to each factor as 
well as how it would be applied. This would then enable counsel to advise their client 
and the defendant to be able to make decisions with confidence.  
 
104 Although at the international level one could still not give a definitive benchmark 
to what remorse is there would instead be a ‘well-crafted vague standard’ (Raban 
2010: 186) that will help refute uncertainty allowing lawyers to advise their clients 
confidently and for defendants make more informed decisions.  
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105 For more information see Schmitt (1996) and Beiner et al (1999). 
 
106 Chief Taku stated:  
The Indictment against Laureant Semanza whom I defended at the ICTR 
alleged that he perpetrated the crimes of Genocide, Complicity to Commit 
Genocide, Conspiracy in Genocide, Crimes against humanity, extermination, 
Torture, murder, Article 3 to the Geneva Convention and additional Protocol 
2; in all 14 Counts, with Paul Besengimana and Juvenal Rungambarara. 
Finally Semanza was tried separately because the other two had not been 
arrested. However, the allegations against them were retained in Semanza’s 
indictment. Semanza was tried and convicted to 25 years at trial level, 
increased to 35 on appeal. However, the two others made plea bargains with 
the Prosecutor who dropped the charges of Genocide against them. The plea 
bargains agreement also indicated that they were did not perpetrate the alleged 
acts of genocide, complicated in genocide or conspiracy with Semanza as 
alleged. They confessed to lesser crimes and were sentenced to very lenient 
sentences of about 12 years each. Rugambarara admitted to command 
responsibility as well as Paul Besingimana, none actually incriminating 
Semanza in any serious way. (Interview with Taku 2010) 
 
107 Note that the interview responses show that the trial professionals believed that 
this particular right is better enforced and protected in the international arena that the 
domestic one.   
 
108 Liberalism is not concerned with the aims and functions of the tribunals, only that 
they reach these aims in fair and open manner that adheres to equal rights and due 
process principles that are the foundation of such criminal tribunals. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
109 The term ‘lawfare’ currently does not have an official definition but the use of the 
word generally means at least for this thesis, the use and implementation of Western 
laws and judicial systems to achieve strategic military or political ends. 
110 An example may be seen in East Timor. In East Timor conflict resolution usually 
takes place in the form of a village meeting, where the perpetrator aims to restores the 
social balance through community work or by paying a fine. The fine itself can take a 
number of different forms, for example it can be paid with livestock, land or money 
depending on the nature and seriousness of the crime, but the main focus of the 
process is reconciliation (Kerr and Mobekk 2007: 169). 
111 It should be noted that this is one of the main roles that international criminal law 
plays in the global community. 
 
112 Such as Volkerrechliche Formen des Modernen Imperialismus (1933); 
Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit interventionsverbot fur raumfremde Machte 
(1939); Der Nomos der Erde (2003). 
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113 The Monroe Doctrine is a policy of the United States introduced on December 2, 
1823. It stated that further efforts by European nations to colonize land or interfere 
with states in North or South America would be viewed as acts of aggression 
requiring U.S. intervention. 
114 The language used in the rules that govern plea bargaining are looked at later on, 
when discussing legal transplant. 
115 See David Schaeffer’s memoirs for insight into how much influence the USA had 
over the construction of the ICTY and ICTR and their laws (Schaeffer 2011). 
116 For more general information on this matter see Weigend (1992). 
117 For example the STL has introduced the notion of absentia proceedings.  
118 For more on the open-ended characteristics of interpretation of rules and laws see 
Lauterpacht (1978) and more generally Koskenniemi (2005). 
119 Rule 62 has now been replaced by Rule 62 (A)(vi). 
120 This information has been calculated by me from the data available on the 
Tribunals’ websites.  
121 Up until this thesis Kallon’s negotiations with the OTP have not been made 
public. 
122 Quoting then-SCSL Registrar, Robin Vincent’s characterization of the Court as 
not so much, ‘mean and lean’ as it was ‘anorexic’ ( Dougherty 2004: 312). 
123 These negotiations, if successful would have taken the form of sentence and 
charge bargaining.  Chief Taku asserted that in Kallon’s deal not only would the 
sentence be greatly reduced but his family will also be relocated to Canada in 
exchange for a guilty plea and cooperation with the OTP (Interview with Taku 2010). 
In the case of Sesay the defendant told the Trial Chamber about the attempts of 
negotiation stating: 
  
Before my trial the Prosecutor offered me a deal to cooperate with them in 
order to serve only 12 years in jail. The deal was that I should accept that I 
ordered RUF fighters to amputate civilians; I should accept that I was involved 
with raping; I should accept that I agreed with orders to kill civilians in Sierra 
Leone; I should agree that I was involved in 
burning. (Appeals Hearing September 2 2009: 416) 
 
124 For more detail on the initial interviews conducted see VanTuyl (2003). 
125 The coercive nature of the negotiations are discussed in a previous chapter. 
126 Which it should be pointed out where not used in the RUF trial, they were thrown 
out. The only reason there are transcripts of this is because a Voire Dire was held in 
order to eliminate these transcripts from evidence (Prosecutor v. Sesay et al). 
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127 Chief Taku expressed that many Sierra Leonean people did not believe 
defendants Kallon and Sesay should have had charges brought against them, saying, 
‘In Sierra Leone, the people are bitter, very bitter that Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris 
Kallon and Augustine Gbao who opted for the peace process were tried and jailed to 
long terms of imprisonment.’ (Interview with Taku 2010) 
128 This is discussed in detail in the section of the thesis discussing utilitarianism. 
129 Analysis into this aspect of international criminal law may well stem from the 
idea of humanitarian intervention as a form of imperialism and the subsequent legal 
proceedings may be an advancement of this argument. For more on humanitarian 
intervention as imperialism see (Bricmont 2006). 
130 Such models include patteggiamento in Italy and plaider coupable in France.  
131 However it is recognised that duress cannot be a complete defence except in the 
most (unlikely) of circumstances, it is, however, very relevant to mitigation. 
 
132 This case is discussed below. 
133 This particular defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of torture as a crime 
against humanity and the remaining five charges were dropped, seemingly this was 
due to a charge bargain. Also as part of the plea deal it was agreed that. 
134 The ‘defence counsel from an adversarial system’ was Ms Catherine Baen from 
Texas US. 
135 Issues of interpretation seem to be an issue in all international tribunals. Mr 
Zecevic also asserts this. ‘The interpretation in my experience at the ICTY is that it is 
extremely hard if possible at all for Judges to fully and correctly asses the credibility 
of the witness testimony if they don’t speak the language of the witness. The 
interpretation, despite the fantastic job that is done here at ICTY by the interpreters, 
basically removes the witness from the trier of fact.’ (Interview with Zecevic 2011) 
136 For more on witchcraft at the SCSL see Kelsall (2009). For more on witchcraft 
within African cultural practices see Behrand (1999); Jolles and Jolles (2000); Junger 
(2007).  
137 The use and belief in witchcraft is not just an African phenomenon. Cambodian 
forces loyal to the Lon Nol regime in the 1970s were given amulets to protect them 
from the Khmer Rouge (Maguire 2005: 44-45). For more general information on the 
use of magic as cultural and religious practices see Kidd (1995) and Mauss (2006).  
138 It should be noted that in this particular circumstance both Professor Crane and 
Sir Desmond are both very experienced prosecutors and both aware of the cultural and 
traditional practices in Sierra Leone. Professor Crane has a Masters degree in African 
Studies and Sir Desmond is a member of the Sierra Leone Bar and has practiced there. 
If there was a less equipped prosecutor at the time it is almost certain that it would 
have been near impossible to negotiate with defendants who would have such 
diametrically opposite beliefs, let alone being able to evaluate practical legal problems 
that may occur. 
139 The name of the case has not been disclosed to me by either of the prosecutors. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
140 For example, when talking about his experiences  at the ICTR and SCSL Wayne 
Jordash expressed that both institutions had very different practices when it came to 
initiating and carrying out plea negotiations stating that, ‘the problem with the SCSL 
was that there was no process.’ (Interview with Jordash 2010) Also as seen in the 
chapter relating to legal imperialism Chief Taku described the very adversarial 
approach by the prosecution took to enter into plea negotiations (Interview with Taku 
2010). Slobodan Zecevic said that he would not have been able to precede with the 
plea negotiations had he not been assisted by counsel from an adversarial background 
(Interview  with Zecevic 2011). 
 
141 In other words, these analytical models are used primarily to evaluate plea 
bargaining. They also help develop an explanation of plea bargaining from which the 
subsequent evaluation is possible. 
 
142 As illustrated in the ICTY and ICTR case law, such as Plavsic; Obrenovic; 
Bisengimana. 
 
143 This of course is one of the main aims for international criminal justice, to find 
guilt and then punish those who are indeed found guilty. 
 
144 For example the lack of transparency in plea bargain cases such as Plavsic 
(Interview with Murphy 2010) and the lack of equality before the law (Interview with 
Murphy 2010; Interview with Jordash 2010). 
 
145 This goes against the suggestions of many scholars, who advocate that plea 
bargaining should encompass features that are in tune with restorative justice (Combs 
2007; Rauxloh 2011). Such suggestions often disregard the need for equality as set 
out by the liberal rule of law. 
 
146 See for example the chapter relating to legal imperialism. In particular the 
interview responses from Mr Zecevic, former president of the ADC at the ICTY 
where he states that: 
There is no doubt that defence counsel and their clients coming from 
inquisitorial background are seriously disadvantaged in the plea bargaining 
process. In my case except from general knowledge and Jurisprudence I was 
completely unaware of the actual process in technical terms meaning what 
needs to be done, when, how and alike. For these reasons in both my plea 
agreements I had an experience defence counsel from adversarial system who 
was actually running the show from the defence side. (Interview with Zecevic 
2011) 
 
147 Such as it make help form a truthful record of what happened, it may aide 
reconciliation, the consequent punishment helps the tribunals reach their retributive 
purposes. 
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148 This is particularly clear in the RUF trials at the SCSL where neither Kallon nor 
Sesay where sure of the procedure or the ideologies that plea bargaining is based on. 
(Interview with Jordash 2010; interview with Taku 2010) Many of the guilty pleas at 
the Special Panels where it is clear that the defendants do not understand what the 
ramifications of pleading guilty are  (Linton and Reiger 2002: 2). 
 
149  This may also help tribunals achieve their purpose of deterrence, as there would 
be no prospect to negotiate a deal in situations where such charges are bought 
therefore potentially deterring would be perpetrators from committing such crimes, as 
there would be ‘no way out’ from prosecution.   
 
150 Although the issue of legal training was not mentioned specifically in the 
interviews, it can be inferred from some of the responses (interview with Crane 2009: 
interview with Zecevic 2011) that some form of institutional training at an early stage 
would avoid potential problems and complication that may arise through the use of 
plea bargaining. Professor Crane states that the concept of plea bargaining can be 
confusing to both the court personnel’ and it would be a ‘challenge to have judges 
understand what’s going on.’ (Interview with Crane 2009) In this vein Mr Zecevic 
states that: 
After the two pleas I did, I am quite sure that if we were not assisted by 
Ms.Baen it would have been virtually impossible for us to finalize the plea 
agreements. Starting from Proffer agreements to actual negotiation there has 
been so many situations where we were in doubt what needs to be done or how 
we should approach that issue. Therefore, I am sure the outcome and overall 
experience would have been different had we been on our own, without Ms. 
Baen. (Interview with Zecevic 2011) 
These two statements indicate that there should be at least some training when it 
comes to legal mechanisms such as plea bargaining. 
 
151 For more on the role of the tribunals’ outreach programmes see Clarke (2011). 
 
152 Civil Parties are victim groups that are participating in the trial proceedings, they 
are usually represented by counsel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
